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ABSTRACT  
   
This project explores the federal government's efforts to intervene in American 
Indian women's sexual and reproductive lives from the early twentieth century through 
the 1970s. I argue that U.S. settler society's evolving attempts to address "the Indian 
problem" required that the state discipline Indigenous women's sexuality and regulate 
their reproductive practices. The study examines the Indian Service's (later Bureau of 
Indian Affairs) early twentieth-century pronatal initiatives; the Bureau's campaign against 
midwives and promotion of hospital childbirth; the gendered policing of venereal disease 
on reservations; government social workers' solutions for solving the "problem" of Indian 
illegitimacy; and the politics surrounding the reproductive technologies of birth control, 
abortion, and sterilization. Using government records, ethnographies, oral history 
collections, personal narratives and life histories, and Native feminist theory, this 
dissertation documents a history of colonial gendered violence, as well as Indigenous 
women's activism in protest of such violence and in pursuit of reproductive autonomy. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 In 1916, Commissioner of Indian Affairs Cato Sells sent a letter to “every Indian 
Service employee,” encouraging superintendents, physicians, field matrons, and teachers 
to do everything in their power to “Save the Babies.”  Sells presented the Progressive-Era 
pronatal campaign, a response to the health crisis plaguing many Indian reservations, as 
the cornerstone of early twentieth-century federal Indian policy.  “There is something 
fundamental here,” Sells intoned, “We can not [sic] solve the Indian problem without 
Indians.”1  With these words, Sells underscored the urgency of the government’s 
campaign to promote healthier Indian babies, a campaign that hinged on altering Native 
women’s social and biological reproductive practices.  Sells’s call to action highlights the 
centrality of Indigenous women’s reproductive lives in twentieth-century federal Indian 
policy, a point he made explicitly when he proclaimed, “We must begin at the right 
place—not only with the infant at its mother’s breast, but with the unborn generation” in 
the mother’s womb.2 
 “The Indian problem” to which Sells referred was not new to the U.S. government 
in the first decades of the twentieth century, and it would not be solved in the decades 
that followed the Indian Service’s pronatal campaign.  The phrase was actually a 
misnomer. “The colonial problem” is perhaps more appropriate, as the concerns of 
policymakers, social reformers, and government bureaucrats had less to do with Native 
Americans themselves than with U.S. settler society’s objectives regarding land and 
political power in the American West.  This study builds on the work of scholars who 
                                                          
1
 Commissioner of Indian Affairs [Hereafter CIA], Annual Report, 1916, 5. 
 
2
 Ibid. 
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understand American westward expansion as a concerted effort on the part of white 
settlers and the federal government to acquire Indigenous land and to establish a white 
dominion in the region.3   
For much of the nineteenth century, as settlers, missionaries, and soldiers moved 
into Indigenous homelands, “the Indian problem” referred to Indigenous groups’ 
continued presence on desired land.  The preferred solution to this incarnation of the 
problem was violence.  Through a series of “Indian wars” in the latter half of the century, 
the U.S. military battled to exterminate or subjugate Indigenous groups, relegating 
militarily defeated tribes to clearly delineated reservations.  Policymakers presented the 
reservation system that developed in earnest following the Civil War as an “alternative to 
extinction,”  but they understood the system as a temporary solution.4  In these decades, 
policymakers and social reformers envisioned yet another solution: cultural assimilation.  
They optimistically predicted that once government employees convinced Native 
Americans to reject their cultural beliefs and practices, adopt Western attitudes and 
behaviors, and convert to Christianity, American Indians would be transformed into 
American citizens, perhaps within a single generation.5 
The transfer of land from Native to white hands continued after the turn of the 
century, but by this time U.S. settler society was transitioning from appropriating space to 
                                                          
3
 Margaret Jacobs recently called on western women’s historians to “com[e] to grips” with the nation’s 
settler colonial history, and she has modeled this settler colonial framework in her own scholarship.  See 
Jacobs, “Getting Out of a Rut: Decolonizing Western Women’s History,” Pacific Historical Review 79, No. 
4 (2010): 585-604; and White Mother to a Dark Race: Settler Colonialism, Maternalism, and the Removal 
of Indigenous Children in the American West and Australia, 1880-1940 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska 
Press, 2009).   
 
4
 Robert Trennert, Alternative to Extinction: Federal Indian Policy and the Beginnings of the Reservation 
System, 1846-1851 (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1975). 
 
5
 See Frederick Hoxie, A Final Promise: The Campaign to Assimilate the Indians, 1880-1920 (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1984). 
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controlling colonized spaces—and the Indigenous groups who continued to inhabit such 
spaces.  Assimilation remained policymakers’ primary solution to “the Indian problem” 
for much of the twentieth century.  Nineteenth-century assimilationist objectives 
continued through the century’s first decades, permeating almost all aspects of federal 
Indian policy, including the pronatal campaign that Sells championed in the 1910s.  
Commissioner of Indian Affairs John Collier challenged many of the assumptions 
undergirding the government’s assimilation agenda in the 1930s and early 1940s, but 
government employees never abandoned their assimilationist mission altogether.  
Following World War II, policymakers came to view the federal government’s continued 
legal and financial obligations to its Indigenous “wards” as an increasingly urgent 
problem and once again presented coerced assimilation, this time through the forced 
immersion of Native Americans into mainstream society, as the solution.  Although 
ultimately unsuccessful in their attempt to solve “the Indian problem” by eliminating 
Indianness, these officials established a terminationist ethos that influenced federal Indian 
policy through the 1960s. 
In the United States and elsewhere, the ultimate objective of settler societies was 
the acquisition of land for permanent occupation.  In the twentieth century, U.S. settler 
society desired Indigenous land for increased settlement and also for the natural resources 
the land contained.  Furthermore, reservation lands remained a critical base of Indigenous 
political power and cultural and spiritual well-being, and successive generations of 
policymakers and government bureaucrats enacted and implemented policies intended to 
sever Indigenous peoples’ physical and emotional connections to their land.  In this 
sense, settler colonialism differed from “classic” or extractive colonial models, which 
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were primarily characterized by the exploitation of natural resources and local labor 
forces.6   
Yet Margaret Jacobs has persuasively argued that the “distinction between 
extractive and settler colonies should not be seen as a strict dichotomy but as a 
continuum,” as “many imperial enterprises have combined elements of resource 
extraction, forced labor, and the appropriation of land.”7  In the American West, a vibrant 
fur trade and a succession of gold rushes preceded, then often overlapped with, sustained 
settlement.  Although enslaved and immigrant populations served as the nation’s primary 
labor force through much of the nineteenth century, scholars have recently begun to 
emphasize the extent to which twentieth-century federal Indian policy served to create 
and maintain an Indigenous laboring class.8  Furthermore, in both classic and extractive 
colonial settings, colonizers carried out moralizing projects that coexisted with and often 
furthered broader colonial objectives. 
 As scholars have embraced colonialism as a framework for interpreting the 
history of the American West, they have engaged global historiographies of colonialism.  
Gender historians, in particular, have drawn inspiration from scholars around the globe 
working in the field of gender and colonialism.  Much of this recent scholarship owes an 
implicit and often explicit debt to Ann Laura Stoler, an anthropologist of early twentieth-
century Dutch colonial Indonesia, who has called on scholars of colonialism to direct 
                                                          
6
 Patrick Wolfe,  “Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native,” Journal of Genocide Research 8, 
No. 4 (2006): 387-409. 
 
7
 Jacobs, White Mother to a Dark Race, 3. 
 
8
 See Colleen O’Neill, Working the Navajo Way: Labor and Culture in the Twentieth Century (Lawrence: 
University Press of Kansas, 2005); K. Tsianina Lomawaima, “Domesticity in the Federal Indian Schools,” 
American Ethnologist 20, No. 2 (1993): 227-240; and Carol Williams, ed., Indigenous Women and Work: 
From Labor to Activism (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2012). 
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their attention to “the intimacies of empire,” the ways in which ostensibly private 
domains such as sex, marriage, and childrearing have shaped colonial power structures.9  
Cathleen Cahill’s Federal Fathers and Mothers, published in 2011, is a model 
application of the theoretical framework of intimate colonialism to U.S. federal Indian 
policy.  Adopting Stoler’s premise that “intimate familial and sexual relationships were 
key aspects of larger imperial projects,” Cahill argues that policymakers and Indian 
Service employees “sought to transform Native peoples’ intimate, familial ties by 
creating new sets of relationships between the nation’s Indian ‘wards’ and government 
employees,” the latter of whom were intended, as Cahill’s title indicates, to serve as 
surrogate parental figures and model “civilized” behavior.10  Similarly, Rose Stremlau 
adds a critical layer to scholarly understandings of the allotment of Indian land by 
demonstrating that allotment “was an attack on not just the land bases but also the 
intimate lives of American Indian people”; through federal land policies, federal officials 
and social reformers attempted to transform Indigenous families.11 
 Despite this scholarly interest in colonial intimacies, however, the subject of 
biological reproduction in the American West remains understudied.  Drawing inspiration 
from studies of biological reproduction in other colonial contexts, this study extends the 
usual focus on social reproduction to biological reproduction, understood as the labor of 
                                                          
9
 See Ann Laura Stoler, Race and the Education of Desire: Foucault’s History of Sexuality and the 
Colonial Order of Things (Durham: Duke University Press, 1995); and Stoler, Carnal Knowledge and 
Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002). 
 
10
 Cathleen Cahill, Federal Fathers and Mothers: A Social History of the United States Indian Service, 
1869-1933 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011), 6. 
 
11
 Rose Stremlau, Sustaining the Cherokee Family: Kinship and the Allotment of an Indigenous Nation 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011), 18. 
6 
 
conceiving, carrying, and delivering a child, as well as early infant care.12  I argue that 
U.S. settler society’s evolving efforts to solve “the Indian problem” hinged on the 
regulation of Indigenous women’s biological reproduction.  Furthermore, following Lynn 
Thomas, I contend that reproduction became a contentious site of colonial intervention 
because so many people—male and female, white and Native, young and old—displayed 
an investment in Indigenous women’s reproductive practices and also because 
reproduction has been so closely linked to Indigenous women’s sexuality.13 
 Native women’s reproductive practices had long been a source of fascination for 
Euro-American colonizers, who used their perception of Indigenous reproduction to serve 
a number of purposes.  In fact, biological reproduction occupied a central position in 
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Euro-Americans’ understandings of racial difference.  
Patricia Jasen has demonstrated, for example, that eighteenth-century observers proffered 
a “myth of painless childbirth” that distinguished Native women from European women.  
In tautological fashion, these observers then associated painful childbirth with “a higher 
level of human development.”14  
 In the latter half of the nineteenth century, American medical authorities launched 
a campaign to criminalize abortion, which rested in large part on perceptions of race and 
biological reproduction.  Anti-abortion physicians feared that married, middle-class 
                                                          
12
 Two monographs in particular have helped shape my thinking on this subject.  See Lynn Thomas, 
Politics of the Womb: Women, Reproduction, and the State in Kenya (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2003); and Laura Briggs, Reproducing Empire: Race, Sex, Science, and U.S. Imperialism in Puerto 
Rico (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002).  Sociologist Barbara Anne Gurr’s Reproductive 
Justice: The Politics of Health Care for Native American Women, published earlier this year, makes an 
important contribution to the study of Indigenous women, settler colonialism, and reproductive politics.  
Gurr’s focus is primarily on contemporary rather than historical circumstances.  See Gurr, Reproductive 
Justice (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2015). 
 
13
 Thomas, Politics of the Womb, intro. 
 
14
 Patricia Jasen, “Race, Culture, and the Colonization of Childbirth in Northern Canada,” Social History of 
Medicine 10, No. 3 (1997), 388. 
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Anglo-Saxon women were aborting their fetuses, while less desirable races were not.15  
In their effort to convince citizens and policymakers of the urgent need for anti-abortion 
laws, many physicians incorporated reproductive practices into a discourse of 
“civilization” versus “barbarism” that was familiar to Euro-American settlers throughout 
the American West.  One prominent anti-abortion physician, for example, conflated 
abortion and infanticide and pointed to the high rates of these practices in ‘barbarous” 
societies throughout the world—and at home, as he specifically highlighted the 
prevalence of the practice among “several savage people of North America.”16  Anti-
abortionists simultaneously stigmatized Indigenous women and pressured white women 
against terminating pregnancies.  This formulation proved useful for government 
employees working on nineteenth-century Indian reservations.  Bureaucrats used 
Indigenous women’s “primitive” reproductive practices, such as the superintendent of the 
Crow Reservation’s contention that Crow women were “fearfully addicted to abortions,” 
to underscore the urgency of the government’s assimilationist agenda.”17 
“The Simplest Rules of Motherhood” begins in the early twentieth century.  At 
the turn of the century, Euro-Americans’ interest in Indigenous reproduction remained 
largely theoretical, and federal interventions in Indian women’s reproductive lives 
remained indirect.  Almost all Native women continued to give birth much as their 
mothers and grandmothers had before them—at home or in a site constructed specifically 
for childbirth, typically with the assistance of other women.  In the 1910s, however, the 
                                                          
15
 Nicola Beisel and Tamara Kay, “Abortion, Race, and Gender in Nineteenth-Century America,” American 
Sociological Review 69, No. 4 (2004): 498-518.  
 
16
 Quoted in Ibid., 507. 
 
17
 Quoted in Crow, Annual Report, 1915, Superintendents’ Annual Narrative and Statistical Reports from 
Field Jurisdictions of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, 1907-1938, RG75, FILM 3748, Labriola American 
Indian Center, Arizona State University. 
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Indian Service embarked on its first systematic attempt to “medicalize” Indigenous 
reproduction—to bring Native women’s biological reproduction under the purview of 
government-employed medical officers.  The Indian Service’s push for hospital childbirth 
was one facet of Sells’s Save the Babies campaign.  The commissioner instructed 
physicians to prepare reservation hospitals for maternity patients, and he instructed field 
matrons, whose responsibilities included regular visits to Indian women’s homes to 
provide instruction in childcare and the arts of domesticity, to persuade parturient Indian 
women to accept prenatal care and enter the hospital for their confinement.  The Save the 
Babies campaign lasted only five years, but the pronatal programming targeting 
biological mothers facilitated later federal intrusions in Indigenous women’s lives, and 
the campaign was only the beginning of an ongoing effort to alter the location and social 
dynamics surrounding Indigenous biological reproduction. 
The Indian Service’s pronatal campaign paralleled other Progressive-Era well-
baby, or “better baby,” campaigns sponsored by white women’s organizations and 
municipal health departments off the reservation, and the campaign’s emphasis on 
physician-assisted childbirth reflected the American medical community’s anti-midwife 
sentiment in the first decades of the twentieth century.18  The campaign also reflected—
and, Sells and other bureaucrats hoped, furthered—the government’s assimilationist 
agenda by marginalizing extended female kin and attempting to transform biological 
mothers through their love for their children.  But the means and ends of the federal 
assimilation campaign in the 1910s were not what they had been a generation earlier.  
The Indian Service’s failure to achieve the rapid transformation for which policymakers 
                                                          
18
 See Richard Meckel, “Save the Babies”: American Public Health Reform and the Prevention of Infant 
Mortality, 1850-1929 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990); and Judy Barrett Litoff, 
American Midwives, 1860 to the Present (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1978). 
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and social reformers had hoped stripped policymakers of their earlier optimism.  Coupled 
with the rise of scientific racism and the hardening of racial ideologies in the Progressive 
Era, the slow pace of change produced pessimism in policymakers and government 
employees alike.  As Frederick Hoxie has argued, by 1920 something of a federal ceiling 
had been placed on Indian advancement, policymakers concluding that Indians were 
capable of only a second-class citizenship.19 
Through Progressive pronatal initiatives, government employees scrutinized 
Indigenous women, buttressing old tropes and creating new “knowledge” about Indian 
women as mothers.   Early twentieth-century Euro-Americans displayed ambivalence 
toward Native women, as demonstrated by Sells’s assertion that Indigenous mothers 
lacked “the simplest rules of motherhood.”  On the one hand, the assertion evoked 
optimism because rules can be taught, and in this sense Sells reflected both the logic of 
assimilation and Progressive Americans’ faith in the tenets of scientific motherhood.  On 
the other hand, Sells deliberately underscored the depths of maternal deficiency, and, in 
light of his faith in the white field matron’s “motherly solicitude,” he seemed to suggest 
that Indigenous women’s perceived maternal deficiencies were at least in part racial in 
nature.20 
Euro-American ambivalence toward Indian women was not new in this period, 
although the Indian Service’s expanding bureaucratic capacity in the Progressive Era 
facilitated increased interventions in response to negative evaluations.  Nineteenth-
century Euro-American observers characterized Indigenous women as sexually 
promiscuous, sexually exploited by their male counterparts, too powerful within their 
                                                          
19
 See Hoxie, A Final Promise; Cahill, Federal Fathers and Mothers, chs. 8 and 9. 
 
20
 CIA, Annual Report, 1916, 6. 
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communities, and overburdened “drudges,” who toiled day in and day out while Native 
men sat idle.21  At times, social reformers and policymakers espoused these contradictory 
characterizations in the same breath, and their perceptions of Native women had more to 
do with evolving colonial objectives than with Native women’s daily reality.   
These tropes lingered into the twentieth century and informed federal efforts to 
discipline Indigenous women’s sexual and reproductive practices and also to transform 
Indian women into the white middle-class ideal of “civilized” domesticity and 
motherhood.  Indigenous women faced contradictory pressures throughout the early 
twentieth century as well, however, due in large part to competing policy objectives and 
to the destabilizing effects of colonialism.  Reservation poverty made middle-class ideals 
untenable for many Indigenous women and their families and made the extended family 
units Euro-Americans disparaged even more crucial for survival.  Furthermore, 
government employees championed the virtues of the housewife and mother while 
simultaneously pushing young Indigenous women into wage work, most notably as 
domestic servants in white homes.22  
 Much of this study focuses on the 1930s and early 1940s, the period roughly 
coinciding with John Collier’s years as commissioner of Indian affairs.  Scholars 
generally view Collier’s administration as a decisive shift in federal Indian policy.  In 
appointing Collier, a vocal critic of the Indian Service, President Franklin Roosevelt 
signaled his desire for reform.  Collier challenged many of the assumptions behind the 
government’s assimilation agenda.  He reversed the allotment of tribal land, championed 
                                                          
21
 Stremlau, Sustaining the Cherokee Family, ch. 3. 
 
22
 See Margaret Jacobs, “Diverted Mothering among American Indian Domestic Servants, 1920-1940,” in 
Indigenous Women and Work, edited by Carol Williams (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2012): 179-
193. 
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increased (although far from total) tribal autonomy, and advocated greater respect for 
Native cultures.23  Yet many of Collier’s reforms were contested and uneven, and 
reservation employees and Native Americans alike experienced Collier’s administration 
as a period of flux.24 
 Scholars generally have not incorporated gender into their analyses of the Collier 
years, but the few important exceptions, such as Marsha Weisiger’s Dreaming of Sheep 
in Navajo Country, affirm the need for such studies.25  Placing Indigenous women and 
specifically gender and reproductive politics at the center of the analysis, this study 
demonstrates that the Collier years reflect notable continuity with regard to policies such 
as the Indian Service’s efforts to eliminate Indigenous midwifery.  In addition, Collier’s 
policies and reforms affected Native men and women differently.   
 Collier’s vision of tribal autonomy was patriarchal, privileging male-dominated 
tribal governments and tribal councils.  The ongoing colonial effort to impose patriarchal 
social relationships and structures of governance, coupled with the Indian Service’s 
ongoing anti-midwife campaign and Indian women’s increasing use of government 
hospitals for childbirth, destabilized local gendered power structures and pushed 
reproductive issues that  in many Native societies would traditionally have been 
navigated through female networks into the male-centric political sphere.26 Collier also 
                                                          
23
 Kenneth Philp’s professional biography of John Collier remains a highly-regarded interpretation of 
Collier’s years as commissioner of Indian affairs.  See Philp, John Collier’s Crusade for Indian Reform, 
1920-1954 (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1977). 
 
24
 See Wade Davies, Healing Ways: Navajo Health Care in the Twentieth Century (Albuquerque: 
University of New Mexico Press, 2001), ch. 2. 
 
25
 Marsha Weisiger, Dreaming of Sheep in Navajo Country (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 
2011). 
26
 While reproduction was a female-dominated process in most Native cultures, this gender division was 
not universal.  Hopi women, for example, frequently chose  a male relative to assist their deliveries.  See 
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accelerated the introduction of trained social workers to Indian reservations.  Social 
workers first defined and then prioritized “problems” related to “sexual delinquency,” 
“illegitimacy,” and “feeblemindedness.”  In doing so, they introduced a new language to 
policy and social science discourses on Indigenous women, and they facilitated—and 
carried out—further intrusions into Indigenous women’s daily lives. 
The chapters on the 1930s and early 1940s also reveal the extent to which the 
history this study documents is one of colonial reproductive violence.  Scholars and 
activists have produced critical studies of the widespread sterilization abuse that occurred 
in government and contract hospitals in the late 1960s and especially 1970s.27  As these 
studies demonstrate, the sterilization of Indigenous women was often coercive, and at 
times physicians sterilized Native women without their knowledge.  In conceptualizing a 
study that begins with a federal pronatal campaign in the 1910s and concludes with the 
federally-subsidized sterilization of Indigenous women in the 1970s, I originally intended 
to explore the policy developments in the intervening sixty years that might help explain 
these two seemingly disparate campaigns.  In fact, this study’s primary argument on the 
subject of colonial reproductive violence involves continuity.   
I have found evidence of the coercive sterilization of Indigenous women at least 
as early as 1930, and I argue that such sterilizations occurred due to the power of 
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negative tropes of Indian women, colonial power dynamics, and reservation poverty, 
which in itself stemmed in large part from colonial policies and processes.  Scholars have 
largely omitted Indigenous women in studies of eugenic sterilization in the early 
twentieth century.  Nevertheless, the sterilization of Indigenous women in the early 1930s 
coincided with the wave of eugenic sterilization statutes passed at the state level in the 
1920s and the Supreme Court’s ruling on the constitutionality of eugenic sterilization in 
Buck v. Bell in 1927.28  The coercive sterilization of Indigenous women was part of a 
broader assault on Native women’s reproductive autonomy, which also included the 
enforcement of criminal abortion laws on reservations and the marginalization of 
medicine women and herbalists with contraceptive knowledge. 
 The coercive sterilization of Indigenous women and other restrictive reproductive 
policies continued following World War II, even as the direction of federal Indian policy 
once again shifted.  Postwar policymakers rejected Collier’s reforms and enacted a 
number of policies intended to solve “the Indian problem” once and for all by eliminating 
Indianness.  Stripped of their predecessors’ optimism, policymakers once again promoted 
the forced assimilation of Indigenous peoples, this time through the termination of some 
tribes’ legal status and through the relocation of Native individuals and families from 
reservations to urban centers.29 The postwar terminationist ethos altered the way many 
Native Americans received health services.  Following the Indian Transfer Act of 1954, 
the Public Health Service (PHS) rather than the BIA bore the responsibility for Indian 
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health care. In the short term, budgetary cuts and jurisdictional confusion limited 
Indigenous women’s access to reproductive health services on which many of them had 
come to rely, although scholars generally agree that the transfer to PHS was 
advantageous for Indian health care in the long term.30   Despite the persistent problem of 
access, the number of Indian women who gave birth in hospitals continued to grow in the 
postwar period.  At least in some regions, PHS medical officers and physicians at 
contract hospitals coercively sterilized Indigenous women, much as their BIA 
predecessors had before them.  Indeed, by literally eliminating Indians, this form of state 
reproductive violence served policymakers’ terminationist objectives. 
 This study closes with a brief analysis of the reproduction-related policies 
targeting Indigenous women in the late 1960s and 1970s.  The coercive sterilization of 
Indigenous women increased in the 1960s, a consequence of the prevailing terminationist 
ethos and related policies, a backlash against decades of an expanding welfare state, 
growing concerns about global overpopulation, and also likely a response to increasingly 
visible Native political activism.  In the 1970s, the coercive sterilization of Native women 
exploded, both in numbers and in documentation in government and Native sources.  By 
this time, many Americans had come to view sterilization as a legitimate form of birth 
control, and increased legitimacy ironically facilitated coercive uses of the technology.  
Furthermore, the federal government’s growing commitment to family planning 
eventually resulted in the virtual subsidization of sterilization operations for Indigenous 
women receiving government health care.31  As in the decades prior to World War II, it is 
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difficult to quantify coercive sterilizations, but reasonable estimates suggest that between 
the mid-1960s and mid-1970s, medical officers sterilized between twenty-five and forty-
two percent of Native American women of childbearing age.32 
 Physicians offered both social and economic rationales to explain their 
sterilization practices in the 1970s.  They displayed paternalism in arguing that they were 
in fact helping women in impoverished communities limit their family size, even if the 
women themselves could not understand this; they expressed negative stereotypes about 
Native women and Native families; and they believed that their actions were necessary to 
reduce the financial burden on the federal government and on white taxpayers, including 
themselves.33  As this study demonstrates, these explanations reflect attitudes and 
practices displayed by federal employees and health workers throughout much of the 
twentieth century.  When the federal government began pouring money into family 
planning in the late 1960s and 1970s, these long-held attitudes and practices received 
official sanction and financial support.  Also paralleling earlier tactics, physicians, social 
workers, and other government employees used their position as state agents to delineate 
the parameters of consent for Native women seeking reproductive health services by 
limiting women’s access to safe, short-term birth control methods or by making explicit 
or implicit threats regarding future financial assistance for their families. 
 Indigenous women protested against inadequate reservation health services and 
colonial reproductive violence in the decades preceding World War II, but their concerns 
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were generally litigated locally.  Following the war, Indigenous women’s local actions 
gained a national platform.  Through a variety of forums, Native women organized 
around issues of social and biological reproduction.  They protested the history of 
colonial reproductive violence covered in this study as well as the tangled web of policies 
they encountered in the 1970s, which were consistent only in their objective of depriving 
Native communities—and Native women specifically—of their ability to exercise 
reproductive autonomy.  Female Indigenous activists articulated a broad-based 
reproductive rights agenda they labeled “reproductive justice,” and they contended that 
reproduction was inextricably linked to Indigenous peoples’ broader political struggles 
for sovereignty and self-determination.  For these women, the struggle for bodily 
autonomy and recognition of maternal rights was a decolonization project.34  This 
decolonization campaign is ongoing. 
 This study has required the use of a wide variety of sources.  In researching this 
policy history, I examined a two-way stream of Bureau of Indian Affairs records: the 
policy directives Indian Service officials sent to reservations and the reports and 
correspondence of employees charged with implementing policy, particularly social 
workers and field nurses.  I also examined reservation hospital records, which consisted 
of both correspondence and quantitative reports.  While in many ways illuminating, not 
surprisingly government sources have some serious limitations on the topic of colonial 
violence, so I attempted to read these archive sources “along the grain” as well as against 
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it.35  For example, while government sources affirmed that Indigenous women were 
sterilized in the 1930s, it has been impossible for me to determine numbers with any 
precision.  These sources do, however, reveal a good deal about the process by which 
government employees shaped Indigenous women’s reproductive choices.  Throughout 
the study, I use pseudonyms for Indigenous women who are discussed in government 
records but who have not left a public record of their experiences.  When this is the case, 
I use quotation marks when introducing a pseudonym and dispense with them for 
subsequent references.  Early- and mid-century anthropological studies served as another 
source base, albeit a somewhat complicated one.  I have used such studies for the 
ethnographical information they provide on Native cultures, while simultaneously 
analyzing the politics surrounding social science researchers’ production of “knowledge” 
about Indigenous women.   
 As importantly, I have examined Indigenous women’s memoirs, autobiographies, 
and life histories, as well as their interviews as recorded in ethnographers’ field notes.  
Three oral history collections have provided critical insight into Native women’s 
experiences throughout the twentieth century: the Voices of Feminism Oral History 
Project at Smith College in Northampton, Massachusetts, and the New Deal in 
Montana/Fort Peck Dam Oral History Project and the Native American Educators Oral 
History Project, both at the Montana State Historical Society.  As research progressed, I 
at times felt inundated with unexpected pieces, sometimes just scraps, of evidence of 
colonial reproductive violence.  For example, buried among Margaret Mead’s twenty-five 
“case histories” of “delinquent” Omaha girls and women is a tragic if frustratingly vague 
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description of one woman’s story, which might not have stood out to me had I not been 
knee-deep in this research.  Mead notes that the woman in question was married and had 
“four children, all but one died.”  She “then had an operation and was told she could 
never have any more children.”  After hearing this news, Mead reported, the woman 
“went completely to pieces,” and her marriage quickly dissolved.36  Finally, the few times 
I have spoken publicly about this research, Indigenous women have approached me to 
share how this history has affected their own families and close friends.  While these 
private conversations are not cited in this study, they have informed my thinking on this 
painful topic and have served as critical reminders of the continued salience of this 
hidden history in Native families and communities. 
 “The Simplest Rules of Motherhood” is a policy history consisting of five 
chapters.  Chapter One explores the Indian Service’s pronatal initiatives targeting 
Indigenous biological mothers in the 1910s.  Chapters Two and Three examine the 
implementation of federal policy on the Crow Reservation in southern Montana.  Crow 
men and women’s active political engagement and relatively voluminous personal 
testimonies facilitated an exploration of how federal policies were experienced, rather 
than strictly how policymakers and bureaucrats hoped they would operate.  Chapter Two 
examines the politics surrounding biological reproduction on the reservation in the 1930s, 
a decade in which approximately half of Crow women gave birth at the Crow Indian 
Hospital and half gave birth at home with the assistance of trusted women.  Chapter 
Three analyzes the gendered policing of venereal disease on the Crow Reservation in the 
same period, shifting the focus from policies and politics surrounding biological 
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reproduction to the disciplining of Crow women’s sexuality.  Chapter Four examines 
reports made by government social workers in the 1930s and 1940s to demonstrate how 
these trained professionals first defined and then attempted to solve the “problem” of 
unwed Indian motherhood and “illegitimacy.”  Chapter Five considers how postwar 
policymakers’ desire to “get out of the Indian business” shaped policymakers’ and 
bureaucrats’ attitudes toward Indigenous reproduction and limited Indigenous women’s 
access to reproductive health services.  The study concludes with an epilogue that 
addresses the reproductive violence Native women experienced in the late 1960s and 
1970s and Indigenous women’s political activism in pursuit of reproductive justice in 
these decades and beyond.
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CHAPTER 2 
"FOR THE RESCUE OF A RACE": TRANSFORMING MOTHERS AND SAVING 
BABIES, 1912-1918 
Although each of Little Woman’s childbirth experiences had been difficult, she 
feared this delivery, in January 1923, would prove too much to bear.  Hours into the 
painful process and with no end in sight, she became convinced she “absolutely couldn’t” 
give birth to her seventh child.  Thankfully, Little Woman did not experience this 
challenging labor alone.  Rather, as had been the case with the deliveries of her first six 
children, she was attended by her mother Pretty Shield, a respected Crow elder who had 
herself given birth five times and had assisted in each of her daughters’ pregnancies and 
whose knowledge and expertise pertaining to childbirth had earned her the distinction of 
“midwife” within her community.  When Pretty Shield determined that this particular 
delivery posed challenges she could not overcome alone, she called on another female 
midwife, a trusted older neighbor.  The second midwife performed rituals to speed the 
delivery.  After Little Woman gave birth to a daughter, the midwife performed 
postpartum rituals before leaving the infant and the exhausted, yet joyful, mother to 
Pretty Shield’s care.1 
 When Little Woman’s daughter Alma narrated this account of her 1923 birth 
decades later, piecing together an event of which she lacked direct memory, she 
foregrounded her grandmother’s presence and the generational connection it represented: 
“She was with me when I was born.”2  In the days following Alma’s birth, Pretty Shield 
                                                          
1
 Alma Hogan Snell with Becky Matthews, Grandmother’s Grandchild: My Crow Indian Life (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 2000), 27. 
 
2
 Ibid. 
21 
 
likely performed rituals intended to strengthen the bond between her and her 
granddaughter, and Alma spent as much time in her first months with Pretty Shield as 
with Little Woman.3  Crow grandmothers often cared for their infant grandchildren, but 
Alma indicates that her relationship with Pretty Shield was somewhat special, as she 
“became what the Crows call káalisbaapite—a ‘grandmother’s grandchild.’”4  The term 
connotes a deep generational bond; as Alma explains, “I was always with my grandma, 
and I learned from her.  I learned how to do things in the old ways.”5  When Little 
Woman died shortly before Alma’s second birthday, Pretty Shield assumed responsibility 
for Alma as well as for her older siblings.6 
 Alma’s description of the central role played by her maternal grandmother in the 
family’s biological and social reproduction is not uncommon among the memoirs and 
autobiographies of twentieth-century Crow and other Indigenous women.  Alma’s female 
relatives and their contemporaries traditionally navigated reproductive matters within 
extensive female networks, consisting of maternal and paternal relatives, clan members, 
and adopted kin.7  That Little Woman gave birth to Alma in these circumstances in the 
early 1920s speaks to the durability of these networks and relationships.  They persisted 
through decades of federal policy designed to diminish their significance. 
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 This chapter focuses on federal policies targeting Indian women in the decade 
preceding Alma’s birth and specifically on a five-year pronatal campaign the Indian 
Service called “Save the Babies.”8  As the name suggests, the Indian Service initiated the 
campaign in response to the tragic infant mortality rates plaguing many Indian 
reservations.  Faced with inescapable evidence of the poor health outcomes for Indian 
infants and children, policymakers and Indian Service officials understood the pronatal 
campaign as a moral and medical necessity.  As Commissioner of Indian Affairs Cato 
Sells explained, the Indian Service embarked on a campaign “for the rescue of a race.”9  
To save babies, Indian Service programs targeted biological Indian mothers and mothers-
to-be, as Sells and others reasoned that better mothers would produce “better babies.”10 
This almost exclusive focus on biological mothers cannot be explained by 
medical or moral motivations and objectives.  Instead, this focus underscores the 
campaign’s assimilationist foundation, and this chapter approaches the Save the Babies 
campaign as one component of a broader federal assimilation agenda centered on the 
transformation of intimate relationships and familial structures.11  Attributing high infant 
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mortality to maternal deficiency, government employees visited Indian women’s homes 
to provide instruction in proper childcare methods and the domestic arts and sponsored 
baby shows that monitored the extent to which women followed their instructions.  In 
targeting biological mothers, government employees marginalized the older female kin 
who often provided daily childcare, instead privileging a nuclear family model in which 
the biological mother bore the primary responsibility for tending to her home, husband, 
and children.  Indian women who deviated from their prescribed maternal role in the 
nuclear unit were often deemed apathetic, or even negligent, mothers.   
The third component of the campaign, alongside home visits and baby shows, was 
the promotion of hospital childbirth.  The Save the Babies campaign marked the Indian 
Service’s first systematic attempt to medicalize pregnancy and childbirth on Indian 
reservations and more specifically to bring Indian women’s biological reproduction under 
the purview of government medical officers.  In advocating hospital childbirth, Indian 
Service employees disparaged Indian midwifery, a practice that had served as a source of 
prestige and authority for older women in many Native societies.  In touting the 
superiority of overwhelmingly male physicians at government hospitals, the Indian 
Service challenged the social and political structures surrounding reproduction on many 
reservations. As with the Save the Babies campaign more generally, Indian Service 
employees and officials advocated hospital childbirth as a means of implementing 
multiple federal objectives. 
Although this chapter’s primary objective is to outline federal discourse and 
policy, local conditions inevitably influenced how Indian women perceived and 
experienced reservation employees’ efforts.  The next chapter more fully addresses these 
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latter questions through a case study of the Crow Reservation in Montana.  To provide a 
foundation for this examination of local implementation, this chapter likewise 
foregrounds Crow women’s perspectives and experiences.  
 
The Need to Save Babies 
Although evidence suggests that many Indigenous groups remained in relatively 
good health through the middle of the nineteenth century, their confinement on 
reservations following the Civil War, ironically viewed by government officials and 
reformers as an “alternative to extinction,” resulted in a drastic deterioration in Indian 
health.12  On some reservations, the situation reached crisis levels by the turn of the 
twentieth century, as communities struggled to adjust to degraded, unfamiliar living 
conditions and Native healers encountered ailments about which they had no prior 
knowledge.   In the first decades of the twentieth century, social reformers called 
attention to three specific health challenges on reservations: tuberculosis, trachoma, and 
infant mortality.13  To overcome these challenges, and to counter the criticism of its 
oversight often implicit in social reformers’ complaints, the Indian Service waged 
repeated campaigns against tuberculosis and trachoma. The Save the Babies campaign, 
however, occupied an at least symbolically central position in Progressive-Era federal 
Indian policy.  Late-nineteenth-century reformers dedicated unprecedented attention to 
maternal and infant mortality and morbidity, and the publicity they gave to shortcomings 
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in the nation’s provision of maternal and infant health care sparked a public outcry by the 
turn of the century.  States began establishing child hygiene bureaus; reformers founded 
the American Association for the Study and Prevention of Infant Mortality; and, in 1912, 
intensive lobbying by women’s clubs and their allies culminated in the founding of the 
U.S. Children’s Bureau.14 
 Consistent with the Progressive quest for order and faith in scientific objectivity, 
the Children’s Bureau, municipal health departments, and social reform organizations 
worked to determine the nature and scope of the problem by documenting and 
interpreting data on infant mortality.  Infant mortality rates appeared to provide a 
“scientific” measure of overall health and thus facilitated comparisons.  Global 
comparisons yielded results Americans found troubling; the Children’s Bureau’s first 
investigation determined, for example, that the country lagged behind most other 
industrialized nations in infant mortality—ranking eleventh out of twenty—and even 
worse in maternal mortality.15  Officials also increasingly separated domestic infant 
mortality data by region and race, inviting comparisons across demographic groups.16  
Early-twentieth-century field studies on Indian reservations revealed a startling reality; in 
1916, Commissioner Sells reported that “approximately three-fifths of the Indian infants 
die before the age of 5 years.”17  
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 High infant mortality made the health crisis on Indian reservations impossible to 
ignore and seemed to portend the rapid fulfillment of Americans’ longstanding trope of 
the “vanishing Indian.”18  As Indian Service employees, Indian Service critics, social 
reformers, and medical authorities spoke publicly about the poor health outcomes facing 
Indian mothers and infants, society’s moral imperative to improve the health and well-
being of its youth intersected with its moral obligations to the nation’s Indigenous wards.  
As Commissioner Sells frequently reminded his contemporaries, Euro-American society 
could not culturally and morally uplift the “Indian race” if there were no Indians left to 
uplift: “We can not solve the Indian problem without Indians.”19  When President 
William Taft appealed to Congress for additional funding to address the poor health 
conditions on many Indian reservations, he hinted at a moral failure on the part of white 
Americans.  After highlighting the disparity between white and Indian infant mortality 
rates, Taft proclaimed, “As guardians of the welfare of the Indians, it is our immediate 
duty to give to the race a fair chance for an unmamed [sic] birth, healthy childhood, and a 
physically efficient maturity.”20  
 Indian Service officials and employees attributed high infant mortality among 
Indians to three primary culprits: insanitary homes, maternal ignorance, and the persistent 
authority of Indian midwives.  Commissioner Sells argued that overcoming these three 
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culprits required an expansive campaign. The campaign began in “[o]ur Indian schools,” 
where he advocated “added emphasis given to such subjects as home nursing, child 
welfare, and motherhood, the sanitation, arrangement, and management of the home, and 
that nothing reasonable shall be spared to fit every Indian girl for intelligent 
housekeeping and for attractive home-making.”21  Outside the schools, as Sells instructed 
a reservation superintendent, the campaign “involves sanitation and ventilation of the 
homes; cleanliness not only of houses and surroundings but of the person and proper food 
for the child.”  Moreover, it “requires the instilling of respect for the physician, the nurse, 
the field matron, and the hospital, and with it the elimination of the medicine man.”22  
Sells intended to enlist “every Indian Bureau employee” in the noble cause, as “everyone 
can do something by instruction or example . . . by personal hygiene, cleanliness and 
sobriety.” Specifically, Sells emphasized the role to be played by “the physician with his 
science, the nurse with her trained skill, [and] the field matron with her motherly 
solicitude.”23 
 
Saving Babies Through Mothers 
 As a whole, the Save the Babies campaign blended old and new federal policy 
objectives. One important continuity was the government’s conviction that the problem 
of infant mortality should be solved within nuclear family units.  Euro-Americans’ belief 
that the nuclear family represented the most “civilized” familial structure preceded the 
nation’s birth.  For example, by the turn of the eighteenth century, missionaries and 
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British colonial officials were working to impose a nuclear family structure among 
Cherokees in southeastern colonies.24  When, a century later, U.S. policymakers and 
social reformers embarked on a coordinated campaign to transform Indians into 
American citizens, what Rose Stremlau labels a “scathing critique” of Indian families 
undergirded their assimilation efforts.25  Stremlau argues that the privatization of Indian 
land—a cornerstone of late-nineteenth century assimilation policy—was in fact “the 
means to the end of remaking Indian families into the idealized, nuclear type embraced 
by Anglo-Americans at the time.”26  Proponents of allotment tended to focus on the 
policy’s potential for transforming Indian men; private property ownership would 
eradicate Indian men’s shortcomings, namely, an insufficient work ethic and a lack of 
independence, in large part by buttressing their authority within the patriarchal nuclear 
family.27 
 Just three years after Congress passed the General Allotment Act in 1887, the 
Indian Service created a new field position: the field matron.  After allotment physically 
separated Indian families into nuclear households, policymakers and reformers reasoned, 
field matrons supplemented this transformation by teaching Indian wives and mothers the 
domestic duties and gendered practices that assimilation required.  Over two decades 
later, the field matron remained central to the Indian Service’s pronatal campaign, as did 
many of the assumptions that had led to the establishment of the field matron program.  
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As Lisa Emmerich has argued, the Indian Service hoped to mobilize Indian mothers as 
“allies” in the federal campaign to save their babies.28  This strategy made perfect sense 
to Progressive-Era Indian Service officials and employees, who understood the field 
matron’s primary task to be “to bring [Indian women] to civilization through their role as 
mothers.”29  At the start of the program, Indian Service employee Emily Cook explained 
that although the Indian woman was “personally conservative,” “she loves her children 
and will do for their sake what she will not do for herself.”30   
This view gained currency with increasing awareness of the poor health outcomes 
among Native children, but it was also supported by broader cultural developments.  As 
Molly Ladd-Taylor argues, “Motherhood was a central organizing principle of 
Progressive-era politics.”  In the first decades of the twentieth century, motherhood 
became “inextricably tied to state-building and public policy” and occupied a central 
position in both male and female political rhetoric.31  Indian Service officials’ decision to 
frame the Save the Babies campaign in a way that specifically targeted Indian mothers 
reflected Euro-American cultural assumptions, a continuation of institutional objectives 
(and perhaps an overly generous assessment of the success of earlier, similar endeavors), 
and a new means of achieving “the wholesale redefinition of native family life.”32  
 Native peoples valued motherhood as well, and to an even greater extent than in 
contemporary Euro-American society, a woman’s status as a mother connoted varying 
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levels of cultural and political authority.  Menstruation (indicative of a woman’s capacity 
for biological reproduction), pregnancy, childbirth, and motherhood reflected Indian 
women’s power as the givers of life.  As Agnes Deernose, a Crow woman, explained to 
ethnologist Fred W. Voget, women’s association with “reproduction, nurturance, growth, 
and population increase” ensured their central role in Crow ceremonial life.33  Theda 
Perdue likewise found that motherhood was not a “trite sentimentality” among 
Cherokees; rather, Cherokee women “invoked motherhood as the source of their power 
and used their status as mothers to make public appeals.”34  Furthermore, the respect 
accorded to mothers was not limited to matrilineal societies like the Crow and Cherokee.  
Although Euro-Americans disapproved of the gendered division of labor common to 
most Indigenous groups, Native societies recognized that women’s biological and social 
reproductive labor was crucial to the perpetuation and survival of their communities. 
 Yet these similarities obscure critical differences between Euro-American and 
Native understandings of mothers and motherhood.  For most middle-class Euro-
Americans, the term “mother” referred to an immediate biological relationship, whereas 
in many Native societies, “mother” signified a social, rather than exclusively biological, 
relationship, and children had many “mothers.”  Cherokee and Crow children, for 
example, referred to some female relatives and female clan members as “mothers.”35 Left 
Handed, a Navajo, reported a similar manner of reckoning within his community: 
“‘Mother’ refers to a great many other women besides one’s real mother.”   “In fact,” as 
the editor of Left Handed’s autobiography explained, “wishing to distinguish his mother 
                                                          
33
 Voget, They Call Me Agnes, 26. 
 
34
 Perdue, Cherokee Women, 55. 
 
35
 Perdue, Cherokee Women, 47; Voget, They Call Me Agnes, 83. 
31 
 
from among all these other women, who stand in different relationships to him and are 
also called mother, a Navaho must state explicitly, ‘my real mother,’ or use some such . . 
. phrase as, ‘she who gave me birth.’”36  Many Native cultures relied on a childrearing 
system that I call flexible mothering.  While the system varied in both theory and practice 
among different communities, flexible mothering was not bound by nuclear structures 
and instead incorporated communal childrearing practices, informal adoption procedures, 
and kin networks capable of mitigating the potentially disruptive effects of hardship and 
loss. 
 In her widely-acclaimed fictionalized depiction of nineteenth-century Lakota 
society, Native anthropologist Ella Cara Deloria notes that within the camp circle, “all 
adults were responsible for the safety and happiness of their collective children.”37  
Throughout the novel, however, Deloria makes clear that within this communal 
childrearing environment, grandmothers played a special role.  As a young girl, 
Waterlily, Deloria’s central character, spends as much time in her grandmother’s home as 
her mother’s, and at various points throughout Waterlily’s childhood, such as during her 
mother’s pregnancy, Waterlily’s grandmother “took sole charge” of her granddaughter.38  
Waterlily’s experience was not unique, either within her tribe or among Native societies.  
By taking a central role in childcare, older women enabled young, able-bodied women to 
perform vital domestic, agricultural, and reproductive labor.  Thomas Leforge, a white 
man who had joined the Crow as a child in the 1860s and spent the majority of his life 
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among the tribe, emphasized the practical benefits of Crow grandparents’ custom of 
raising firstborn children: “This old-time practice was good for the young parents, it was 
good for the elderly foster-parents, it was good for the tribe, as it left physically capable 
young couples free from the worries of providing for their children and thus enabled them 
to go on producing others.”39  
 Maternal or paternal aunts and female clan members likewise fulfilled maternal 
roles, either through daily childcare or adoption.  In many Native cultures, children 
interacted with these women in the same ways that they interacted with their biological 
mothers, and Agnes Deernose recalled that she “learned more from my mother’s sister 
than from my own mother.”40  When Deernose gave birth to her first and only biological 
child in 1925, she had recently left her first husband and her son’s father, and her family 
agreed that it was best for Agnes’ sister to assume primary responsibility for raising the 
child.  This arrangement did not mean that Deernose did not perform social reproductive 
labor, however.  Not only did she see her son regularly; she, along with her second 
husband and mother, raised three adopted children—her maternal uncle’s two daughters 
and Deernose’s first grandson.41  When Alma Snell, who was raised by her grandmother 
Pretty Shield, became pregnant as the result of a rape, her sister assumed the care of her 
baby, although Snell regularly spent time with her child.42  In other cases, childless 
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relatives might request that a child come to live with them.43  Crow women emphasize 
that separations of this sort were not “very real,” as families and clans gathered together 
often.44  As Deernose explains, “Crows like to share children.  They don’t think of 
adoption as giving a child up.”45 
 The memoirs, autobiographies, and collaborative narratives of Indian women 
highlight the continuity of flexible mothering within their communities.  The examples 
cited here all occurred in the early twentieth century, around the time of the Indian 
Service’s pronatal campaign.  The women do not describe lost customs and practices; 
rather, they often use present tense and sometimes explicitly underscore continuity with 
phrases like “even to this day.”46  Historians have affirmed the persistence of flexible 
mothering practices among Indigenous people.  Although policymakers and reformers 
intended allotment to promote nuclear families, and although the federal commission 
charged with implementing allotment among the Cherokees in the early twentieth century 
deliberately “marginalized elders,” Rose Stremlau concludes that grandmothers remained 
“primary caregivers to their grandchildren” after tribal land had been allotted.47   
 Despite the continued prevalence of flexible mothering practices on early 
twentieth-century Indian reservations, they are rarely acknowledged in Indian Service 
campaign rhetoric.  In part, this omission may have stemmed from ignorance, as the 
kinship patterns and practices that were so familiar to Indian communities were not 
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always visible to non-Native observers.  The Crow Reservation, for example, spanned 
fifty by eighty miles and included six districts, hindering consistent oversight.48  Even 
following the Crow Act of 1920, which divided communal tribal land into individual 
allotments, Crows continued to live in multigenerational households or to cluster 
dwellings to form a “multigenerational compound.”49  Under these circumstances, 
outsiders were ill-equipped to discern who raised whom and which family members 
handled which domestic duties.  Furthermore, language could prove more deceptive than 
illuminating: a young Deernose used the same word—masaka—to refer to her mother’s 
sisters as to her biological mother.50  
 Nevertheless, there is evidence that some reservation employees recognized the 
communal nature of Native childrearing.  For example, responding to a 1926 Indian 
Service inquiry regarding how Indian communities cared for children coming from 
“broken homes,” the subagent of one of the six districts of the Crow Reservation 
explained that “Caring for these children seems to be the least of their troubles.  The 
custom of adopting the children from all classes of homes out to relatives or others seems 
to be universal.  And it seems that there is no difference between the care of an own [sic] 
child and an adopted child.”51  At times, it seems possible that reservation employees 
considered these on-the-ground realities when implementing the Save the Babies 
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campaign. A decade prior to the above questionnaire, Dr. H. L. Oberlander, physician at 
the Crow Agency, reported that the field matron visited Indian homes and interpreted 
Indian Service pronatal literature, “and then each mother and prospective mother and 
members of the family also were appealed [sic] to the importance of carrying out the 
instructions for the care of the baby.”52  Within the same report, however, two other 
Indian Service physicians exemplified the Bureau’s focus on biological mothers, noting 
that the field matrons “instruct the mothers as to the proper care and feeding of their 
babies” and present them with “reading material” on these topics.53 
 During the Progressive Era, the growing bureaucracy intensified earlier Indian 
Service efforts to make Native communities legible to the federal government.54  For 
policymakers and Indian officials, the family was the most fundamental unit within the 
social structure, and the most legible family unit was the nuclear family.  As a result, they 
saw little benefit in investigating alternate models.  Although it is impossible to know for 
sure, it is plausible that Dr. Oberlander’s reference to “members of the family” referred 
exclusively to biological fathers, brothers, and sisters.  To confirm the Crows’ tendency 
to live in multigenerational homes throughout the 1920s, Frederick Hoxie had to read 
against the grain of Indian Service records.  The Crow superintendent reported that “there 
were from 423 to 460 ‘families’ under his jurisdiction,” and that these families lived in 
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“305 to 350 ‘houses,’” up to a quarter of which were tents.55  Confronted with the 
unremarked upon discrepancy that implied at least one hundred Crow families did not 
have homes, Hoxie concluded that “a great many Crows shared dwellings with people 
outside the nuclear unit.”  Because the Indian Service defined “a family as a conjugal unit 
or a single adult and the related children, if any,” census takers had no choice but “to 
count several families in a single dwelling.”56 
 Indian Service records appear to document progress in frequently-espoused policy 
objectives, namely, privileging the nuclear family as a system of relatedness and the 
adoption of permanent, “civilized” homes, even as they mask more complicated lived 
experiences.  Rose Stremlau characterizes the Dawes commissioners’ task of producing a 
Cherokee tribal roll to facilitate allotment as “the bureaucratic reinvention of Cherokee 
family life”; it is “a story . . . about making Cherokee people something on paper that 
they were not, in their daily reality, and then working to make the reality match the 
records on file.”57  Commissioners used Euro-American categories and exerted their 
authority to define family, segregating onto separate cards people who resisted 
segregation in their daily lives.   
The Indian Service’s Save the Babies rhetoric and programs a decade later present 
a similar bureaucratic reinvention.  Official campaign rhetoric assumed a nuclear family 
unit, and, at least in theory, Indian Service pronatal efforts targeted Indian mothers as 
individuals.  The nuclear family unit also implied specific gender roles; the independent 
male head of household provided for and wielded authority over his dependents, while 
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his wife tended to the home and children.  As many scholars have shown, Indian Service 
officials and employees understood that appropriate gender roles had to be learned, and 
they dedicated themselves to imparting these lessons.58  In the midst of the Save the 
Babies campaign, Indian Service officials and employees emphasized the urgent need to 
instill a sense of maternal responsibility in Indian mothers.  Commissioner Sells urged the 
superintendent of Fort Totten School in North Dakota to launch “a vigorous campaign . . . 
with the object of increasing the interest of the Indian mothers in the proper care of their 
children.”59  The superintendent of the Pine Ridge Reservation in South Dakota 
instructed his employees “to hold three special meetings for mothers and to do all else 
that was possible to impress upon the Indian mothers the importance of the care of their 
children.”60  
Ironically, even as Sells expressed his desire to “overcome” Indians’ “distinctly 
barbaric” “habit” of treating wives and mothers as “the burden bearer[s],” the Save the 
Babies campaign and related Progressive initiatives functioned to assign responsibilities 
to them that were usually shared among kin.61  As Sells’s and the Pine Ridge 
superintendent’s comments on maternal responsibility suggest, consolidated 
responsibility for Indian women (even if only on paper) easily translated into 
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consolidated blame of them.  The two men’s decision to frame their task as a matter of 
arousing “interest” in a recognition of “the importance of” the proper care rather than 
simply providing education and instruction in childcare techniques implies a perception 
of maternal deficiency shared by other Indian Service personnel.  At its most extreme, 
this perception led Euro-American federal employees to conclude that Indian mothers did 
not love their children.62  Because Indian Service employees scrutinized biological 
mothers and not other females who may have played a significant role in raising their 
children, they sometimes observed flexible mothering practices but perceived maternal 
negligence.  This perception of maternal negligence, in turn, influenced the way 
reservation employees interpreted Indian mothers’ receptiveness to their practical 
instructions.  Regarding nutrition, for example, Colorado River physician Anna Israel-
Nettle asserted that Indian mothers could provide adequate meals for their families, but 
they did not “owing to laziness” and because “they are too indolent to take the trouble.”63   
The rhetoric surrounding the Save the Babies campaign reflects a convergence of 
developments both within and beyond the Indian Service.  Notions of cultural superiority 
had long informed federal policies intended to assimilate American Indians.  In the 
Progressive Era, the rise of ideologies laden with scientific racism caused policymakers 
to reassess—although not abandon—their assimilation agenda to reflect Euro-Americans’ 
increasing pessimism regarding an inferior race’s potential for improvement.64  In these 
same years, physicians and public health officials outside of the Indian Service became 
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increasingly vocal about the dangers of maternal ignorance, which they identified as the 
primary culprit in child mortality and morbidity.  Rima Apple characterizes these medical 
authorities’ accusations as “unambiguous and explicit.”65  When, in the foreword to the 
1916 pamphlet Indian Service employees distributed and interpreted to Indian mothers, 
Commissioner Sells declared, “it is because so many Indian mothers follow the wrong 
ideas in caring for their children that so many of them die,” he in fact echoed a sentiment 
regularly voiced outside the Bureau.66 
Sells similarly echoed his peers when he urged his employees that “The simplest 
rules of motherhood applied under intelligent and friendly direction would save most of 
the Indian babies who annually fill untimely graves.”67 As Rebecca Plant has argued, 
Progressive experts “concentrated primarily on maternal practices (what mothers actually 
did).”68  This implied that maternal deficiencies could be corrected through education, a 
philosophy that aligned with the Indian Service’s assimilation agenda.  The problem, 
Indian Service employees reported, was that Indian women often seemed particularly 
slow to learn these “simplest rules.”  On the Fort Berthold Reservation in western North 
Dakota, the superintendent’s 1914 report lamented that despite the field matron’s efforts, 
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her home visits were likely to prove ineffective because “unless the average woman of 
the reservation is repeatedly prompted no good results are obtained.”69   
Medical experts, on whose advice the Indian Service increasingly relied, often 
affirmed employees’ observations.  L. Webster Fox, a seventy-one-year-old 
ophthalmologist at the University of Pennsylvania, became intensely interested in the 
trachoma problem plaguing Indian reservations in the early 1920s, and for a time became 
a close adviser to Sells’s successor.  Fox shared his conclusions based on visits to Indian 
reservations with readers of the Journal of the American Medical Association: “It is 
extremely difficult to teach these ignorant Indian mothers that the bottom hem of their 
skirts is not the proper thing with which to wipe their noses and their babies’ eyes.  The 
urging of health journals, such as Hygeia, on them would be ridiculous, and even the 
talks to the youngsters accomplish very little.”70  Fox believed that the tactics typically 
used by medical authorities in addressing problems relating to infant and child welfare 
were ineffective with Indian mothers.  Whether relayed by Indian Service personnel or 
outside observers, skepticism regarding the speed or extent to which Indian mothers 
benefitted from instruction perpetuated policymakers’ and Indian Service personnel’s 
increasing doubt about Indians’ capacity for advancement. 
Although early twentieth-century health-related mother-blaming targeted white 
middle-class mothers alongside poor and non-white mothers, white women benefited 
from a competing cultural belief about white middle-class women as mothers that 
persisted throughout the century’s first decades.  Turn-of-the-century maternalism held 
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that middle-class white women had an innate capacity for nurturing and mothering that 
buttressed their authority within the family and within civic life.71  As Margaret Jacobs 
demonstrates, the power of maternalism as an ideology meant that in practice, even 
middle-class white women who were not biological mothers themselves served 
humanitarian and nation-building goals by “acting in a motherly manner toward other 
women they deemed in need of rescue and uplift.”72  Thus, Rebecca Plant contends that 
at least until World War I, “mother-blaming” most often reinforced white middle-class 
women’s cultural authority while undercutting that of poor or nonwhite women.73  When 
Sells called on “the field matron with her motherly solicitude,” he demonstrated his faith 
in these field workers’ ability to occupy a maternal role in relation to Indian women and 
their children.74  The persistence of maternalism within Euro-American culture provided 
some protection for middle-class white women in the face of medical criticism; white 
women as a group could not be labeled “bad mothers.”  As the targets of maternalist 
uplift, Indigenous mothers had no such protection. 
 
The Save the Babies Campaign: Home Visits and Baby Shows  
 The field matron program resulted in a somewhat unusual development in turn-of-
the-century government bureaus: the hiring of a significant number of white women.75   
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When the Indian Service embarked on the Save the Babies campaign in the 1910s, 
Commissioners Valentine and Sells looked to this female labor force to implement many 
of the campaign’s central features.  Since the program’s inception, the field matron had 
been expected to be a jack-of-all-trades.  When Commissioner Thomas Morgan first 
enumerated the field matron’s responsibilities in 1891, the job description included 
providing instruction in the beautification of the home, home sanitation, basic nursing 
skills, and domestic tasks such as sewing and gardening.  Morgan directed field matrons 
to facilitate cultural, moral, and spiritual uplift, both through instruction and by example.  
Finally, Morgan emphasized that this job description was not exhaustive and called on 
individuals in the field to provide aid whenever an opportunity presented itself.76 
Although the field matron’s duties were varied and wide-ranging, the creation of a 
bureaucratic position charged with transforming Indian homes reflects entrenched ideas 
about domesticity that in many ways characterized late-nineteenth-century Euro-
American culture.  As Cathleen Cahill reminds us, social reformers concerned with 
Indian affairs in this period “had come of age during the heyday of Americans’ 
celebration of the home as the keystone of their political, economic, and social order,” a 
celebration buttressed by the romanticization of such ideas in novels, song, and plays and 
by their enshrinement in the law.77  
                                                                                                                                                                             
CIA, Annual Report, 1912, 27.  Although the Indian Service occasionally hired Native field matrons, Lisa 
Emmerich notes that this was not generally the Bureau’s policy.  See Emmerich, “‘Save the Babies!,’” 117. 
 
76
 Emmerich, “‘To Love and Respect and Seek the Ways of White Women,’” 47-49.  Commissioner Robert 
Valentine provided a similarly wide-ranging job description almost two decades later.  See CIA, Annual 
Report, 1909, 7. 
 
77
 Cahill, Federal Fathers and Mothers, 35-36. 
 
43 
 
 In the 1910s, Indian Service officials and employees relied on field matrons’ 
regular visits to Indian women’s homes—an established practice on many reservations—
to counter the maternal ignorance and unsanitary living conditions to which Indian 
Service personnel attributed Indian infant mortality.  In many respects, field matrons’ 
reports and officials’ and other employees’ discussions of field matrons’ work highlight 
the continuity of field matrons’ efforts prior to and during the campaign.  Commissioner 
Sells declared that the “campaign for better babies” required an intensive educational 
curriculum for Indian mothers and future mothers, and he presented “attractive home-
making” as a critical component of this curriculum.  Sells did not see improving the 
health outcomes of Indian infants as separable from Indian women’s acceptance of the 
“higher ideals of life,” which included what he understood as an appropriate domestic 
gender order.78  Similarly, at the height of the pronatal campaign, a physician on the 
Crow Reservation’s health report assured the Indian Office that the field matron in his 
district was making “all efforts . . . to create a greater love for and interest in the home.”79 
 For two decades, Indian Service field matrons had preached the beautification of 
the home and the importance of home sanitation in the same breath, but Lisa Emmerich 
argues that as individual field matrons responded to the needs of the communities they 
served, most gradually prioritized health work above domestic work.80  After the turn of 
the century, as Indian officials and employees gained a better understanding of germ 
theory and as it became clear that the health crisis on many Indian reservations had 
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deepened, this informal shift became institutionalized.  The year before he announced his 
Bureau’s pronatal campaign, Commissioner Valentine moved the field matron program 
from the Industrial Division to the Medical Division of the Indian Service.81  When 
Valentine resigned, Cato Sells continued the pronatal campaign, picking up where his 
predecessor left off.  Sells contended that sanitation was “the most pressing feature” of 
the Save the Babies campaign, advising a reservation superintendent, “Let sanitation be 
our watchword.  In our nation-wide health campaign, let us make sanitation the first 
consideration.”82  Calling on Indian Service employees to do their part in the Indian 
Service campaign “for the rescue of a race,” Sells urged field matrons to bring sanitation 
knowledge and techniques into “every home of an Indian mother” and eradicate the 
“intolerable conditions . . . creating an atmosphere of death instead of life.”83  Ironically, 
because efforts to combat infant mortality increased the urgency of field matrons’ regular 
visits to Indian homes and justified heightened scrutiny of Indian mothers, the Save the 
Babies campaign expanded field matrons’ capacity to perform the non-medical 
component of their work.  As Emmerich concludes, Indian Service pronatalism “helped 
to reaffirm the importance of the tenets upon which the field matron program had been 
founded.”84  
 The emphasis on home visits demonstrates the persistent conviction that the 
problems facing Indian communities were more individual than structural and thus could 
be solved through intimate interpersonal interactions.  The high infant mortality rates on 
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Indian reservations would be solved through regular exchanges between white field 
matrons and Indian mothers.  Ideally, these exchanges would produce trusting 
relationships in which field matrons would bring about change through the art of 
persuasion.  Reporting on the implementation of the Save the Babies campaign on the 
Crow Reservation, Supervisor L. F. Michael praised the field matrons’ diligence: “Home 
cleanliness and personal hygiene of the family is preached constantly and many are 
responding splendidly.” Michael acknowledged that some Crow “have taken exception to 
the cleaning up and keeping clean,” but he expressed confidence that “constant work, 
with kindness and firmness will overcome this attitude.”85  Other reports betrayed the 
varying levels of coercion implicit in these visits.  The superintendent of the Cheyenne 
and Arapahoe Reservation in Oklahoma, for example, reported that the visits “are 
understood to be in the nature of inspection; and where conditions are unsatisfactory the 
attention of the family is called to them.”86  According to this superintendent, the system 
worked well, as “All Indians know that their homes are under constant inspection as to 
cleanliness and have come to take pride in passing inspection.”87  In some cases, Indian 
Service employees explicitly argued that these interpersonal exchanges demanded 
coercion.  Dr. Oberlander explained that “it was sometimes necessary to use the police” 
to enforce field matrons’ and other health workers’ sanitary instructions.88  Dr. Anna 
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Israel-Nettle, long-time physician on the Colorado River Reservation in Arizona, was 
even more direct, arguing that “THE INDIANS MUST BE COMPELLED BY FORCE 
TO BE SOMEWHAT SANITARY . . . Moral suasion will do these Indians no good.  
THEY MUST BE MADE TO DO.”89   
 Not surprisingly, some Indian women resisted field matrons’ efforts to enter their 
homes and scrutinize their domestic practices.90  Sells hoped that a campaign explicitly 
dedicated to saving mothers’ babies would help eradicate this resistance.  Specifically, 
Sells urged employees that “baby shows” could serve as a means of “extending our work 
into every home of the reservation.”91   Recognizing that field matrons’ central role in the 
Save the Babies campaign would likely raise the field matron program’s status within the 
Bureau, Elsie Newton, supervisor of the field matrons, began urging Sells to broaden the 
Indian Service’s pronatal efforts in 1913, and in 1914, she persuaded him that baby 
shows offered an additional venue in which employees could inspect, instruct, and gain 
the confidence of Indian mothers.92  Newton’s inspiration for these “better baby” contests 
came from the “baby health shows” white middle-class women organized for themselves 
and others in this period.93 
On many reservations, one or more field matrons organized the event and worked 
to arouse interest and encourage attendance in the days and weeks preceding it.  Sells was 
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adamant that reservation baby shows, like the contemporary baby shows on which the 
Indian Service modeled these contests, carry the weight of scientific authority.94  He 
advocated “standard score cards,” “suitable certificates” issued from Washington, D.C. 
for the highest-scoring babies (or more accurately, the babies’ mothers), and a visible role 
for Indian Service physicians.95  Not only did physicians “act as Judges” and grade the 
babies; they also, as the superintendent at Pine Ridge Agency reported, “instruct the 
mothers not alone as to saving the babies, but having better babies.”96 
 As Lisa Emmerich has demonstrated, baby shows quickly became the most 
visible component of the Indian Service’s pronatal initiatives.97  Baby shows also 
exemplified and facilitated Indian Service employees’ targeting of Indian mothers, as 
officials and employees were nearly unanimous in their assumption that it would be 
biological mothers who showcased Indian babies at these events.  At baby shows, as the 
Pine Ridge superintendent’s report suggests, physicians and field matrons provided child 
care instruction in an attempt to combat maternal ignorance.  When reservation 
employees reported on baby shows, they praised Indian mothers more frequently and 
liberally than they did when reporting on any other component of the Save the Babies 
program.  The nature of their praise, however, underscored many employees’ conviction 
that the first step in combating maternal ignorance was instilling the sense of maternal 
responsibility that many Indian mothers seemed to lack.  In 1917, Sells proclaimed that 
                                                          
94
 For a discussion of baby shows among other groups during this period, see Laura L. Lovett, Conceiving 
the Future: Pronatalism, Reproduction, and the Family in the United States, 1890-1938 (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2007). 
 
95
 CIA, Annual Report, 1917, 17. 
 
96
 Pine Ridge, Annual Report, 1918, 4. 
 
97
 Emmerich, “‘Save the Babies!’” 
48 
 
“great interest was manifested by the Indian mothers” in reservation baby contests, and 
superintendents followed his lead in evaluating success on the basis of mothers’ interest 
in the competition.98    
Through baby shows, Indian mothers learned (or at least Indian Service personnel 
intended for them to learn) that not only were they solely responsible for their children’s 
health, welfare, and appearance, but they personally would be judged along these lines.  
Thus, employees praised Indian women when they appeared to demonstrate pride in their 
child’s baby show “performance.”  The superintendent on the Blackfeet Reservation 
proclaimed, for example, that “a considerable number of entries [in a recent baby show] 
testified to the fact that the average Indian mother is as proud of her offspring as is a 
white mother, and as willing to exhibit it.”99  Similarly, Indian mothers earned praise 
when they approached baby contests with what Indian Service personnel interpreted as a 
competitive spirit.  Sells informed a reservation school superintendent in Minnesota that 
as a result of baby shows, employees on many reservations observed “much wholesome 
rivalry developing among the mothers to possess the best baby.”100  The Indian Service 
did not leave this sense of maternal competition to chance.  Rather, baby shows were 
designed to instill it.  In addition to certificates, mothers of the highest-scoring babies 
received prizes such as “washtubs, washboards, clothes baskets, tablecloths, and cutlery,” 
prizes that reinforced field matrons’ lessons in appropriate domesticity.  Sells also 
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mentioned cash prizes, a reward that no doubt appeared particularly attractive to many 
women in the midst of the impoverishment plaguing many reservations.101  
 
The Save the Babies Campaign: Hospital Childbirth 
 For Commissioner Sells, “the campaign for better babies” demanded a 
transformation in Indian women’s housekeeping and childrearing practices and a 
transformation in the way Indian women experienced pregnancy and childbirth.  Sells 
presented hospital childbirth as a critical component of the Indian Service’s pronatal 
campaign.  In 1916, he instructed Indian Service employees that “Every Indian hospital 
bed not necessarily occupied with those suffering from disease or injury should be 
available for the mother in childbirth.”102  Sells regularly repeated this refrain in his 
correspondence and reports, declaring the following year that he was “particularly 
anxious that our hospitals shall be used for mothers in childbirth.”103  Sells’ emphasis on 
hospital childbirth reflects his conviction that by altering the location and circumstances 
in which Indian women gave birth, the Indian Service could tackle the three culprits 
behind the infant mortality crisis—insanitary homes, maternal ignorance, and the 
continued authority of Indian midwives. 
 As a solution to the poor health outcomes for Indian babies, Sells’s advocacy of 
hospital childbirth shared many of the limitations characteristic of the Save the Babies 
campaign and other early twentieth-century Indian Service health initiatives.  In 
advocating changes to behavior—in this case, a change in the location where Indian 
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women gave birth—the Indian Service sidestepped uncomfortable questions about the 
causes of the now highly visible problem of Native infant mortality.  The Bureau, did 
this, moreover, in a decade in which national investigations into infant mortality exposed 
the sharp correlation between poverty and high infant mortality rates.104  At the same 
time, the Indian Service was not alone in contending—or at least hoping—that hospital 
childbirth would produce better health outcomes.  Historian Molly Ladd-Taylor argues 
that the turn-of-the-century infant and maternal health movement “set the stage for the 
medicalization of childbirth.”105  Middle- and upper-class women, fearful of the constant 
threat of their own or their infants’ deaths, first called on physicians to attend their births 
and then embraced the care of a physician or even a specialist in the hospital setting.106  
In the midst of calls to improve infant and maternal health, physicians positioned 
themselves as experts and worked to expand their authority over childbearing and 
eventually childrearing.107 
 As a practical matter, the Indian Service’s push for hospital childbirth would 
scarcely have been possible prior to the 1910s.  At the turn of the twentieth century, the 
Indian Service operated only five reservation hospitals.  Faced with statistics attesting to 
the severity of reservation health problems and increasing charges of the Bureau’s 
neglect, the Indian Service began expanding reservation health services.  The inclusion of 
hospital birth in the Indian Service’s Save the Babies campaign both reflected and fueled 
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a surge in hospital construction.108  By 1911, the Indian Service operated fifty hospitals, 
and by 1918, that number had grown to eighty-seven.  The number of physicians 
employed by the Indian Service doubled between 1900 and 1918.109  The Crow Indian 
Hospital, on which the next chapter focuses, was a product of this period of extensive 
hospital construction.  Prior to 1907, Crow leader Robert Yellowtail explained, “the 
Crow Indians did not know what a hospital was,” but in that year, the Indian Service 
funded the construction of a one-room hospital on the reservation.110  In some cases, 
Native communities played an active role in expanding reservation health services.  
Throughout the Save the Babies campaign, Indian leaders on reservations without a 
hospital regularly emphasized their community’s need for reservation hospital services.111  
Similarly, Crow leaders requested an expansion of the Crow Indian Hospital, which 
Commissioner Sells approved.112 
 The early twentieth-century push for hospital childbirth, both within and outside 
the Indian Service, was closely related to sanitation concerns.  In the final decades of the 
nineteenth century, a series of medical and scientific breakthroughs revolutionized the 
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American medical community’s understanding of disease and disease transmission, and 
as medical practitioners sought to apply their new knowledge of germ transmission to 
childbirth, they found home deliveries more difficult to manage and advocated the 
hospital setting on sanitary grounds.113  As knowledge of germ theory spread to the 
public, hospitals attempted to capitalize on this new awareness; “the hospital began to 
picture itself,” Richard Wertz and Dorothy Wertz explain, “as a superclean, germ-free 
place, safer than the home.”114  Indian Service officials and employees drew on this 
scientific language of germ transmission and sanitation, but they rarely foregrounded the 
sanitary conditions of government hospitals.  The Bureau’s own inspection reports 
testified to the gulf between reservation hospitals and the pristine, sterile image 
publicized by some urban hospitals.  In the worst cases, inspectors railed against the 
“dirty and neglected condition” they found at reservation hospitals.115  More typically, 
inspectors lamented hospital structures that seemed to foster rather than prevent germ 
transmission, such as an inability physically to separate maternity patients from patients 
with communicable diseases.116  In large part, these deficiencies resulted from inadequate 
funding. 
 In advocating hospital childbirth, Indian Service officials and employees tended 
to focus on the insanitary conditions of Indian homes, and on this point, as this chapter 
has demonstrated, Indian Service employees were well-versed.  By mid-decade, Indian 
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Service employees presented negative evaluations of Indian homes in support of hospital 
childbirth, reasoning that even inadequate hospitals were preferable to the alternative.  In 
a typical example, following a visit to the Flathead Reservation in Montana, the medical 
inspector noted, “The majority of the homes are such as to warrant that the expectant 
mother come to the hospital during her confinement.”117  Sells echoed this sentiment in 
his 1917 annual report, praising the Indian Service policy “of bringing every possible 
case of confinement to the agency hospitals for the lying-in period” and asserting that the 
initiative “has given to many Indian children a start in life that would have been 
impossible had their birth been consummated under the old unhygienic environments.”118   
 Policymakers and Indian Service officials realized, however, that the hospital 
posed advantages beyond sanitation.  Like their Progressive counterparts invested in the 
Americanization of immigrants, Indian Service officials recognized the hospital’s 
potential as both a means and marker of assimilation.  For decades, policymakers had 
presented the acceptance of Western medicine as a critical step in the assimilation 
process.  While they seldom dwelt on how the shift to the reservation had contributed to 
this marked deterioration, policymakers hoped that if Indians came to see Western 
medicine as the solution to their communities’ pressing health concerns, they would also 
be more amenable to other aspects of Western culture.119   Particularly after the turn of 
the century, policymakers and Indian Service officials recognized that the poor health 
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conditions on Indian reservations actually hindered their non-medical assimilation efforts.  
A series of investigations concluded that “from the standpoint of public health,” the 
prevalence of disease on Indian reservations made them “a menace to the neighboring 
white communities.”120  Neighboring whites responded by characterizing Indians as dirty 
and diseased, which in turn served to reify reservation boundaries.  White communities 
opposed the admission of Indian children to public schools and Indians’ inclusion in 
community activities “necessary to their advancement.”121  Indians’ eventual 
incorporation into the body politic, policymakers concluded, hinged on their acceptance 
of Western medicine. 
 Paralleling Progressive-Era Americanization programs among immigrant groups, 
Commissioner Sells and other Indian Service personnel regarded women’s acceptance of 
Western medicine as especially critical.  Natalia Molina suggests that Los Angeles public 
health officials viewed Mexican women as “malleable and influential within their 
families,” and Indian Service officials shared this perception with regard to Native 
women.122  In his 1916 annual report, Sells presented Indian women as both the primary 
obstacle to and the best measure of progress, declaring, “The antipathy of the Indian 
woman to the white man’s hospital is fast being overcome.”123  In this case, Sells referred 
to hospital use more generally, but reservation superintendents and health workers 
frequently presented hospital maternity cases as barometers of a particular tribe’s 
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progress in accepting Western medicine.  Although not always the case, on many 
reservations the rates of hospital childbirth outpaced the rates of hospital use for illness 
and surgery, a pattern that perhaps reflects the Indian Service’s more coordinated efforts 
to promote the former practice.  While a woman’s decision to give birth in the hospital 
was itself a much-celebrated success, officials and health workers hoped that the 
experience would foster an appreciation of medical supervision, and the new mother 
would continue to seek the physician’s advice and treatment.124  On a symbolic level, a 
child’s birth in a modern medical environment, rather than on a dirt floor, seemed to 
promise a modern rather than “backward” future. 
 In the first decades of the twentieth century, medical practitioners increasingly 
understood the hospital as an ideal educational venue and a woman’s confinement period 
as a valuable “teaching moment.”125  As members of the American medical community 
worked to enhance their professional standing and to accelerate specialization, they 
recognized that increased authority over pregnancy and childbirth could yield significant 
returns. As Progressive physicians and patients embraced the tenets of scientific authority 
and expertise, they produced new understandings of the relationship between doctor and 
patient, including the growing ideal of “the mother dependent on the physician.”  The 
notion that expectant and new mothers should defer to the expertise of the authoritative 
physician only gained strength in the interwar period.126  Because the institution itself 
served to reaffirm the physician’s authority, a primary lesson hospital staff imparted 
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during a women’s confinement was the hierarchical relationship between the physician 
and the new mother.127  Indian Service employees regularly echoed these ideals.  For 
example, when Peter Paquette, superintendent of the Navajo Agency, wrote to inform 
Commissioner Sells of his medical staff’s progress in implementing Save the Babies 
initiatives, he emphasized his commitment to persuading Indian women to give birth in 
the hospital, where they would be “under the personal direction of the Physician.”128 
 Both within and outside the Indian Service, the hospital’s educational potential 
extended beyond interpersonal hierarchies.  As the cultural celebration of “Mother Love,” 
which held that mothers benefitted from innate maternal knowledge, waned following the 
turn of the century, many Americans began to view the well-educated, scientifically-
trained medical practitioner as the appropriate authority on motherhood.129  That this 
level of expertise remained more an ideal than a reality during these years did not negate 
the idea’s growing power.130  Women’s confinement period presented physicians and 
specialists with an ideal occasion to provide education in the proper care of themselves 
and their children and thus to combat the maternal ignorance that they believed to be 
largely responsible for infant mortality.  Within the Indian Service, as this chapter 
demonstrates, combatting maternal ignorance was at the core of the Bureau’s pronatal 
initiatives, but superintendents and physicians expressed skepticism that instruction 
relayed to parturient and new mothers in their homes would achieve lasting results.  They 
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feared that owing to ignorance, distractions, or competing advice from family and 
friends, Indian women frequently disregarded the physician’s instructions the moment he 
walked out the door, especially on reservations where long distances and a highly-mobile 
population prohibited regular follow-up visits.  As a result, Navajo superintendent Peter 
Paquette contended that “practical work can only be done in placing the mother in a 
hospital before confinement and keeping her there a sufficient length of time 
thereafter.”131  
 Indian Service officials and employees also presented hospital childbirth as 
evidence of progress, because in choosing to give birth in a government hospital with the 
assistance of a state-employed medical professional, an Indian woman apparently 
rejected other alternatives.  From their earliest efforts to provide federally-funded medical 
services on reservations, policymakers and Indian Service officials intended for 
government hospitals and state-employed medical practitioners to facilitate the 
eradication of Native healers, particularly the Indian “medicine man.”  When in 1916 
Commissioner Sells celebrated Indian women’s waning opposition to the “white man’s 
hospital,” he went on to declare that “the medicine man will soon be only a memory.”132  
Sells’s prediction betrays his propensity for premature optimism, as the reports he 
received from the field often lamented medicine men’s continued influence and 
championed increased vigilance in combating the problem.  Following an inspection of 
the Flathead Reservation, for example, Dr. L. F. Michael recommended that the 
reservation superintendent wage “an active campaign against the pernicious practice of 
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the medicine man,” and Superintendent Fred C. Morgan affirmed that “every effort will 
be put forth to combat this evil.”133 
 Superintendents and health workers blamed medicine men for individual 
instances of illness and death, as well as a Native community’s poor health more 
generally, and they often attributed Indians’ unwillingness to utilize hospital services to 
the medicine man’s power. Furthermore, the Indian Service’s official regulations 
regarding medicine men, adopted in 1904 and sporadically circulated throughout the Save 
the Babies campaign, reveals that lawmakers were as concerned with the dangers 
medicine men posed to the government’s assimilation agenda as they were with the 
dangers Native healers posed to Indian health.   The regulations stated that a medicine 
man “shall be adjudged guilty of an Indian offense” when “the influence of a so-called 
‘medicine man’ operates as a hindrance to the civilization of the tribe, or that said 
‘medicine man’ resorts to any a[r]tifice or device to keep the Indians under his influence, 
or shall adopt any m[ea]ns to prevent the Indians from abandoning their heathenish rit[e]s 
and customs.”134  Because many Native cultures viewed health and healing from a 
holistic perspective, Indians often looked to medicine men as spiritual leaders as well as 
healers.  Thus, Indian Service efforts to eradicate Indian medicine men dovetailed with 
Indian Service efforts to promote the acceptance of Christianity and the rejection of 
Indian religions.  When Indian Service officials accused medicine men of relying on 
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“local superstitions,” they presented the medicine man as a symbol of Indians’ continued 
backwardness.135 
  Indian Service employees knew that on most reservations medicine men had little 
to do with childbirth.  In most early twentieth-century Native communities, the biological 
event of childbirth took place within the context of gendered and generational support 
networks.  Although not the case in every Indigenous society or for every individual, 
many Native women looked to their mothers, older female kin, or female neighbors to 
guide them through the rituals associated with pregnancy, childbirth, and postnatal 
care.136 Like Pretty Shield, some women gained enough experience and knowledge 
through birthing their own children and observing and assisting other deliveries that their 
community came to view them as experts in midwifery.  Reflecting the gendered 
assumptions of officials and employees, Indian Service documents seldom acknowledged 
that on many reservations, women were as likely to possess broad healing knowledge and 
spiritual authority as men.  Pretty Shield, for example, was a medicine woman as well as 
a midwife.137  Yet, if the Indian Service effectively ignored medicine women, it did not 
ignore midwives.  In their reports and correspondence, Indian Service officials and 
employees closely associated “medicine men” and “midwives,” and they made the same 
allegations about midwives that they made about medicine men: they imperiled women 
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and infants’ health, hindered the Bureau’s civilization agenda, and served as a continued 
marker of primitive culture. 
These complaints also intersected with broader cultural trends, as the Indian 
Service’s condemnation of Indian midwives joined a chorus of early twentieth-century 
voices decrying “the midwife problem.”138  As the professionalizing American medical 
community pursued reforms in medical training and education, they endeavored to reduce 
competition from midwives by presenting pregnancy and childbirth as biological events 
that required intensive medical management by scientifically-trained professionals.139  In 
the pages of the Journal of the American Medical Association, leading medical 
authorities pitted “trained physicians” against “ignorant midwives” and suggested that 
much of the nation’s maternal and infant mortality could be attributed to this 
ignorance.140  In these same years, some members of the American medical community 
launched—or, more accurately, re-launched—an antiabortion campaign, this time 
intended to eliminate the continued practice of illegal abortion, and antiabortionist 
medical authorities contended that midwives bore particular responsibility for the 
unauthorized termination of pregnancies.  Not only did midwives not have the necessary 
education and training to assist women through childbirth; they were also often immoral 
and virtually always dangerous.141 
For many medical professionals, and for many middle- and upper-class 
Americans, the “midwife problem” had a specific geography: rural and urban immigrant 
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communities and African-American communities in the South.  Few of these medical 
professionals and observers located the midwife problem on Indian reservations. 
Observers’ tendency to leave Indian reservations off their conceptual maps resulted from 
the segregated position of reservations within the nation’s physical and cultural landscape 
and the relative isolation of Indian Service health employees from their colleagues 
outside the Service.  Nonetheless, Indian Service personnel were well aware that 
midwives or trusted older women continued to perform the vast majority of obstetric 
work on reservations, and the “problem” of midwifery on Indian reservations had much 
in common with medical professionals’ and middle- and upper-class Americans’ 
understanding of the problem in more frequently-cited locations.  From the perspective of 
an increasing percentage of white Americans, the twentieth-century midwife was the 
“other”; she was “backward” and, either explicitly or implicitly, un-American, 
characterized as “a remnant of barbaric times, a blot on our civilization, which ought to 
be wiped out as soon as possible.”142   
The ubiquity of Indigenous midwives in Indian Service documents highlights the 
government’s intense scrutiny of Native women’s biological reproduction in this period.  
Because both the Indian Service and Native communities ascribed material and symbolic 
weight to reproduction, the Indian Service’s campaign to eradicate the Indian midwife 
often sparked a political struggle.  In many Native cultures, the gender-exclusivity 
surrounding biological reproduction solidified older women’s authoritative position, an 
authority that women on some reservations staunchly resisted conceding.  In successive 
annual reports in the late 1910s, the superintendent of the Cheyenne and Arapahoe 
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Reservation in Oklahoma lamented that despite some success in persuading the Indians to 
utilize other hospital services, reservation employees remained unable to persuade Indian 
women to use the hospital for childbirth.  The superintendent presented “the old women 
of the tribe,” who regarded “midwifery as their inalienable prerogative,” as the primary 
obstacle.  In keeping with the assumptions undergirding the Indian Service’s campaign to 
combat infant mortality and the broader Progressive-Era disdain for midwives, the 
superintendent indicted these midwives as “incidentally, being responsible for deaths 
without number, among the children.”143  
In their attempt to diminish midwives’ authority, government employees hoped to 
disrupt the gendered networks through which many Indian women navigated pregnancy 
and childbirth, and hospital childbirth facilitated the Indian Service’s attempt to target 
biological mothers as individuals.  Although not referring to childbirth specifically, 
Carolyn Niethammer, biographer of Navajo leader Annie Wauneka, explains that within 
the government hospital, the “patient was taken out of the bosom of the family.”  “Not 
only was the hospital filled with strangers,” Neithammer continues, “but the patients 
became strangers to themselves and each other as their familiar clothing was put away 
and they had to wear hospital gowns or pajamas and eat unfamiliar foods.”  Physicians 
regularly came and went, “pressing and poking” patients during each appearance.144  For 
Indian women anticipating delivery or in the throes of labor, the hospital staff’s poking 
and prodding was necessarily of an intimate and sensitive nature.   To a large degree, 
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Commissioner Sells’ belief that the hospital presented an ideal educational environment, 
and thus his emphasis on “the necessity of bringing every possible case of confinement to 
the agency hospitals for the lying-in period,” stemmed from his recognition that 
circumstances rendered Indian women peculiarly vulnerable to Indian Service 
authority.145   
Although some Indian women had begun requesting or accepting a physician’s 
attendance at home births before the Save the Babies campaign, that assistance did not 
preclude the active involvement of other attendees.  “As long as it remained in the 
home,” Richard Wertz and Dorothy Wertz have argued, “birth remained to large extent 
the province of women.”146  The hospital setting clarified the physician’s authoritative 
role.  Indian Service hospitals endeavored to reinforce this authority by restricting the 
presence of family and friends during a woman’s confinement or other periods of 
extended hospital care, although they often discovered that patients staunchly resisted 
these measures.  In some cases, the patient presented her use of the hospital as contingent 
on the presence of selected visitors.147   
When an Indian woman entered an Indian Service hospital for her confinement 
period, she may have been forty or fifty miles from her home, but she remained on her 
reservation, and her time away from home typically did not extend beyond a month or so.  
In contrast, when an Indian child entered an off-reservation boarding school, he or she 
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could be thousands of miles from home and often remained away for years at a time.  
These are, without question, significant differences.  Both experiences, however, at least 
theoretically functioned to destabilize community and familial bonds, as Indian Service 
employees stepped in to fulfill the educational and nurturing roles that would otherwise 
be fulfilled within kin networks.  Boarding school administrators and staff intended for 
their performance of these roles to produce a shift in Indian students’ loyalty and a 
negative assessment of their families—their former educators.  Similarly, when Indian 
Service employees reported their progress in promoting hospital childbirth in the decades 
following the Save the Babies campaign, many, such as Ruth E. Murphy, field nurse on 
the Flathead Reservation, rejoiced that the women on the reservation now distrusted the 
“old Indian midwives” and knew to “expect doctors and hospital care.”148  
Hospital childbirth, and particularly the rejection of Indian midwives and other 
female birthing assistants, also furthered a long-standing federal objective that was 
central to the Indian Service’s early twentieth-century assimilation agenda: the 
consolidation of patriarchal authority in Indigenous families and communities.  Theda 
Perdue finds that in the decades preceding removal, Cherokee society’s attempts to 
accommodate “civilization” resulted in Cherokee men’s intrusion into the previously 
female realm of biological reproduction.  In 1826, for example, the Cherokee council, 
“composed exclusively of men,” prohibited infanticide and asserted its authority to 
penalize women found guilty of this crime.149  Policymakers and reformers looked 
favorably upon Indian men’s efforts to buttress their political authority because, 
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persistent characterizations of Indian women as “drudges” and “burden bearers” aside, 
many Euro-Americans feared that Indian women’s influence, particularly in matrilineal 
societies, emasculated Indian men and contributed to what they perceived as Indian 
men’s fundamental laziness. Rose Stremlau explains that Indian men “were the ‘welfare 
kings’ of the 1880s.”  She argues that policymakers expected that the land reform policies 
they adopted in that decade to create “male-dominant” families, in large part because 
privatization provided incentives for husbands closely to monitor their wives’ sexuality 
and reproduction.150 
Although the Save the Babies campaign targeted biological mothers as a rule, 
Commissioner Sells instructed field matrons that in anticipation of and following an 
infant’s birth, “the importance of the provision which the husband should make for the 
health and comfort of the mother and child should be early and urgently impressed upon 
him.”151  The husband, not the woman’s mother or female relatives, should bear 
responsibility for his wife’s and child’s “health and comfort,” and this responsibility 
stemmed from the husband’s prescribed role of provider.  During and following the 
Progressive-Era pronatal campaign, Indian Service officials argued that Indian Service 
physicians, the vast majority of whom were male, should assume responsibility for 
pregnancy and particularly childbirth.  As the next chapter will demonstrate, although 
Indian Service physicians were white rather than Indian men, this shift contributed to 
Indian men’s increased influence by marginalizing older women from a process that 
enabled them to exert authority within their communities. 
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Conclusion 
 When Commissioner Sells embraced the pronatal campaign initiated by his 
predecessor, he envisioned an expansive, multi-faceted effort to combat infant mortality 
on Indian reservations, and the campaign’s rhetoric and strategies reflected a convergence 
of Progressive-Era trends within and outside the Indian Service.  The Save the Babies 
campaign must be understood as double-edged.  On the one hand, Indian Service officials 
and employees embarked on the campaign in response to an increasingly unavoidable 
awareness of the poor health outcomes facing Indian mothers and infants.  Without 
question, Indian communities shared these concerns, as infant morbidity and mortality 
was a painful reality for many Indian families.  Whether advocating better sanitation 
techniques or hospital childbirth, Indian Service personnel drew from their understanding 
of current scientific knowledge.  Furthermore, Indian communities were often more 
likely to welcome Indian Service health efforts than non-medical federal programs, and 
as the next chapter demonstrates, in the decades following the campaign, many Indian 
women embraced hospital childbirth.152    
 At the same time, the campaign, like early twentieth-century federal-Indian policy 
more broadly, was rooted in federal paternalism and laden with implicit, and sometimes 
explicit, blame.  As Commissioner Sells reminded his colleagues, the “campaign for 
better babies” could not produce “good results” unless “the Indian parents exchange 
indolence for industry.”153  More typically, Indian parents did not share this blame 
equally.  Sidestepping structural factors and defining the problem of high infant mortality 
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as one of individual knowledge and behavior, superintendents, field matrons, and health 
workers directed their energies at Indian mothers, referring to fathers only sporadically 
and largely disregarding other female kin’s involvement in childrearing.  If saving babies 
was the object of the Indian Service’s pronatal campaign, the means to that end hinged on 
transforming mothers and the social relationships in which they were enmeshed. 
Commissioner Sells and others believed that the problem of high infant mortality 
demanded heightened scrutiny of Indian mothers.  Although reservation employees’ 
reports sometimes included praise or at least acknowledgement of progress, when they 
assessed Indian women as housekeepers and mothers, they often found them lacking in 
ability, interest, and knowledge.  The question of blame was exacerbated when the 
implementation of campaign initiatives fell on the shoulders of individuals like Dr. Anna 
Israel-Nettles, who viciously conflated health-related measures, such as home sanitation, 
with non-medical issues, such as morality.  At the peak of the Save the Babies campaign, 
Commissioner Sells called on Indian Service employees to dedicate themselves to “the 
rescue of the race,” and he relied on field matrons to mobilize Indian mothers in this 
federal effort to save the babies.154  Within the context of the pronatal campaign, Sells 
used the language of “rescue” to underscore the campaign’s moral mission to save lives.  
The assessments of Indian mothers scattered throughout reservation employees’ reports 
on the Save the Babies campaign did not exist in a vacuum, however.  Rather, they lent 
weight to another “rhetoric of rescue,” which, as Margaret Jacobs demonstrates, rested on 
the belief that children needed to be “rescued” from their homes.155  Policymakers and 
social reformers believed that employees’ reports of inadequate living conditions and 
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maternal ignorance and Indian communities’ continued reliance on dangerous and 
backward healers demonstrated the necessity of removing Indian children from their 
families and placing them in government boarding schools.  The criticism directed at 
Indian mothers resulted in long-term negative consequences for Indian women, as the 
campaign buttressed tropes of maternal negligence and incompetence that did not wane 
following the campaign’s termination. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE POLITICS OF CHILDBIRTH ON THE CROW RESERVATION 
 In the late 1920s or very early 1930s, Montana writer, politician, and amateur 
ethnographer Frank B. Linderman spent one month with Pretty Shield, a respected Crow 
elder and medicine woman in her mid-seventies.  Having already published the life 
history of Plenty-Coups, Pretty Shield’s contemporary and “the last legitimate [Crow] 
chieftain,” Linderman asked Pretty Shield to tell him “a woman’s story.”1  As in his life 
history of Plenty-Coups, Linderman understood his endeavor as an urgent attempt to 
provide a “genuine record” of Crow life-ways that he believed were rapidly 
disappearing.2  Linderman suggested that Pretty Shield, like “the old men” he had 
interviewed previously, shared his interest in recording her early life rather than the more 
recent past.  Of life on the reservation after the disappearance of the buffalo, the female 
elder lamented, “There is nothing to tell, because we did nothing . . . We stayed in one 
place, and grew lazy.”3 As a result, Pretty Shield’s narrative does not extend much farther 
than her marriage at the age of sixteen and the birth of her first child in the 1870s.  
Although Pretty Shield often struggled to follow her interviewer’s request to focus on 
“women’s things,” she had no such trouble when she recalled her first child’s birth.  She 
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experienced her labor and delivery in the company of her mother and a trusted female 
midwife.4 
 Pretty Shield prefaced her childbirth story by emphasizing that “everything was 
so different when I was young.”5  Four years after Linderman published Pretty Shield’s 
story, Robert Yellowtail, superintendent of the Crow Reservation and himself a Crow 
man, echoed Pretty Shield’s emphasis on change in Crow women’s childbirth practices, 
although Yellowtail’s tone was one of celebration rather than wistfulness. In his second 
annual report as superintendent, Yellowtail proclaimed, “We have . . . established, 
through the ability of various physicians” that childbirth in a government hospital under 
the supervision of trained physicians was far preferable to “the old method,” in which 
“the mother was delivered in the Crow Camp where she was attended by women with no 
training and only trusted to good luck and nature to make a safe and proper delivery.” 
While Pretty Shield relished the relative ease and simplicity surrounding her first 
childbirth experience, Yellowtail touted government physicians’ obstetric feats, including 
“the dangerous Caesarian section.”6 
 In these very different but roughly contemporaneous texts, two men—one a white 
ethnographer, the other a Crow government employee—discussed reproductive processes 
that in Pretty Shield’s early adulthood had been understood to be the province of women.  
Furthermore, both men, and perhaps Pretty Shield herself, positioned the circumstances 
in which Pretty Shield gave birth as a relic of the past.  In doing so, they overstated the 
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gulf between “old” and “new” methods.  They obscured the fact that in the years 
preceding her interview with Linderman, Pretty Shield had continued to work as a 
midwife on the reservation, and that she was not alone in doing so; at the start of the 
decade, approximately half of Crow women gave birth at home with the assistance of 
other women.7 
 This chapter draws on historian Lynn Thomas’s analytical concept of the “politics 
of the womb” to explore the debates in which Yellowtail, Linderman, Pretty Shield, and  
many others engaged, as well as the shifting policies and practices that served as the 
backdrop for such conversations.  In her study of twentieth-century Kenya, Thomas 
develops the politics of the womb through an analysis of "critical events,” which, 
following Vreena Das, she defines as “those that rework ‘traditional categories,’ 
prompting ‘new modes of action’ to come into being” and that “leave their mark on a 
variety of institutions.”8  This chapter focuses on the Crow Reservation in southern 
Montana and approaches the 1930s and early 1940s as a “critical moment” that operated 
much like the events at the heart of Thomas’s study.     
In the midst of a decisive shift in federal Indian policy, the decade and a half was 
a highly-charged political and cultural moment on the reservation. It was also a moment 
in which Crow women’s attitudes and practices regarding biological reproduction were in 
flux.  In this context, the politics surrounding pregnancy and childbirth became 
particularly visible, as differently positioned parties—Euro-American government 
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employees and health workers, social scientists, Crow men, young Crow women, 
midwives and former midwives—debated the appropriate location and social setting for 
childbirth.  In discussing, implementing, and responding to policies pertaining to control 
of reproduction and authority in reproductive matters, invested parties addressed 
questions of women’s status, the purpose and scope of colonial governance, and the 
nature and import of various social relationships. 
 
The Crow Reservation 
This chapter focuses on a single reservation as a case study.  A case study is 
necessary because local circumstances mattered in the implementation of federal policy.  
For example, the Crow Reservation was distinguished in this period by the fact that a 
Crow man served as superintendent of the reservation.  Yet developments on the Crow 
Reservation mirrored trends on reservations throughout the West.  As a Native society 
occupying land desired by an expanding and politically and economically powerful 
nation, Crows shared historical and contemporary experiences with other Indigenous 
peoples due to their shared status as targets of U.S. settler society’s ongoing efforts to 
displace them.9 Furthermore, because the Indian Service conceptualized policy at the 
national level, there were patterns in the way employees, many of whom spent their 
careers moving from reservation to reservation, implemented these policies.  
In 1851, Crow leaders signed the first Fort Laramie Treaty, in which the U.S. 
government recognized the tribe’s right to 33 million acres in present-day Montana and 
Wyoming.  In addition, the government pledged to provide Crows with $50,000 worth of 
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supplies annually, a pledge U.S. officials almost immediately ignored.  Throughout the 
1860s and 1870s, Crow warriors fought alongside the U.S. military in a series of battles 
against the Sioux, their primary rivals in the region.  As scholar Jonathan Lear explains, 
the government treated the Crow “as an ally” in return for this valuable assistance, but 
this military alliance “did not stop the United States from repeatedly revising treaties at 
will and from encroaching on Crow lands.”10  In a second Fort Laramie Treaty in 1867, 
the U.S. only recognized eight million acres of land, and by 1882, the U.S. recognized 
only two million acres in what would soon be the state of Montana as Crow land.11  The 
dispersed group relocated to the tribe’s newly-bounded reservation in the early 1880s.  
Crows struggled to survive within these new geographic constraints at the same moment 
that the buffalo almost completely disappeared from the region, effectively stripping 
them of their traditional livelihoods.12  Within two decades, nearly one-third of the 
reservation population perished.13  Survivors endured “massive disorientation.”14   
Like other Indigenous groups, Crows were targets of the federal government’s 
multi-faceted assimilation campaign.  Government employees recruited Crow children to 
attend off-reservation boarding schools, where students received Western educations and 
spent years away from their families and communities.15 Other Crow children attended a 
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boarding school on the reservation until it closed in 1920.  Former students reported that 
superintendents used police power to “force” children’s attendance, and the school staff 
mistreated students.  Although administrators initially allowed students to return home on 
the weekends, they eventually stopped this practice.16  The federal government also 
promoted the allotment of tribal land.  Crow land was allotted in waves, beginning in the 
1880s and culminating in the Crow Act of 1920.17  From the perspective of policymakers 
and social reformers, allotment had the potential to accomplish multiple federal 
objectives.  It supposedly encouraged economic self-sufficiency and a capitalist 
orientation; facilitated the transfer of “excess” Crow land to white management and 
ownership; and allowed for the physical separation of large households into nuclear 
family units.18  
Government employees also carried out initiatives intended to transform Crow 
women specifically.  As Frederick Hoxie has argued, “In the reservation setting, Crow 
women were expected to conform to Anglo-American standards of behavior.”19  This 
meant decreased sexual freedom, decreased economic and political standing, and 
decreased autonomy within the home.  As Chapter One demonstrated, this also meant 
increased expectations regarding daily domestic and maternal responsibilities.  Field 
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matrons visited Crow women’s homes to teach women the arts of domesticity and the 
science of motherhood, and the Progressive-Era Save the Babies campaign intensified 
this effort.  At the start of the century, Janette Woodruff was the sole field matron 
assigned to the Crow Reservation.  By 1916, at the height of the campaign, three field 
matrons carried out the campaign’s programs.20   
By the 1930s, developments on the Crow Reservation exposed the limitations of 
the state’s power to remake Crow society.  Despite successive superintendents’ attempts 
to repress cultural expression, the Crows maintained many of the social and cultural 
practices the government aimed to eradicate.  Throughout the first decades of the century, 
Crows continued to speak their tribal language and to practice traditional ceremonies and 
rituals.21  Perhaps most importantly, clans continued to be organized along matrilineal 
lines; kinship networks remained at the center of the reservation social structure; and 
many Crows continued to privilege the extended family over the nuclear family unit.22   
Crows adapted to reservation life by reconfiguring their political relationship to 
the federal government as well as their internal political structure.  The twenty-six bands 
constituting the Crow “tribe” had maintained a great deal of autonomy prior to their 
confinement on the new reservation.  While these decentralized bands influenced 
reservation settlement patterns, Crows gradually shifted toward a more unified political 
system in the early twentieth century in order to present a strong political voice to Indian 
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Service officials and policymakers.23  Furthermore, the policy of removing Indian 
children from their homes and placing them in government boarding schools produced a 
generation of young, educated leaders, who returned to their reservation eager to have a 
say in the political and economic issues facing their communities.  This new generation 
of predominantly male leaders formally called for the removal of a series of 
superintendents in the 1910s and 1920s before they finally achieved success in ousting a 
dissatisfactory superintendent and securing Yellowtail’s appointment in the early 1930s.24   
The appointment of John Collier, a social reformer and vocal critic of the Indian 
Service, as commissioner of Indian affairs in 1933 seemed to portend notable change in 
federal Indian policy, as Collier advocated greater respect for Native cultures and 
promised increased political autonomy for Native groups.   Collier rejected many of the 
assumptions undergirding the government’s assimilationist agenda, and he championed 
the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, which effectively reversed land policies that had 
been in place since the late 1880s.  Scholars generally agree that Collier’s attitudes and 
policies represent a significant shift in federal Indian policy, although in the short term, 
progress was limited by the unwillingness of reservation employees, many of whom 
remained committed to assimilationist ideals, to accept Collier’s vision.25  
The impact of Collier’s administration was magnified on the Crow Reservation, 
due in part to the established foundation for political and cultural expression and in part 
to Collier’s historic appointment of a Crow man as superintendent on his own 
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reservation.  Robert Yellowtail was one of the young, educated leaders who obtained a 
central position in tribal politics in the early twentieth century.  As a child, he attended an 
Indian boarding school in Riverside, California.  He returned to his reservation in the 
early 1910s and immediately involved himself in a decade-long struggle to protect Crow 
unallotted lands from continued encroachment by white settlers. Throughout the 1910s 
and 1920s, Yellowtail joined other Crow leaders in successive delegations to 
Washington, D.C., and he spearheaded local political opposition to superintendents he 
did not believe served Crow interests.  In the early 1930s, he and other young Crow 
leaders once again waged a campaign to remove a sitting superintendent, this time career 
Indian Service administrator James Hyde.  As the recently-appointed commissioner, 
Collier viewed the campaign as an opportunity to put his commitment to tribal autonomy 
into practice.  He approved Hyde’s transfer and appointed Yellowtail as superintendent of 
the Crow Reservation.26 
Much to Collier’s disappointment, the Crows voted against his Indian 
Reorganization Act, which established guidelines for tribal governments and 
constitutions, but throughout the decade, political authority was centralized within the 
Crow Tribal Council.  Frederick Hoxie has noted that in the 1920s, the council “became a 
vehicle for the defense of cultural values and the formation of a distinctive group 
consensus,” as it effectively replaced the Business Committee.27  In many ways, the 
Tribal Council was a remarkably democratic political body, but in the 1930s, the council 
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was dominated by Crow men and served to magnify male power on the reservation.  
Although council meetings were open to all tribal members, Crow women were less 
likely than men to attend them, and they rarely spoke when they did attend.28  Native 
women have charged that sexism in tribal politics increased following the Indian 
Reorganization Act, as male leaders “attempted to define ‘traditional’ leadership as the 
exclusive domain of men.”29 
Following a decade of superintendent Calvin Asbury’s rigid restrictions on Crow 
cultural expression, the 1930s also witnessed a cultural resurgence.  Decades later, Mae 
Takes Gun Childs described Asbury as “very strict and very mean with the Crows most 
of the time.”  She recalled that “he was known . . . as a mean uncaring man who tried to 
force the Crows to give up some of the cultural events” and who did not hesitate to use 
police power to enforce his instructions.30  Lillian Bullshows Hogan described 
reservation life under Superintendent Asbury similarly: “The Crows gave him a real bad 
Indian name because they didn’t like him . . . but we all knew he was the boss and 
everything he said was it.”31  Both women remembered Yellowtail’s appointment as a 
decisive turning point in reservation life—to the extent that they skipped over Hyde’s 
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short-lived superintendency altogether in their recollections, conflating the attitudes and 
practices of both of Yellowtail’s predecessors.  After “Robbie took over,” Childs 
recalled, “then the people could do as they pleased, they could have dances and 
celebrations, tobacco dances or anything else.  They weren’t afraid anymore.”32  While 
Yellowtail was superintendent, Crows revived their annual fair, which had waned in the 
late 1910s, and a group of Crow men, including Hogan’s brother and Yellowtail’s 
brother, reintroduced the Sun Dance to the reservation.33  
Whites who lived among the Crows observed a sharp increase in Crow political 
and cultural consciousness in the 1930s, a development that few viewed favorably.  In 
1939, William Petzoldt, a Baptist missionary who had lived on the reservation for more 
than three decades and who led the church that Yellowtail attended, expressed his 
“violent disaggreement [sic]” with the Crows’ renewal of “old customs,” customs he had 
hoped had “died out” under previous superintendents.  Whereas Childs and Hogan had 
credited Yellowtail for the changes they praised, Petzoldt blamed Collier for the 
developments he lamented.  He explained that his opposition to “present Collier policy” 
stemmed in part from “the disturbance created in the mind of the Indian in telling him to 
recreate the days of old, which are def[initely] gone forever.”34  Chester Bentley, another 
Baptist missionary who lived and worked on the reservation, echoed these sentiments.  
Bentley contended that Collier’s policies represented “a step backward,” serving only to 
create “a chaotic state of affairs where the mind and purpose of the Indian is concerned.”  
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Specifically, Bentley lamented the change he believed he witnessed in Crow attitudes.  
He explained that “10 years ago the Indian was more ‘submissive,’ whereas today the 
Indian was rather haughty, proud, conceited.”35  
Thus, the Crow women Takes Gun Childs and Hogan and the white Baptist 
missionaries could agree that the 1930s was a decade of profound political change on the 
reservation and that political change was closely related to Crow cultural expression, 
even if they viewed these developments from very different perspectives.  Government 
employees’ efforts to intervene in Crow women’s reproduction, on the other hand, 
remained consistent with previous decades.  Crow men and women’s attitudes toward 
these policies and toward biological reproduction—a cultural and political matter—more 
generally were shaped by the reservation’s spirited atmosphere in the 1930s. 
 
Reproduction and Crow Politics 
 Although Commissioner of Indian Affairs Cato Sells announced the end of the 
Save the Babies campaign in 1918, government employees continued to promote hospital 
childbirth on reservations for medical and assimilationist reasons.  In the 1920s, the 
responsibility for persuading Indian women to give birth in government hospitals shifted 
from field matrons to field nurses.  Reflecting the Indian Service’s increased commitment 
to professionalism and expertise, administrators began phasing out the field matron 
program and replacing field matrons with trained public health nurses.  In practice, 
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however, the two programs exhibited notable continuity.  Supervisor of Nursing Elinor 
Gregg’s 1926 “Plan of Work for Field Nurses” acknowledged that field nurses’ 
responsibilities necessarily extended beyond health; her program included “activities 
which are, strictly speaking, along lines of home economics” and “social services.” 
Gregg emphasized field nurses’ duties with regard to maternal and infant welfare.  She 
instructed her employees to make regular visits to the homes of parturient women and to 
use such occasions to “Urge hospital care for delivery.”  With regard to method, Gregg 
recommended the “friendly visit,” the field matron’s preferred tactic.36   
 By the 1930s, government employees on the Crow Reservation had made notable 
progress in their effort to promote hospital childbirth.  At the start of the decade, 
approximately half of Crow women gave birth in the Crow Indian Hospital.37  The 
increase in hospital deliveries paralleled a trend throughout Indian Country.  Historian 
David Dejong contends that by 1940, “80% of all Indian babies were born in Indian 
Service operated or contracted hospitals.”38  Given the high rates of infant mortality that 
continued to plague the Crow Reservation, some women found field workers’ promises 
of better maternal and infant health outcomes persuasive.  For example, Effie Hoover, a 
female Baptist missionary who joined government employees in encouraging hospital 
childbirth, related the case of one “outstanding” Crow woman who, following the deaths 
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of two infant daughters, chose to give birth to her third daughter in the government 
hospital “so the little one might have the best start possible.”39  In this case, mother and 
infant experienced a safe childbirth, but tragically, the infant succumbed to pneumonia 
within six months.  Convinced that government field workers had neglected her ill child, 
the death of her daughter caused the devastated mother to question the faith she had 
placed in government health workers.40   
 Female field workers’ efforts to persuade Crow and other Native women to give 
birth at the hospital did not rely solely on promises of better health outcomes.  Personal 
relationships notwithstanding, female Indian Service employees were agents within the 
U.S. colonial apparatus.  They were, as Crow Senior Physician Charles Nagel described 
himself and his colleagues, “the living part of the governmental machine.”41  With the 
authority of the state behind field workers, Native women had reason to fear various 
forms of disciplinary action.  Field nurses like Anna Perry practiced intrusive repetition, 
and Perry’s own reports indicate that the “friendly visits” that Gregg advocated were 
often characterized more by tension than intimacy.  Perry lamented that Crow women 
viewed her with suspicion, but the distrust appears to have been mutual.  In September 
1940, Perry received word from an undisclosed source that two young women in her 
district were pregnant.  She made contact with the two women to inquire about their 
pregnancies and found that one of the women already “look[ed] the part.”  Nevertheless, 
the women evaded Perry’s prenatal and hospital instructions by simply “deny[ing] the 
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charge.”42  Over the next two years, Perry regularly commented on Crow women’s 
tendency to make false promises, pledging to visit the clinic for prenatal care and the 
hospital for delivery but failing to follow through on their commitments. Her experiences 
were not unusual; a field nurse stationed at the Ponca Subagency in Oklahoma 
encountered false promises so frequently that she concluded the women in her district 
“say they will go [to the hospital for childbirth] just to be agreeable or to avoid an 
argument.”43  
 The way some field nurses responded to Indigenous women’s resistance gave the 
latter reason to view the nurses as patronizing rather than trustworthy.  The Ponca field 
nurse’s hypothesis that Indian women made false promises regarding hospital childbirth 
“to avoid an argument” suggests that she found it reasonable that the women might 
expect an argument or worse if they refused to follow the field nurse’s “advice.”  Perry’s 
responses to women who did not yield to her persuasion further support these women’s 
assumption.  In June 1942, a young Crow woman gave birth at home despite Perry’s 
efforts to make arrangements for her hospitalization and left the hospital against the 
physician’s advice after Perry accompanied her there five days following her delivery.  
Although the woman had visited the clinic for prenatal care and accepted Perry’s visits 
throughout her pregnancy, and she consented to bottle feed her baby and eventually to 
take him to the hospital as Perry encouraged, Perry’s frustration with the new mother, 
who she contended “has always been a problem,” is palpable throughout her report.44   
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 The promotion of government childbirth also continued to include a multi-faceted 
anti-midwife campaign.  Government employees publicly disparaged Indigenous 
midwives in an attempt to make younger women question the trust they placed in them.  
In addition, decades later former midwives recalled that the government used police 
power to force them to stop their practice.  Elder Indigenous women used the words 
“soldiers” and “police” interchangeably when they reported that in the decades prior to 
World War II, even as many non-Native women continued to deliver babies at home, 
government agents threatened Native midwives with arrest.  Activist Charon Asetoyer 
contends that these women were “told that they would be arrested because they were 
passing on that knowledge.”45  The former midwives suggested that they slowed or 
ceased their practice due to fear.  In the 1940s, government employees on some 
reservations noted with approval that midwifery seemed to be decreasing because older 
women feared the legal repercussions they would face if anything went wrong.  
 Government policies undermined midwives’ influence in more subtle ways as 
well.  At boarding schools, Crow and other Indigenous girls received lessons in the 
superiority of Western medicine and the inferiority of the traditional healing practices of 
their communities.  Boarding school also disrupted young women’s participation in 
reproduction-related customs and the transmission of reproduction-related knowledge.  
As Irene Stewart, a Navajo woman, explained, “My attempt to live the traditional Navajo 
way of life was chopped up with school life.  The customary puberty ceremony was not 
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made for me because I was in school at that age.”46  Like Stewart, Alma Hogan Snell 
spent years away from the Crow Reservation, geographically separated from her 
extended kin network, while she attended Flandreau Indian School in South Dakota.  But 
Snell’s grandmother was Pretty Shield, a well-respected Crow midwife.  When Pretty 
Shield had given birth in the second half of the nineteenth century, her mother had acted 
as a midwife.  When Pretty Shield’s daughter Little Woman delivered her babies, 
including Snell, in the first decades of the twentieth century, Pretty Shield acted as 
midwife.  Pretty Shield and Snell enjoyed a close relationship, and it is entirely possible 
that Pretty Shield might have performed midwifery services when it was Snell’s turn to 
give birth.  As it happened, Pretty Shield passed away shortly before Snell’s first 
pregnancy, and Snell gave birth at the Crow Indian Hospital.47  In some cases, as women 
like Pretty Shield passed away, their knowledge was not passed down to younger 
generations of women, leaving Indigenous women with fewer options for childbirth 
attendants. 
 As superintendent, Robert Yellowtail lent his voice to the government’s campaign 
against Indigenous midwives.  He pulled no punches in explaining the inferiority of the 
“old method” of “Camp” births under the supervision of “women with no training.”48  In 
his capacity as superintendent, Yellowtail’s insistence on the inferiority of home births 
and midwives is unremarkable, but as a Crow man, Yellowtail’s arguments reflect a 
notable change in political authority on the reservation.  Pregnancy and childbirth, 
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processes previously navigated within female networks, had been forced into the male-
centric political sphere. 
 Like many Native cultures, Crows had long adhered to a gendered division of 
labor that they deemed necessary to the harmony within and even survival of the tribe.  
Among Crow women’s most critical responsibilities was the social and biological 
reproduction of their families and, by extension, the tribe.  Through their role as life-
givers, Crow women earned respect which often translated into ceremonial roles and 
informal political influence.  The respect granted to women’s reproductive labor was 
reflected in the matrilineal nature of Crow society; women gave birth to children, and it 
was the woman who determined the children’s identity and inheritance.49  As the practice 
of midwifery suggests, Crows recognized a generational hierarchy within this gendered 
division of labor.  By the time ethnographer Frank Linderman interviewed Pretty Shield 
in the early 1930s, the Crow elder had given birth to five children, acted as a midwife for 
her own daughters, and assisted in the birth of countless Crow babies.  From the 
perspective of many on the reservation, Pretty Shield was an expert in the life-giving 
process of biological reproduction, and her knowledge and service demanded respect.50   
 Yellowtail’s comments undermined Pretty Shield and other Crow midwives’ 
status and obscured their continued influence.  Although he insisted that the women 
assisting home births had “no training,” some Crow women, such as Pretty Shield, likely 
had more experience with childbirth than many of the physicians at the Crow Indian 
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Hospital in the 1930s.51  Crow women’s training consisted of an informal apprentice 
system.  Typically, a woman only assisted deliveries after she had given birth herself; she 
then assisted other midwives before overseeing deliveries on her own.  A Crow woman 
only earned the reputation of “midwife” after she had gained the trust of other women.52  
As Yellowtail’s younger sister Agnes Deernose explained, when it came to pregnancy 
and childbirth, women looked to older women because they “knew what to do.”53   
 Furthermore, Yellowtail’s optimism regarding Crow women’s faith in the new 
method of childbirth and his confidence in occupying a public role in these decisions did 
not necessarily align with the circumstances of his personal life.  When his wife Lillian 
Bullshows Hogan had given birth a few years before his appointment as superintendent, 
she had taken control of childbirth preparations and informed her husband that she would 
not go to the hospital and would instead move closer to her mother’s residence, so her 
mother could assist her during and following childbirth.  Hogan recalled that Yellowtail 
deferred to her judgment, replying, “I’ll do your way. We’ll go over there, live there.”54   
 Nevertheless, although Yellowtail may have overstated the transformation he 
celebrated, he did not imagine it.  Hospital childbirth altered the gendered dynamics 
surrounding childbirth.  One of anthropologist Robert Lowie’s male informants noted that 
traditionally, “all obstetricians were . . . women . . . Indeed, no males, not even boys” 
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were allowed to witness a delivery.   Although the informant suggested that this had 
begun to change “in recent times,” hospital deliveries accelerated and formalized the 
transition to male-supervised childbirth.55 
 Throughout the 1930s, the Crow Indian Hospital and its staff occupied a central 
position in reservation politics, as tribal leaders displayed a determination to ensure that 
the government hospital served their needs and interests.  To the frustration of reservation 
medical staff and Indian Service officials in Washington, D.C., Crows regularly 
submitted complaints when they believed a member of the hospital staff treated them 
unfairly, and the Crow Tribal Council demanded that physicians attend council meetings 
to address the complaints.  As Crow women began giving birth at the hospital, the 
circumstances surrounding their reproductive experiences became subjects of debate 
within the male-dominated Tribal Council.  When a Crow woman had a complaint about 
her experience at the hospital, she could turn to the council.  At mid-decade, for example, 
one woman alleged that the senior physician had treated her roughly during her delivery, 
employing excessively interventionist techniques.  Tragically, her infant did not survive, 
a death the devastated mother and father blamed on the physician’s use of forceps.56  
Another woman complained that the hospital staff had disregarded her maternal rights by 
separating her from her infant overnight, despite the fact that she was still breastfeeding.  
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In both cases, the women’s husbands introduced the complaints on their wives’ behalf, 
although in the latter case the woman also appealed directly to the council.57 
 Although this process of registering positions and complaints resembles Euro-
American expectations of men’s political prominence and the husband’s authoritative 
position, it is not clear that it was entirely a Western imposition.  Alma Hogan Snell 
describes a somewhat similar process of indirect political influence prior to the 
establishment of the reservation, when largely autonomous bands were governed by a 
council of warriors.  Snell explains, “If a woman wanted her views put before the council, 
she approached the gathering.  She would say, ‘I wish to speak to’—a certain man, 
maybe her father or her husband or her clan uncle.  The man would say, ‘I will speak to 
her private,’ or ‘Say on.’  If he said, ‘Say on,’ she would be speaking to the man but the 
council would hear her words.  In that way she made her views known to the council.”58   
 What does appear to be new, however, was the idea that the Tribal Council was 
an appropriate venue for topics related to reproduction.  Following the council meeting, 
the Crow Health Council, a group that Nagel had recently created, invited the physician 
to address the allegations that he had authorized and enforced the overnight separation of 
a mother and her nursing infant.  In his response, Nagel questioned the mother’s 
breastfeeding practices, noting that “No woman should nurse her baby in the middle of 
the nite [sic].”  The question of breastfeeding prompted a discussion of the merits of 
Crow women’s breastfeeding habits more generally—a discussion in which only Crow 
men and the white physician participated, and in which Nagel informed the male council 
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members that he believed Crow and other Native women breastfed incorrectly, because 
they did not abide by a defined schedule.59  The circumstances surrounding these men’s 
conversation, much like those surrounding Yellowtail’s disparagement of midwives and 
Crow women’s submission of complaints to the Tribal Council, highlight men’s 
increased role in reproductive matters on the reservation. 
  
Crow Women and Midwifery in the 1930s 
 By the 1930s, the Crow Indian Hospital was not an abstraction for most Crow 
women.  Reservation employees noted in the late 1920s that more than ninety percent of 
Crows accepted hospital care in at least some situations.60 Many Crow women took ill 
children to the hospital or even sought medical care themselves.  For some Crow women, 
such as Robert Yellowtail’s sister-in-law Susie Yellowtail and his cousin Alma Hogan 
Snell, the hospital was also a place of employment.  While Susie Yellowtail briefly 
worked at the hospital as a nurse, the hospital more typically employed Crow women as 
attendants or cooks. Crow women also experienced the hospital as a politicized site, as 
the institution was a subject of regular conversation between kin, among members of the 
Crow Indian Women’s Club, and in Tribal Council meetings.   
 Crow women’s increased familiarity with the government hospital represented 
real progress in the Indian Service’s decades-long campaign to persuade the Crows to 
accept Western medicine.  Crows were less likely to express ideas that had been 
prevalent when the hospital was first established in 1907, such as that the building was “a 
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strange place from which you might not come out alive.”61  Rather, by the 1930s many 
Crows approached government health services much as they approached other aspects of 
the government’s “civilization” agenda: selectively.  As indicated above, some Crow 
women, like other Indigenous women, opted to deliver their babies at the hospital.  These 
women agitated to ensure the hospital met their needs as a location for childbirth.  In 
1930, for example, a “committee of [Crow] women” presented their concerns regarding 
the “lack of isolation facilities” for maternity patients at the hospital to Assistant 
Supervisor of Nurses Mabel Morgan when she visited the reservation.  They complained 
that the placement of tuberculosis and obstetrical cases “in juxtaposition” was 
unacceptable, and Morgan indicated her agreement in her final report.62  Crow women 
also refused to allow the hospital to disrupt their social networks.  When possible, Crow 
women as well as Crow men simply disregarded the hospital employees’ requests to limit 
the presence of visitors.63 When one or more employees remained firm on this hospital 
policy, Crows registered their dissatisfaction through the Tribal Council.64   
 At the start of the decade, about half of Crow women made a different choice: 
they did not give birth in the hospital and instead gave birth at home with the assistance 
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of trusted women.  Logistical considerations likely influenced many women’s 
reproductive decisions.  The reservation had a single hospital to meet the needs of almost 
two thousand Crows, dispersed throughout six districts.  Josephine Russell, a Crow 
woman, noted that women might have had to travel “twenty-five, thirty miles before they 
could reach the hospital,” and many Crow families did not have automobiles.65  Field 
nurse Anna Perry’s regular complaints about the distance between Crow Agency and her 
jurisdiction at Pryor, as well as the poor quality of roads connecting the two locations, 
suggest obstacles the women in her district would have faced in arranging a hospital 
childbirth.  To minimize these obstacles, Perry and other field nurses encouraged women 
to make their hospital journey several days before their anticipated delivery date and in 
some cases provided transportation themselves.  For some Crow and other Indigenous 
women, however, such solutions were untenable, as they were unwilling to leave their 
families for an indefinite period of time.  
 In many cases, however, Crow women’s home deliveries and reliance on 
midwives were much more than a simple matter of logistics.  Their decisions were rooted 
in a Crow “culture of childbirth” that government employees including Yellowtail 
typically ignored or disparaged in universal terms.66  The Crow culture of childbirth was 
gendered, and many Crows, including Yellowtail’s former wife, continued to believe that 
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childbirth should be a woman’s affair.  They did not allow men, even their husbands, to 
be present for their labor and delivery.67   
The culture also had a generational structure; it provided a foundation for 
intergenerational bonds, including that between older female kin and the newborn child.  
As noted in Chapter One, Alma Hogan Snell, who characterized herself as a 
“grandmother’s grandchild,” began the story of her birth by emphasizing her 
grandmother’s presence: “She was with me when I was born.”68  After delivery, the older 
women cleaned and cared for the infant and performed rituals to ensure the child’s future 
well-being.69  Ethnographer Fred Voget’s female informants explained that the maternal 
grandmother often cut the umbilical cord, and the paternal grandmother pierced a female 
infant’s ears shortly after birth.70  Often, the maternal or paternal grandmother kept her 
new grandchild in her bed for days if not months following birth, relinquishing the child 
to his or her mother only for nursing.71   
 Because midwifery brought older Indigenous women respect within their families 
and communities, many had a vested interest in maintaining their central role in 
childbirth.  Since the 1910s, the Indian Service’s effort to persuade Native women to give 
birth in hospitals had in large part been a struggle to wrest control away from their older 
female kin.  In the midst of the Save the Babies campaign, reservation employees who 
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lamented their lack of progress in getting maternity cases to the hospital attributed their 
failure to older women’s conviction that midwifery was “their inalienable prerogative..”72  
A decade later, a physician at the Crow Indian Hospital observed that “the influence 
extended by . . . Indian Mid Wives” explained some Crow women’s continued reluctance 
to enter the hospital for confinement.73  Over the next two decades, field workers 
complained that mothers and grandmothers believed themselves to be “veterans” in 
reproductive matters and persuaded pregnant women to disregard government 
employee’s advice regarding hospital confinement and new mothers to disregard advice 
regarding childcare.74 
 Crow and other Indigenous women also appreciated the intimacy and relative 
comfort of a home birth.  As Anna Moore Shaw, a Pima woman, explained, “Like most 
Indian women of the time, I was much too modest to have my babies delivered by a 
doctor in a hospital.”75  From the perspective of Crow women who opted for midwife-
assisted home births, the “old method” Yellowtail disparaged and the “crude” and 
“primitive” practices other government agents derided included a number of strategies 
older women employed to increase the laboring woman’s comfort.76  Typically, 
midwives or birthing assistants lined the ground with a buffalo robe or hay to provide a 
soft foundation, and they planted two stakes or hung a rope for the laboring woman to 
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grasp during labor pains.  They instructed the laboring woman to kneel or squat rather 
than lie down so that they could utilize rather than fight gravity.77  Indigenous midwives 
also had recourse to rituals to ease difficult deliveries.  These included manipulation and 
massage techniques, as well as chants and recitations.78 Among the Crow, many 
midwives employed herbs such as sage as incense or used bear root to facilitate a 
delivery.  When a midwife did not have this knowledge, she called on a medicine woman 
who did.79 
 Some Crow women found the circumstances surrounding a home birth far 
preferable to the circumstances surrounding a hospital birth.  Indigenous women who 
experienced a home birth and a hospital birth emphasized the relative ease of squatting or 
kneeling, so that the baby was in a “natural position,” versus attempting to push out a 
baby lying flat with one’s legs in the air.80  More generally, as Carolyn Niethammer has 
noted, the government hospital was “filled with strangers,” and patients spent a good deal 
of their time by themselves.”81  The medical staff at the Crow Indian Hospital regularly 
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complained that the hospital was overcrowded and understaffed, leading to charges of 
neglect by Crow patients.82  Agnes Deernose, Robert Yellowtail’s younger sister,  entered 
the hospital for confinement, but she “got scared and came back home” before the onset 
of labor.  Deernose’s fears stemmed less from associations of the hospital as a “sick 
people’s lodge,” and more from her sense of loneliness and alienation in the sterile 
medical setting.  She gave birth with the assistance of two trusted female kin.83 
 When Susie Walking Bear Yellowtail, Robert Yellowtail’s sister-in-law, chose to 
give birth at home, her decision stemmed from a different set of fears.  Like the power 
struggles between some reservation employees and elder Native midwives, Yellowtail’s 
experiences underscore the explicitly political struggle that sometimes surrounded 
childbirth.  Susie Yellowtail was one of the first Native American registered nurses. She 
graduated from the Boston City Hospital School of Nursing in 1923, and at the end of the 
decade she returned to her reservation and spent three years working as a nurse at the 
Crow Indian Hospital.84  When she prepared for childbirth in early 1934, however, she 
staunchly refused to give birth in the hospital in which she had worked.  Yellowtail was 
not opposed to Western medicine or even medicalized childbirth.  In fact, she requested 
that a government physician attend her home birth, a request Senior Physician Charles 
Nagel unequivocally refused.  Nagel condemned Yellowtail’s “selfish” request, 
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proclaiming, “You have been offered the services of the Hospital . . . You are therefore 
not entitled to receive the courtesy of the Field Service.”  He informed Yellowtail that he 
was ordering Indian Service health workers “not to render you assistance.”85   
 The cause of Yellowtail’s opposition to a hospital delivery and also of Nagel’s 
animosity was likely the circumstances surrounding Yellowtail’s recent employment at 
the reservation hospital.  Her experience working with white doctors at the hospital was 
largely negative.  Like many other Crows, she contended that the white medical staff 
mistreated Crow patients.  More specifically, she alleged that government physicians 
sterilized Crow women without their consent.86  Hospital records make clear that 
physicians performed at least a few hysterectomies during Yellowtail’s employment.87   
Because the hysterectomies were recorded in quantitative rather than narrative reports, 
the rationales for the hysterectomies and the context in which they occurred are obscured 
in these government sources.   
 The timing of Susie Yellowtail’s allegations and of references to sterilizations in 
government records roughly coincides with the wave of eugenic laws passed at the state 
level in the 1920s and the Supreme Court’s ruling on the constitutionality of eugenic 
sterilization in 1927.  Western states were among the most likely to pass such statutes, 
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and Montana passed a sterilization statute in 1923.88  With a few exceptions, most 
scholarship on eugenic sterilization in the first half of the twentieth century either ignores 
Indigenous women entirely or explicitly argues that Native women “fell outside of early 
twentieth-century eugenic campaigns.”89 To the contrary, although lawmakers in most 
states did not address Native Americans in the discussions leading up to the passage of 
the laws, eugenic statutes were written in a manner that allowed Indian women to be 
targeted in their implementation.90  
In addition to references to moral degeneracy and sexual deviancy, many state 
laws authorized the sterilization of individuals who were, in the words of one 1929 
statute, “likely to become . . . wards of the state.”91  This phrase theoretically included the 
biological reproduction of all Indigenous women, and in fact government employees used 
dependency on the government in various forms as arguments in favor of the sterilization 
of individual women.  Lawmakers also often specified that they intended for sterilization 
laws to be pursued aggressively and expansively.  The above statute, for example, 
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concludes, “The provisions of this act are to be liberally construed to accomplish this 
purpose.”92 
 Government employees on the Crow Reservation and throughout Indian Country 
drew on these state eugenic statutes in recommending the sterilization of Indigenous 
women.  More than most states, Montana’s sterilization statute set a relatively high bar 
for patient consent, but as Chapter Four will demonstrate, reservation employees relied 
on colonial power dynamics to delineate the parameters of consent.  Furthermore, Susie 
Yellowtail alleged that at times physicians disregarded consent altogether and sterilized 
Crow women “without their being aware of it.”93  Her allegations resemble the 
“Mississippi appendectomies” black women in the South reported in the 1950s; women 
entered the hospital for childbirth or an unrelated surgery and received a hysterectomy.94   
Montana’s statute also stated that eugenic sterilization required that the individual 
in question be an inmate of a state institution, typically the Montana State Training 
School (often referred to as the School for the Feebleminded) in Boulder and the 
Montana State Mental Hospital in Warm Springs.  Both were about a four-hour drive 
from Crow Agency, and government employees and occasionally tribal judges or law 
enforcement sent Crow girls and young women to these institutions, which suggests that 
Crow women may have been included in the more than 250 sterilizations legally 
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performed on inmates of these institutions.95  This leaves the hysterectomies performed at 
the Crow Indian Hospital unexplained, however.  It is not clear whether the operations 
were blatantly illegal; or Indian Service employees and/or state authorities characterized 
government hospitals as acceptable state institutions; or the hospital staff offered non-
eugenic grounds for hysterectomies that I have not located.  
For Susie Yellowtail’s part, her biographer and descendants contend that 
Yellowtail’s knowledge of the "non-consent sterilizations” white doctors performed on 
Crow women transformed her into a political activist.96  They insist that she was vocal 
about these accusations in the 1930s, although she was unable to get anyone with power 
to listen to her.97  What she was able to do at the time, however, was refuse to give birth 
in the hospital herself and to assist other women who made the same choice.  She worked 
as a midwife in southern Montana from the 1930s through the 1950s.98 
Yellowtail’s preference for home birth and her midwifery career complicate any 
simple dichotomy between “old” and “new” childbirth methods.  On the one hand, the 
reservation witnessed a resurgence of Crow cultural expressions in the 1930s, which 
Baptist missionary William Petzoldt implied included the “rehabilitat[ion]” of Crow 
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medicine men.99  Susie Yellowtail and her husband Tom played central roles in these 
developments.  According to Yellowtail’s biographer, throughout the Depression and war 
years “the Yellowtails belonged to a group nicknamed ‘The Crazy Bunch’ who were 
trying to resurrect old songs, hand games, and other customs of the pre-reservation 
Crow.”100  Both embraced the “Sun Dance renaissance” on the reservation; Tom was 
among the earliest dancers and eventually became a prominent Sun Dance leader and 
medicine man.  In this sense, Yellowtail’s commitment to midwifery can be seen as part 
of her broader effort to “relearn traditional Crow life-ways” following the years she spent 
away from the reservation.101  But, on the other hand, Yellowtail had also received the 
type of medical training that government employees, including Robert Yellowtail, viewed 
as necessary for a proper delivery.  As a nurse-midwife,  she used her medical training to 
allow Crow women to give birth in the location and social and cultural context of their 
choice. 
 
Conclusion 
 Begun in earnest through the Progressive-Era Save the Babies campaign, the 
federal government’s effort to persuade Indigenous women to give birth in government 
hospitals continued more than a decade after the campaign’s official termination.  As 
growing numbers of Crow women chose to utilize hospital maternity services, they, like 
other Crows, agitated with varying degrees of success to make the government hospital 
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an institution that served their particular needs.  The Crow Indian Hospital was a 
cornerstone of tribal politics in the 1930s and early 1940s, as it represented the federal 
government’s obligations to Crow men, women, and children and the health and survival 
of the community, and it served as an early site of battles for increased self-
determination.  Crow women’s use of the hospital brought their hospital experiences, 
including experiences surrounding childbirth, into the political sphere.  As Susie 
Yellowtail’s story demonstrates, and as the next chapter will explore more fully, the 
hospital also served as a site in which individuals were deprived of bodily autonomy and 
isolated from social networks. 
 The 1930s and early 1940s also witnessed a continuation of the federal campaign 
to eradicate the influence of Indigenous midwives.  The promotion of hospital childbirth 
furthered ongoing efforts to marginalize older Indigenous women, with the assumption 
that their authority would be replaced by that of male physicians and husbands.  As the 
involvement of Robert Yellowtail and other male Crow leaders suggests, this carried 
broader implications for tribal politics, as it destabilized gendered and generational power 
structures on the reservation.  Nevertheless, Crow midwifery, although under increased 
constraints, continued in various forms throughout the Depression and World War II 
years, revealing the politics in play when observers obscured this reality. 
 In the “critical moment” examined in this chapter—the Crow Reservation in the 
1930s and early 1940s—Crow and Euro-American men and women negotiated 
reproductive politics alongside other highly-charged political issues regarding colonial 
health policy.  The next chapter continues this case study of the Crow Reservation.   It 
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further explores the colonial, gendered, and generational politics on the reservation by 
shifting the focus from Crow women’s reproductive practices to their sexual practices. 
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CHAPTER 4 
POLICING VENEREAL DISEASE ON THE CROW RESERVATION 
            In the fall of 1932, Superintendent James Hyde arranged for the incarceration of 
four “incorrigible” young Crow women “as prisoners” in the Crow Indian Hospital.1  
“Julie” had been found by a Crow policeman “in a drunken stupor.”  Hyde alleged that 
the other three had committed infractions of a sexual nature: “Mary” had been 
cohabitating with a Crow man outside of a legal marriage, and “Hannah” and “Rachel” 
had both had “affairs,” the former with a married man.2  Each woman flouted Euro-
American expectations that sexuality be restricted to legal, monogamous, preferably 
Christian marriages.  As superintendent, Hyde bore primary responsibility for 
maintaining “law and order” on the reservation; he believed the young women’s moral 
infractions raised reasonable suspicions of venereal disease and warranted at least short-
term detainment.  The women remained under observation in the hospital for anywhere 
between a few days and three weeks, during which time the hospital staff determined 
whether the women were infected with a venereal disease and administered any necessary 
treatment. 
            The brief incarceration of these four young women reveals a good deal about 
Indian Service efforts to eradicate venereal disease on Indian reservations in the 1930s.  
The motivations behind such detentions hint at the intersection of gender, sexuality, and 
the policing of venereal disease and at the relationship between female sexual morality 
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and “law and order.”  Hyde did not mention similar efforts to detain the three women’s 
male partners.  Coercive policing of venereal disease disciplined female sexuality that 
non-Native government employees perceived as deviant, buttressing an ongoing federal 
effort to channel Native sexuality and reproduction into monogamous, nuclear family 
units.  Indian Service employees often incorporated venereal disease into their 
characterizations of Indigenous women as a group, which in turn helped shape local and 
institutional policy and practice. 
            In the decades prior to World War II, venereal disease posed a number of 
problems with no easy solutions.  Syphilis, for example, was (and remains) a highly 
contagious disease—and also a painful, often debilitating, and sometimes fatal one.  In 
the 1930s, despite medical and technological advancements, detection remained less 
reliable than physicians would have liked, and treatment was unpleasant, inconsistent, 
and sometimes laden with disagreeable side effects.  Within the Indian Service, 
superintendents and reservation health workers concluded that due to grave public health 
concerns and Indians’ wardship status varying levels of coercion to control venereal 
disease were both necessary and justified.  They advocated mandatory examinations, 
through deception if necessary; depended on police power to enforce weekly treatment 
programs; and arranged for at least short-term detention of non-compliant sufferers.   
            Throughout the decade, venereal disease campaigns provoked sometimes 
contentious debates on the reservation, and such debates were not drawn strictly along 
racial lines.  Crows’ perspectives on venereal disease and their experiences with and 
attitudes toward Indian Service control efforts also hinged on factors such as gender and 
age, as well as attitudes toward assimilation and position within the tribal political 
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structure.  Occurring in tandem with the debates regarding midwifery and hospital 
childbirth described in Chapter Two, reservation-level venereal disease campaigns in the 
1930s became a terrain on which Indian Service officials, reservation employees, and 
Crows debated pressing concerns regarding reservation health policy and reservation 
politics.  To an even greater extent than contemporary discussions surrounding 
reproduction, however, men—both Crow and white—dominate the historical record 
surrounding venereal disease campaigns.  Middle-aged and older Crow women make 
occasional appearances, but the perspectives of young Crow women—the group most 
likely to be the target of disciplinary efforts—are obscured altogether. 
            It is difficult to discern how frequently Hyde or other Crow superintendents 
employed coercive methods, particularly given the incomplete nature of surviving 
hospital records.  Hyde informed Commissioner of Indian Affairs Charles Rhoads of his 
actions only after a reservation inspection report prompted the commissioner to make a 
specific inquiry.  Rhoads emphasized that government hospitals were not to be used as 
jailhouses and suggested that Hyde’s actions constituted a violation of Indian Service 
policy.3  Thus, the incarceration of Crow women in the Crow Indian Hospital highlights a 
discrepancy between institutional policy and on-the-ground practice.  Although at times 
difficult to recover, such discrepancies were likely quite common when they involved 
venereal disease control.  Venereal disease provoked public health concerns, gendered 
moral anxieties, and fears regarding child welfare, all of which encouraged policymakers, 
medical professionals, Indian Service officials, and reservation employees to debate the 
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appropriate degree and nature of coercion in their efforts to police venereal disease 
among the government’s “wards.” 
            Discrepancies between official rhetoric and local practice and omissions in 
government records are a few of the methodological challenges in writing about venereal 
disease, but the subject also presents ethical challenges.  Hyde served as superintendent 
of the Crow Reservation at a time when medical professionals were attempting to strip 
venereal disease of its moral connotations.4  But as his behavior indicates, stigma 
remained, as it does to some degree to this day.  Scholarship on venereal disease can help 
to eradicate such stigma by complicating sensationalist perceptions and exposing the 
harmful consequences of stigmatization, but such scholarship can also obscure the fact 
that the history of venereal disease is in large part a history of human suffering.  In 
exploring Indian Service campaigns to control venereal disease on the Crow Reservation 
in the first half of the twentieth century, I utilize sources that often did not respect 
sufferers’ privacy and that were at times highly voyeuristic.  In narrating this history, I 
have generally omitted graphic descriptions and representations and instead focused on 
patterns that illuminate the assumptions behind and consequences of Indian Service 
venereal disease control programs.    
 
 “The Crow Menace” 
 Around the turn of the twentieth century, various sectors of American society—
predominantly middle-class Euro-American social reformers, social workers, and social 
scientists—concluded that venereal disease, specifically syphilis and gonorrhea, posed a 
threat to the nation’s families and communities.  While they recognized that venereal 
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disease threatened middle-class families, they associated the diseases with sexual 
immorality, even deviance, and as a result, they viewed the problem as rooted in other 
groups—namely, the working class and immigrant populations.5  As Laura Briggs has 
argued, Euro-Americans also associated venereal disease with colonized populations in 
tropical locations such as Puerto Rico and the Philippines.6  Within the Indian Service, 
officials sounded alarm bells regarding the prevalence of venereal disease on Indian 
reservations in the West. 
 In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, both Euro-Americans and 
Crows debated the source of venereal diseases such as syphilis on the reservation.  Had 
Euro-Americans introduced the disease to Crows, or vice versa?7  Some non-Native 
observers adamantly argued that white Americans could be blamed for bringing venereal 
disease to the Crow Reservation.  In 1892, A. B. Holder, former physician on the 
reservation, published an article in a medical journal in which he contended that “the 
venereal diseases were introduced among Indian tribes by the white race” and that those 
tribes who “opened their arms to receive the white man,” such as the Crow, had been hit 
the hardest.8  Almost three decades later, W. A. Russell, a Montana physician who was 
not affiliated with the Indian Service but claimed an intimate knowledge of reservation 
conditions, argued that Crow men had first acquired syphilis on a diplomatic trip to 
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Washington, D.C.  Russell also blamed soldiers who had been stationed at Fort Custer, 
although he pointedly noted that this had been a “negro” regiment.9 
 Regardless of the original source of the disease, the result was the same: Holder 
and Russell concurred that the Crow Reservation was riddled with venereal disease.  The 
reservation system segregated a nonwhite population within defined boundaries, 
encouraging non-Native observers to use universal language ascribing (usually negative) 
characteristics to an entire group.  Holder’s “intimate acquaintance” with Crows allowed 
him to proclaim with “great certainty” that of the “two thousand five hundred Crow 
Indians” living on the reservation, no fewer than “four-fifths . . . suffer or have suffered” 
from a venereal disease.10  Not all of Holder’s Indian Service informants believed 
venereal disease to be a problem on their reservations, but those who did made similarly 
sweeping claims.  The physician at the Fort Berthold Reservation in nearby Dakota 
reported that “Every living Indian on reservation and generations unborn [are] affected.”  
In Indian Territory, soon to become the state of Oklahoma, the agent on the Kaw 
Reservation simply noted that “[a]ll are diseased,” and the agent on the Quapaw 
Reservation declared Indians there “[a]lmost to a soul affected with syphilis.”11  The 
assured tone of Holder and his peers is somewhat remarkable for an era in which venereal 
disease diagnosis relied primarily on the physical appearance of the afflicted, and the 
article included no discussion of how the medical officers came to their conclusions.12 
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For his part, Russell titled his 1919 talk “The Crow Menace” and published it in the 
Hardin Tribune; after establishing that syphilis was not indigenous to the Crow, he went 
on to warn his predominantly white audience of the dangers the disease-ridden 
reservation posed to neighboring white communities.13 
 Employing circular logic, Holder asserted a near perfect correlation between a 
given tribe’s commitment to a white standard of chastity and the prevalence of venereal 
disease among the tribe.  Holder and his colleagues measured a tribe’s chastity through 
its women.  Once again, universal language carried the day, allowing Holder confidently 
and without qualification to conclude that “the Crow woman is debauched and 
diseased.”14  In making such sweeping claims, Holder and other late nineteenth-century 
Americans drew on long-standing Euro-American tropes of Indigenous women.  From 
colonial America through the Lewis and Clark expedition and beyond, a combination of 
sensationalism, self-serving rationalization, and insufficient or outright inaccurate 
understandings of Native social, economic, and cultural practices encouraged Euro-
American observers to perceive Indigenous women as shamelessly promiscuous and 
consequently as sources of rather than sufferers from venereal disease.15  
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 Holder proclaimed that the Crows were “[a]bsolutely without chastity,” and 
Indian Service employees on the reservation in the early twentieth century generally 
agreed with his assessment.  Superintendent Evan Estep characterized the Crow as 
“notoriously unchaste”; Supervisor of Schools Elsie Newton labeled them “unusually 
immoral.”16  Unlike Holder, neither Estep nor Newton had much sympathy for the notion 
that whites had acted as a corrupting force upon the Crow, although both acknowledged 
that they regularly heard this argument.  From their perspective in the 1910s, the Crows’ 
sexual moral code (or lack thereof) appeared rooted in “former times” and served as a 
significant difference between Crows and white Americans.17   
Estep and Newton were less certain about whether prevailing social conditions on 
the reservation should be blamed on Crow men or Crow women, and they effectively 
blended Victorian understandings of “fallen women” with emerging Progressive concerns 
regarding “problem girls.”18  Estep offered scathing criticism of Crow men, arguing that 
“these young gallants” glorified sexual conquest and moved rapidly from one young 
“wife” to the next.19  It was not just young men, however.  By virtue of cultural attitudes 
and environmental conditions, “the influence of the whole tribe” contributed to Crow 
women’s debasement.20   
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Estep’s contemporaries in social reform and social science circles devoted 
considerable energy to discerning the conditions that produced sexual immorality in 
young women, and their conclusions supported Estep’s nod toward environmental 
factors.  Middle-class Progressives attributed much of the blame to working-class familial 
and domestic arrangements.  Working-class women bore more children than their middle-
class counterparts, which middle-class observers argued led to both neglect and 
overcrowded living conditions.  Furthermore, the tendency of already large nuclear 
families to share domestic spaces with extended family members precluded privacy and 
modesty and produced “confused family groupings.”21  Thus, the familial and domestic 
arrangements common in many Native cultures shared many of the characteristics to 
which middle-class Progressives attributed American women’s moral decline.  
 Once again, regardless of who or what bore the bulk of the blame, the result was 
the same.  In Estep and Newton’s framing, once corrupted, the Crow woman’s chastity 
was lost, and the discourse regarding “problem” Crow girls and women prevailed.  After 
asserting the poor moral conditions on the reservation and providing anecdotal and police 
evidence to support her claims, Newton “wish[ed] to call attention” to the active role 
Crow women played as willing participants or even “instigators” in the depraved 
circumstances she described.22  Estep concluded a related commentary on Crow sexual 
immorality in his 1915 annual report by indicting Crow women.  In a vague reference to 
either prostitution or just sexual promiscuity, Estep contended that Crow women perform 
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“all this class of work.”  With no mention of the grave health problems, perhaps most 
notably tuberculosis, facing the Crows since their reservation confinement, Estep cited 
the gradual decline of the reservation population as evidence that Crow women’s 
promiscuity and  resulting diseased condition were leading Crow Indians “on the road . . . 
to extinction and oblivion.”23  Perhaps more to the point, the ongoing policy discussion in 
which Estep, Newton, and various Indian Service officials engaged centered on what 
should be done with promiscuous Crow women. 
 Crow women understood the social and moral conditions on the reservation 
somewhat differently.  Pretty Shield, a respected female elder, had been the second wife 
in a polygamous marriage, a marriage that Estep and other government employees would 
certainly have deemed immoral.  From Pretty Shield’s perspective, her own courtship and 
marriage were far preferable to the social experiences of her grandchildren.   Pretty 
Shield feared that increasing exposure to white ways—namely, immodest dress, alcohol, 
and looser sexual norms—corrupted young Crows.24   Although Estep and Newton 
accused Crow parents, and especially mothers, of negligence and apathy regarding their 
daughters’ sexual morality, Crow women born in the first decades of the twentieth 
century recall that their parents and other kin “kept a close watch” on them throughout 
their adolescence.25  Such recollections suggest the continued importance of familial 
networks in regulating individual behavior and community norms.  For example, Agnes 
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Deernose, a teenager in the 1920s, recalls that a young woman’s promiscuity “would 
shame her brothers.”26   
Many Crows also recognized that a young woman’s kin served as her only real 
protection from sexual violence.  Scholars and activists have argued that rape was 
uncommon in most Indigenous societies prior to Euro-American contact, so Native 
women in the early twentieth century generally understood sexual violence on 
reservations to be a Western imposition.27  Crow and other Indigenous women feared 
sexual violence at the hands of white men, who lived on or in proximity to the 
reservation, and also at the hands of Crow and other Indigenous men, who had been 
corrupted by Euro-American patriarchal norms, alcohol, and the trauma of various 
manifestations of colonial violence.  For his part, Estep contended that rape (of Crow 
women by Crow men) was prevalent on the reservation, but, ironically, its prevalence 
seemed to preclude his desire or ability to offer protection to female victims.  In 
presenting rape as traditional and socially sanctioned and implying that Indian women’s 
chastity was easily lost, Estep and many of his peers contributed to the notion that Indian 
women were “rapable,” a notion that female Indigenous scholars argue has been 
“codified” through federal policy.28 
 
The Campaign “to Eradicate Syphilis”  
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 As young American men, including many Native men, mobilized for World War I 
in Estep’s last year on the Crow Reservation, military and civilian leaders discovered that 
venereal disease was not only an individual, familial, and community problem; the 
scourge threatened national security.  They urged state legislatures and municipal 
authorities to establish measures authorizing unprecedented force in the detection and 
treatment of venereal disease.29  Local and state leaders responded with a surge of highly-
gendered venereal disease statutes, many of which resulted in the mass incarceration of 
women but not of men.30 Wartime measures reflected and codified a long-standing notion 
that women could be divided into two categories: “good,” “pure,” and “innocent” on the 
one hand, or “bad,” “impure,” and “sensual” on the other.31  Proponents argued that 
venereal disease statutes protected the former, while subduing the prostitute or 
promiscuous woman.32  Without question, the gendered assumptions informing wartime 
discourse and legislation had negative implications for Native women.  Many non-Native 
observers, including a good number of Indian Service employees, believed Indigenous 
women’s default position to be sexually immoral and promiscuous and viewed an 
individual Indian woman’s claim to “pure womanhood” as contingent at best.   
 The hysteria surrounding venereal disease waned following the cessation of 
hostilities, but the legal mechanisms established during and immediately following the 
war remained in place in their original or revised form.  Nationwide, the 1920s brought a 
lull in both public attention to and federal funding for venereal disease control, and this 
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lull apparently extended to the Crow Reservation.  Despite Estep’s and Russell’s 
expressions of urgency the previous decade, physicians on the Crow Reservation did not 
view venereal disease as “a serious problem.”33 Concerned Americans, including future 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs John Collier, lamented that health workers on other 
reservations appeared equally complacent; Collier heaped criticism on the Indian Service, 
accusing the Bureau of neglecting reservation health problems out of apathy and a 
woefully inadequate budget.34  By the early 1930s, however, Superintendent Calvin 
Asbury was warning his superiors of the “apparent prevalence” of venereal disease on the 
reservation.35 Because at this point Asbury and the reservation’s medical employees 
relied only on rumor and the number of reported cases (which remained relatively low), it 
is difficult to determine whether and to what extent venereal disease rates rose in the 
1920s and early 1930s, particularly given their predecessor’s pronouncements in the 
1910s.  As of 1928, Lewis Meriam’s survey team concluded that “[n]o accurate facts are 
available to substantiate” assertions regarding the prevalence of venereal disease on 
Indian reservations.36  If, however, venereal disease rates did indeed increase in this 
period, it bears noting that the rise roughly coincided with the encroachment of white 
settlers in all reservation districts in the 1910s and 1920s.37  
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 In the early 1930s, government employees on the Crow Reservation embarked on 
a series of campaigns against venereal disease that proceeded in fits and starts for the 
remainder of the decade.  This renewed attention to venereal disease paralleled national 
trends.  Physicians and public health officials argued that disinterest and complacency 
had only exacerbated the problem, and when Thomas Parran became Surgeon General in 
1936, he rededicated the nation to the eradication of venereal disease.38   
Although limited by insufficient manpower and resources, field employees on the 
reservation generally administered Wassermann tests to Crow men applying for New 
Deal jobs programs, and they attempted to test parturient Crow women.  At various 
points throughout the decade, the Senior Physician or his staff administered routine 
Wassermann examinations on all incoming hospital patients.39  To better assess the scope 
of the problem and to encourage regular treatment, superintendents and physicians 
frequently proposed and sometimes attempted to carry out house-to-house surveys to 
collect blood samples.40  Employees instructed known sufferers to seek treatment at field 
stations in each district, although stations remained inadequately funded and equipped 
throughout the decade.41   
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Prior to the advent of penicillin in the early 1940s, the prescribed treatment 
process was, in Dr. J. M. Murphy’s understated assessment, “rather disagreeable,” 
generally consisting of weekly injections of Neo-Arsphenamine and weekly 
intramuscular injections of bismuth salicylate.42  The bismuth injections were necessary 
to offset potential toxic reactions from the Neo-Arsphenamine, but American medical 
officers generally agreed that the dual treatment regimen, if administered consistently and 
for an appropriate duration, rendered most patients non-infectious.43  Physicians on the 
Crow Reservation expected sufferers to submit to such injections for three years before 
they could be considered cured.44  It is not clear why these physicians determined that the 
year of treatment prescribed by leading medical officers off the reservation was not 
sufficient for their Crow patients. 
Health employees also took measures to educate reservation Indians on syphilis 
and gonorrhea, how to avoid them, and the urgency of aggressive treatment, but health 
workers on the Crow Reservation placed far less emphasis on education than did their 
colleagues working to control venereal disease among mainstream Americans.  In 1933, 
Dr. Byron Lord requested Public Health Service films on venereal disease, which he 
hoped to show on the reservation, but such educational measures were quite rare, even 
after Surgeon General Parran made public education one of the five pillars of his national 
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venereal disease campaign.45  Instead, more blatantly coercive measures often dominated 
reservation campaigns. Many Indians were not satisfied with the government’s 
educational measures and demanded that reservation employees provide them and their 
communities with more education regarding venereal disease.46  
 
“These Indians Being Wards of the Government” 
Aided by the Progressive faith in professional expertise and the grave situation 
exposed by World War I, physicians had usurped social reformers’ position as the 
primary authority on the nation’s venereal disease problem by the 1930s.  They argued 
that venereal disease was first and foremost  a public health issue and urged laymen to 
view these diseases through a medical rather than a moral lens.47  Even among medical 
professionals, however, the shift in perspective was uneven and incomplete.  Within and 
outside the Indian Service, venereal disease evoked both public health concerns and the 
looming specter of illicit sex, a combination that foregrounded tensions between the 
“common good” and individual civil liberties.  These tensions were particularly fraught 
on Indian reservations, where predominantly white federal employees worked among a 
nonwhite population legally classified as “wards” of the U.S. government.   
In formulating and implementing venereal disease control efforts on the Crow 
Reservation, Indian Service administrators built on a number of colonial assumptions, 
including the notion that American Indians as a population warranted extensive study and 
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that federal Indian health policy served at least in part to further Euro-American 
knowledge.  As L. Webster Fox, an ophthalmologist who was a driving force behind an 
Indian Service health campaign in the 1920s,  explained to his medical colleagues, 
Indians provided the medical community with “a permanent population wholly under the 
domain of the federal government whose life and habits permit of continuous 
surveillance.”  “When the governmental agencies take an interest in the citizens of any of 
the sovereign states,” he continued, “the question is raised as to their authority to do so; 
yet here is an entire people, over whom the federal government has unhampered 
authority.”48 For his part, Fox took advantage of the government’s “unhampered 
authority” and the possibility of “continuous surveillance” to advocate experimental and 
quite radical methods for treating trachoma, a serious eye infection, which historians have 
argued often did Native patients more harm than good.49  
Colonized spaces had long been sites of medical experimentation.  Laura Briggs 
emphasizes that European colonies provided the motivation, raw materials, and subjects 
that facilitated venereal disease research and contributed to early medical breakthroughs.  
After the War of 1898, U.S. scientists and physicians took up similar research in the 
nation’s newly-acquired tropical colonies.50  Marginalized populations functioned as the 
subjects of venereal disease research on the mainland as well, with the Public Health 
Service’s “Tuskegee Study” as only the most famous example.  Convinced that African 
Americans were a “syphilis-soaked race,” the PHS carried out a forty-year study on the 
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effects of syphilis in more than 300 black men. PHS officers offered incentives to appeal 
to the study’s poor and illiterate subjects, including hot meals, free aspirin, and the 
promise of a burial stipend.  They did not, however, provide treatment for the sufferers, 
and they deliberately prevented the patients from receiving treatment elsewhere.  As 
testimony by survivors in the early 1970s made abundantly clear, the men had little 
understanding of the nature or purpose of the study, and in some cases had never been 
informed that they had syphilis.51   
In 1932, the year the PHS began its Tuskegee Study, Superintendent Hyde 
embarked on a “social study” on the Crow Reservation.  Motivated by his “particular 
interes[t] in the moral situation that seems to exist at Crow,” Hyde intended to record the 
marriage and divorce history of each man and woman on the reservation.52  Just what 
Hyde planned to do with this information was unclear, but by the end of the year Hyde 
and District Medical Director O. M. Spencer envisioned an expanded study.  Inspired by 
a recent report of a venereal survey among southern blacks, Spencer suggested that 
reservation employees collect blood samples in addition to marital histories.53 Neither 
Hyde nor Spencer believed Crows should be informed that they were being tested for 
syphilis.  Rather, Spencer advocated deceit: he proposed that blood samples also be tested 
for tuberculosis, if only so that employees could explain the necessity of bloodwork.  
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This, Spencer argued, “in my opinion will be more easy to put over than if it is known 
that we also wanted to do a Wasserman on these blood samples.”54 
Although Hyde predicted that a reservation-wide venereal survey would “produce 
some rather alarming and disquieting results,” neither he nor his superiors addressed the 
question of treatment in the planning stages of the survey.55  Presumably, Hyde and 
Spencer expected that once an individual became aware of his or her infection, he or she 
would obtain treatment at reservation health facilities, preferably voluntarily and by force 
if necessary.  Instead, the men focused on the information the survey would provide.  
Spencer believed that a venereal survey among the Crow would provide a foundation for 
“a comparative survey among the Indians and the negroes in the South as to the venereal 
disease rate and the social conditions.”56  In the end, Hyde and Spencer’s vision did not 
materialize.  Hyde began compiling index cards with marital histories—Spencer 
characterized the early responses as “interesting”—but budgetary constraints and the 
Crows’ growing dissatisfaction with Hyde, culminating in his swift transfer, prevented 
federal employees from carrying out the venereal disease component of Hyde’s study.57  
As a rule, distance, cost, and Crow reticence and at times outright resistance limited 
government employees’ ability to obtain the type of knowledge they intended venereal 
surveys to produce. 
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Colonial assumptions also influenced government employees’ ideas regarding the 
appropriate use of force and coercion in the policing of venereal disease on Indian 
reservations.  Since the late nineteenth century, public health officials had worked to 
convince state and local leaders that because communicable diseases posed a threat to 
public health, public health officials required the authority to take necessary measures to 
control their spread, most often in the form of quarantine.  During and immediately 
following World War I, states and municipalities took aim at venereal disease 
specifically, passing laws and ordinances granting law enforcement agencies and other 
authorities expanded leeway in their efforts to detect and treat these diseases.  When 
Indian Service employees debated their authority to compel resistant Indians to submit to 
examination and treatment, they often referred to their state’s venereal disease statutes.  
But state laws varied tremendously.   Montana’s Venereal Disease Control Act of 1921, 
for example, was relatively weak.  Montana was one of a handful of states with no 
compulsory premarital or prenatal venereal disease examinations, and the statute 
explicitly prohibited compulsory treatment.  As a result, federal employees on the Crow 
Reservation seldom deemed state law sufficient justification for their efforts. 
At any rate, the extent to which Indian reservations came under state jurisdiction 
in health matters was often the subject of debate among Indian Service personnel, not to 
mention politicians and state public health officials.  In a 1936 inspection report, District 
Medical Director Spencer’s successor Lynn Fullerton urged that the reservation medical 
staff report all Indians who tested positively for syphilis to the State Board of Health and 
notify the Board of any individuals not obtaining recommended treatment.  Fullerton 
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argued that such procedures were “only compliance with the State law.”58  Hyde’s 
successor Robert Yellowtail disagreed. Although Yellowtail was critical of individual 
physicians and nurses at the Crow Indian Hospital throughout his decade as 
superintendent, he generally supported Indian Service health initiatives, including those 
surrounding venereal disease.  He agreed that “stern measures” should be taken “to stamp 
out syphillis [sic] on this reservation,” but, citing a letter from Montana’s Attorney 
General, he argued that the Secretary of the Interior, not the states, wielded authority in 
policing venereal disease on Indian reservations and that consequently Yellowtail, not 
state health officials, should have the power to compel treatment.59 
The Office of Indian Affairs received so many inquiries regarding the appropriate 
degree of coercion reservation employees were authorized to employ in the fight against 
venereal disease that Commissioner John Collier issued a circular in 1934 to clarify the 
matter.  Citing a 1914 federal statute, Collier informed reservation employees that when 
persuasion proved inadequate, they could use police power to enforce the quarantine of 
an Indian suffering from a contagious or infectious disease, including a venereal disease, 
pending necessary treatment.  The circular did not directly address government 
employees’ authority to compel an individual to submit to an examination.60  The Indian 
Office’s 1935 Law and Order Regulations included “giving venereal disease to another” 
among the sexual crimes for which an Indian could be found guilty by a Court of Indian 
Offenses.  According to the regulations, the reservation’s Court of Indian Offenses could 
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sentence the guilty party to up to three months of labor and also compel the party to 
submit to examination and treatment.61 
The 1934 circular and 1935 Law and Order Regulations granted Indian Service 
employees a good deal of authority, but fuzziness remained, resulting in variation in their 
implementation from reservation to reservation.  Indian Service employees were 
accustomed to taking a variety of actions with relative impunity, particularly with regard 
to matters, such as education and health, that they believed to be for the Indians’ “own 
good.”  For example, surveying the home conditions that he believed contributed to the 
Crows’ poor health, Superintendent Hyde argued that “progress by teaching is by the 
nature of things too slow to make much of an inroad.”  Hyde posited that a “semi-
dictatorship” would actually benefit reservation Indians.62  
Reservation employees quickly became convinced of the need to use police force 
to compel treatment.  At the start of the decade, Commissioner Charles Rhoads 
encouraged Calvin Asbury, Hyde’s predecessor, to use police power sparingly, “only in 
unusual cases,” so that the Indians did not “become too resentful.”63  Asbury indicated his 
agreement, expressing confidence that the threat of police power would be sufficient and 
police enforcement only a last resort.64  This threat was undoubtedly buttressed by the 
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fact that, according to Crow women’s recollections decades later, police were a regular 
presence in Crows’ lives while Asbury was superintendent.65   
Two years after Rhoads’ plea for moderation, the method of last resort had 
become the rule rather than the exception.  Hyde and the reservation physicians 
contended that the success of weekly venereal disease clinics depended almost entirely on 
the policemen who ensured infected individuals’ regular attendance.  When budgetary 
constraints resulted in a reduction of the reservation police force in 1933, Hyde and 
Senior Physician J. M. Murphy warned that the reduction in the police force signaled the 
end of the reservation’s venereal disease campaign. Hyde lamented that without police 
enforcement, clinic attendance was “more or less voluntary”; as a result, Murphy 
explained, weekly treatments had dropped from fifty to a small handful.  “The 
tribesmen,” Murphy complained, “seem to sense the fact that our hands are tied in this 
matter and . . . they have deliberately absented themselves from the clinics.”66 
Throughout the decade, tribal policemen’s role in enforcing treatment waxed and waned, 
although it does not appear that the use of police power again reached 1932 and early 
1933 levels. 
Reservation employees often attributed an Indian’s unwillingness to visit the 
clinic regularly for treatment to defiance, ignorance, or laziness, but undoubtedly the 
nature of the treatment dissuaded some Crows from following physicians’ instructions, 
just as it did many non-Native sufferers.  In addition to multiple years of unpleasant 
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weekly treatment, Dr. Charles Nagel also prescribed a lifetime of surveillance.  
“Recovered” patients still required biannual blood tests and annual spinal fluid tests.67  
Weekly injections prompted adverse reactions in some patients that deterred return visits. 
The annual spinal tap was an equally trying experience—a painful process with 
disagreeable side effects, such as chronic headaches, and the risk of severe complications, 
including paralysis or even death.68  Physicians often found that Indians accepted 
treatment when symptoms were “acute” but resisted when symptoms were less severe, as 
they did not see the need for ongoing invasive procedures.69   
            Opposition to Indian Service treatment programs did not necessarily mean 
ignorance of or lack of concern regarding venereal diseases, as Crows had recourse to 
alternate avenues of treatment.  Due to unpleasant experiences at the Crow Indian 
Hospital, a lack of confidence in the hospital staff, or a desire for privacy, Crows, 
particularly those who were willing and able to pay for medical care themselves, 
sometimes bypassed the government hospital and obtained the services of a private 
physician in Hardin or other nearby towns.70  Lewis Meriam and his survey staff 
suggested that this frequently occurred on other reservations as well.  Crows may have 
also had recourse to Indigenous treatment methods.  Ethnologist Fred Voget’s informants 
in the 1930s explained that a venereal disease—likely syphilis—had been introduced to 
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the reservation generations earlier, and “specialists” had devised a medicinal “cure.”71  A 
female interviewee described the application of a poultice made from leaves of a plant 
she referred to as “something-that-works-on-that-thing-that-eats.”  She, like 
anthropologist Robert Lowie’s informants a decade earlier, emphasized the importance of 
heat in the treatment process.  Whether via heated lard or hot stones, Crow healers treated 
venereal infections in part by applying heat to a patient’s groin area.72  Such treatments 
may have been reasonably effective in alleviating a patient’s symptoms and limiting the 
spread of infections; physicians now believe that exposure to heat may have “some 
curing effect on venereal diseases.”73 
As suggested by Superintendent Asbury’s warning of the “apparent prevalence” 
of venereal disease at the start of the decade, Indian Service estimates of venereal disease 
rates on the Crow Reservation remained uncertain, informed to a large degree by rumor 
and non-Native perception.  Reservation employees administered Wassermann tests on 
certain groups as a matter of course, but these limited findings often compounded rather 
than clarified confusion.  For example, hospital records from 1934 and 1935 indicate that 
physicians administered Wassermann tests on 681 incoming hospital patients, with just 
over seven percent showing a positive reaction for syphilis.74   If this rate was in fact 
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representative of the reservation as a whole, the rate of syphilis on the Crow Reservation 
was roughly in keeping with national trends.  Public health officials in the 1930s 
estimated approximately one in ten Americans suffered from syphilis.75  The following 
fall, however, the Senior Physician reported that routine tests revealed “an alarmingly 
high number of positive Wassermanns, about twenty five per cent.”76  The Wassermann 
test was invaluable for the detection of venereal disease, but contemporary researchers 
warn that the exam was “so overly sensitive” in this period that it likely “turned up as 
much as 25 percent false positives,” potentially leading to inflated rates, particularly on 
reservations where Indians resisted repeat examinations.77   
Continued uncertainty, combined with Euro-American concerns about a disease-
filled reservation, convinced a succession of variously-positioned reservation employees 
of the urgent need for a survey similar to Hyde’s proposal.  At mid-decade, Dr. Nagel 
renewed earlier Indian Service efforts to conduct a reservation-wide campaign for the 
detection of syphilis.   Nagel argued in a circular to enrolled tribal members that survey 
results would “EITHER SUPPORT OR DENY THE EVIL STORY THAT NEARLY 
ALL MEMBERS OF THIS TRIBE ARE AFFECTED WITH A SERIOUS SOCIAL 
DISEASE.”78  
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Nagel’s venereal disease survey proved controversial and quickly became a 
lightning rod in reservation politics.  The survey’s specific methods aside, some Crows 
resented and challenged Nagel’s motivations for undertaking the survey.  Nagel revealed 
many of his assumptions in the circular, a document one Indian Service administrator 
characterized as “exceedingly tactless,” and Crow leaders’ responses suggest a 
widespread perception that Nagel expressed such assumptions regularly.79  At a Tribal 
Council meeting less than a month after Nagel distributed his circular, Barney Old 
Coyote condemned the physician and his survey.  Old Coyote complained that Nagel 
“claims that every member of the Crow tribe has had that disease.”80  Even those 
defending Nagel and his survey expressed frustration with the physician’s bold 
pronouncements.  Max Big Man, chairman of the reservation health council Nagel had 
organized, argued that “Doctors should . . . avoid such rash statements as was made that 
ninty [sic] per-cent of the Crows are afflicted with a certain disease when perhaps the 
per-cent affected is only twenty per cent.” For Big Man, sensationalist claims not only 
resulted in bruised egos and defensive responses; they also encouraged discrimination 
against Crows.81 
 Nagel’s proposed methods for carrying out the survey were also controversial.  
By the end of the decade, as part of Surgeon General Parran’s nationwide campaign to 
eradicate venereal diseases, the Public Health Service coordinated with local health 
departments to establish mobile venereal disease clinics; health officials notified local 
                                                          
79
 W. V. W., “Memorandum,” 4 Mar 1935, Records of the BIA: Central Classified Files, 1907-1939, FILM 
9730, Series C, Part 1, Reel 27, Labriola, ASU.   
 
80
 Minutes, Tribal Council Meeting, 6 Feb 1935, Records of the BIA: Central Classified Files, 1907-1939, 
FILM 9730, Series C, Part 1, Reel 27, Labriola, ASU.   
81
 Minutes, Crow Health Council Meeting, 25 Jan 1935, Records of the BIA: Central Classified Files, 1907-
1939, FILM 9730, Series C, Part 1, Reel 27, Labriola, ASU.   
 
131 
 
residents of the available services and urged them to visit the nearest clinic for 
examination and, if necessary, treatment.82  Nagel deemed this model inadequate for the 
Crow Reservation.  After all, the Crows already had access to free examinations at the 
Crow Indian Hospital and district field stations, and many had failed to take advantage of 
the opportunity.  Instead, Nagel, like Hyde before him, advocated a house-to-house 
campaign.  He explained to tribal members that a doctor and nurse would visit their 
homes and take a blood sample from each member of the household.   
In his appeal to tribal members, Nagel emphasized, “WE DO NOT DESIRE TO 
USE FORCE, BUT ASK ONLY WILLING AND CONSCIENTIOUS 
COOPERATION.”83  Members of the all-male Crow Health Council repeatedly stressed 
to Nagel that the council’s support of the circular and the survey it described was 
predicated on the absence of coercion.  Following a late January meeting, the council 
secretary reported that “Nothing is understood to be a compulsory movement by the 
authorities.”  The question of compulsion apparently provoked some pointed discussion, 
in which council members asked Nagel to clarify his use of the term “arrest” with regard 
to treatment.84  The following week, council member George Hogan motioned that the 
council approve the survey on the condition that “all members of the Crow Tribe 
approached, by the surveying party, or the Medical Staff of this reservation, shall be 
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requested and the approval given by the Indian or Indians visited before any check is 
made of any disease.”85 
Nagel’s critics remained unpersuaded by the doctor’s emphasis on cooperation. 
Superintendent Yellowtail, himself a supporter of the campaign, attempted to summarize 
the disgruntled group’s position: in being “given no choice in the matter,” Crows “were 
being treated like so many slaves,--or dogs, as they put it.”86  Barney Old Coyote argued 
that Nagel’s desire to test “the whole tribe for this disease syphilis” was rooted in the 
senior physician’s belief that all Crows were afflicted with the disease.  In short, he 
planned to test reservation Indians because they were Crow.  In response, Old Coyote 
countered that examinations should be voluntary and based on need: “I wish to say that 
some of you Indians that are well and healthy should not have the blood test, but if an 
Indian has this disease go to him and get your blood examined.”87  Holds Enemy, another 
Crow man, expressed similar outrage over Nagel’s attempt to make each tribal member 
submit to a blood test.   The sixty-three-year old alluded to deeply-held beliefs regarding 
the power of blood that encouraged him to resist having “any blood taken away from me 
and sent away.”  Holds Enemy chose to call Nagel’s bluff,  publicly declaring that he 
would not permit Nagel to take his blood.88  In presenting their arguments to fellow 
Tribal Council members, the survey’s detractors focused on compulsory examination 
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rather than compulsory treatment, but Nagel’s responses to his critics’ charges indicate 
that he encountered opposition on both fronts.  
Nagel dismissed these men’s allegations.  In a letter to Commissioner Collier, he 
argued that “several members of the Tribe” had spread “mis-information” regarding his 
survey—namely, that government employees would “use Force and Duress” in carrying 
out examinations and then would “use force to those who were found so infected.”  To 
the contrary, Nagel informed the commissioner, neither he nor Superintendent Yellowtail 
had “in any manner or way indicated that we intended this to be anything but a complete 
survey and a conservative method of advising those so ill that treatment would be to their 
immediate benefit.”89  Nevertheless, suspicions of coercion were not without foundation.  
In addition to individual and collective past experiences that had bred distrust of 
government health programs and practitioners, concerned Crows could point to Nagel’s 
own words.   Nagel’s circular employed authoritative language, such as “MUST” and 
“ORDERS,” and referred without explanation to statutes to invoke the legal power of the 
U.S. government.90 For his part, Superintendent Yellowtail regularly stated his conviction 
that the dangers venereal diseases posed to the reservation unquestionably “justif[ied] 
action by the Government.”91  
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In the end, Nagel’s “crusade against venereal diseases” ensured that the 
physician’s days on the reservation were numbered.92  Appealing to fellow Tribal 
Council members, Holds Enemy concluded his indictment of Nagel’s proposed survey by 
declaring, “I myself wish to see the Crow tribe let Mr. Nagle [sic] go.”93  Shortly 
thereafter, Holds Enemy’s peers demonstrated their overwhelming agreement, voting 141 
to fourteen in favor of Nagel’s removal.94  The testimony of a Crow mother who alleged 
that Nagel had forcibly separated her from her nursing infant during an overnight hospital 
stay, described in Chapter Two, further galvanized the council against the physician. 
Nagel was not without his supporters.  Delegates to the Crow Health Council 
shared Superintendent Yellowtail’s concern that “there are members of this tribe [who] 
are diseased and . . . they are a menace to the other members of the Crow Tribe.”95  
Immediately following tribal council members’ vote in favor of Nagel’s removal, Kitty 
Deernose, one of the few women who spoke publicly about Nagel’s venereal disease 
control efforts, defended Nagel and his proposed survey.  Emphasizing the need to 
consider “the good of the people,” Deernose warned that some individuals could have 
syphilis and not know it; the blood test would provide them with this critical information.  
“Before making a decision,” she concluded, “get the doctor’s report.”96  
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Nagel’s venereal disease campaign was not the only topic council members 
discussed leading up to the final vote, nor was it Crows’ only cause for dissatisfaction 
with their physician.  But Nagel’s approach to policing venereal disease seemed to offer a 
microcosm of broader frustrations.  Nagel’s vocal critics successfully persuaded an 
overwhelming majority of tribal council participants that the white government-employed 
physician’s approach to Crow health was high-handed, patronizing, and self-serving, and 
that he enacted policies with little regard to individual and tribal autonomy or to the 
Crows’ best interests. The contentious political climate lingered following the tribal 
council’s vote, preventing implementation of the planned campaign and culminating in 
Nagel’s resignation.   
 
Policing Venereal Disease Among Crow Women 
            Discrepancies between institutional policy and on-the-ground practices appear to 
have been particularly notable in the policing of venereal disease among Indigenous 
women.  If much of the formal rhetoric surrounding venereal disease campaigns was 
gender-neutral, implementation of these campaigns on the Crow Reservation was 
decidedly less so.  As a practical matter, field workers on the Crow Reservation 
specifically targeted women.  After all, female field matrons and field nurses day-to-day 
tasks were already directed at women and children; they often had more knowledge of 
women’s whereabouts than men’s, and they hoped that their more regular contact with 
women would enhance their persuasive powers. 
            Hyde’s authorization of the incarceration of young Crow women at the 
reservation hospital represents one discrepancy between policy and practice that singled 
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out women.  Asked by Commissioner Rhoads whether it was his “custom to incarcerate . 
. . incorrigible girls and young women at the Crow Agency Hospital,” Hyde did not deny 
the charge.  Rather, Hyde argued that although the young women had been accused of 
moral infractions, he and the hospital staff had a medical rationale for the women’s 
confinement.  He explained, for example, that after hearing reports of Hannah’s affair 
with a married man, Hyde desired “to have her placed under observation with a view to . . 
. discern whether she was infected with a social disease.”97  Presumably, if Hannah tested 
negatively for syphilis, she would be released, and if she tested positively, her 
confinement would ensure that she received regular treatment.  It appears, however, that 
the hospital staff did not prioritize the administration of Wassermann tests on each young 
woman.  One young woman remained under “observation” for days with no formal 
examination, highlighting the fact that such detentions also served to get misbehaving 
women off the streets.98  Hyde’s actions and his explanation resemble measures civilian 
and military leaders had embraced a decade and a half earlier, as the nation waged war 
against the Axis powers abroad and venereal disease at home.99 Under this model, 
women who committed any number of moral infractions, particularly but not exclusively 
of a sexual nature, were suspected of venereal disease and could be detained on at least a 
short-term basis.100  Despite the Indian Office’s disapproval of this practice, it appears 
that it continued, even following Hyde’s removal.101  
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             In explaining his decision to detain Hannah at the hospital, Hyde cited the 
possibility of a venereal infection, but he also alluded to the possibility of pregnancy, 
another condition he believed warranted surveillance.  In fact, government employees’ 
scrutiny of Indigenous women’s reproductive capacity dates to at least the late nineteenth 
century.  As discussed in Chapter One, the Indian Office established the field matron 
program in the early 1890s, which sent white women into Native homes to “uplift” Indian 
women via the tenets of “civilized” motherhood.102  In the Progressive Era, government 
employees implemented pronatal initiatives that targeted Indigenous biological mothers.  
Superintendents, physicians, and field workers called on mothers to join the federal effort 
to save their babies by altering the way they raised them.103  The double-edged campaign 
provided some mothers with welcome nutritional and medical assistance, while implicitly 
and sometimes explicitly blaming Indigenous mothers as a group for reservation infant 
mortality rates.  Progressive-Era Indian Service employees also began urging Native 
women to accept government medical care throughout their pregnancies and to give birth 
in reservation hospitals, extending the state’s involvement in the reproductive process. 
            Medical practitioners recognized that venereal disease could threaten a woman’s 
reproductive capacity, as some infections led to sterility.  As Allan Brandt explains, 
“venereal disease often made it impossible for a woman to fulfill what Progressive 
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physicians saw to be her primary domestic responsibility, motherhood.”104  Such fears 
fueled Progressive-era measures to protect innocent mothers and children, and Brandt 
suggests that they demonstrate the way venereal disease “functioned metaphorically to 
define gender roles.”105 Attitudes toward female sterility also underscored the dual 
categories of womanhood, divided along both racial and socioeconomic lines.  
Government employees displayed considerable ambivalence regarding sterility in Native 
women.  Some field workers expressed sympathy for individual women who were unable 
to conceive or successfully carry a pregnancy to term as a result, employees believed, of 
their disease histories.106  In contrast, Superintendent Estep believed female sterility to be 
both widespread and a significant problem on the Crow Reservation, but Estep’s attitude 
was one of scorn (and a broad attribution of blame) rather than sympathy.107  
            Reservation employees believed venereal disease signified a number of maternal 
failures, perhaps most immediately in those instances when a pregnant woman suffering 
from syphilis infected an infant at birth.  Early twentieth-century physicians increasingly 
called attention to a condition known as congenital syphilis.  Often, congenital syphilis 
was fatal, with the infected infant dying either immediately following birth or within the 
first year of life.  In other cases, the child survived with a range of physical, and 
sometimes mental, impairments.  One frustrating aspect of congenital syphilis was that an 
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infant could present syphilitic symptoms immediately, or he or she could show no 
indications of the disease until years later.108   
            Associations between infant mortality and venereal disease were so strong that 
employees sometimes expressed surprise when a mother’s negative test results indicated 
that an infant’s death could not be attributed to a congenital infection.109  Once again, 
some employees sympathized with individual women who mourned the loss of one or 
more children, although they rarely depicted Indian women as sufferers who had been 
innocently infected by their husbands and in turn innocently passed on their condition to 
their innocent children.  Others expressed outrage.  Nagel, for example, condemned one 
young married Crow woman who, he contended, “practiced coitus, during a very 
discusting [sic] and revolting period” and wound up with an infant showing “every 
evidence of Congenital Syphilis” as a result.110 
             Observing such disruptions in the reproductive process, many Indian Service 
personnel concluded with Florence McClintock, a field nurse who worked in California, 
that venereal disease “is not a medical problem alone . . . It is an Infant and Maternity 
problem.”111  As such, the Indian Service hoped that reservation employees’ ongoing 
efforts to medicalize Indian women’s biological reproduction would facilitate 
reservation-level initiatives to control venereal disease.  In her 1926 “Plan of Work for 
Field Nurses,” Supervisor of Nursing Elinor Gregg instructed nurses to make regular 
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“prenatal nursing visits” to the pregnant women in their jurisdiction, during which they 
monitored the pregnancy’s progress, provided hygiene and nutritional instruction, and 
worked to correct any perceived deficiencies in the home environment prior to the 
infant’s arrival.  Gregg also presented prenatal visits as opportunities for field nurses to 
“Urge hospital care for delivery,” noting that nurses should assist in home deliveries only 
after emphasizing the superiority of the hospital and only if absolutely necessary.112  
After birth, field nurses ideally made regular, even daily, “post partum visits” to monitor 
the newborn’s progress and provide the mother and infant with whatever general nursing 
care the mother (or other household members) would permit.113 
            As reservation employees dedicated increased attention to venereal disease in the 
1930s, venereal disease programming became incorporated into prenatal and postnatal 
visits and hospital deliveries and provided an urgency and additional rationale for such 
medicalization.  Field nurses on the Crow Reservation used prenatal visits to encourage 
parturient women to visit their district clinics for a physical examination which included 
a Wassermann test and then made follow-up visits to ensure that women with syphilitic 
reactions obtained regular treatment.114  Hospital deliveries allowed the medical staff to 
examine newborns for syphilitic symptoms, but also to employ preventative measures, 
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such as applying a silver nitrate solution to the infant’s eyes to prevent blindness caused 
by a mother’s gonorrheal infection.115  When a pregnant woman refused hospital 
childbirth and was unable or unwilling to obtain medical assistance at a home delivery, 
field nurses often performed these tasks in the woman’s home postpartum.  
            Indigenous women may have experienced the Indian Service’s targeted efforts to 
police venereal disease in pregnant women as double-edged.  Government employees 
used the relative intimacy and regularity of prenatal and postnatal visits as an opportunity 
to educate Native women regarding venereal disease and its dangers, a minimal 
component of the reservation’s venereal disease program as a whole.  In addition, the 
women’s pregnant condition may have increased their motivation to undergo the 
unpleasant processes of providing a blood sample and/or receiving weekly injections.  
Field workers suggested, sometimes sympathetically and sometimes callously, that this 
was particularly true for women who had personally experienced the loss of an infant or 
who had observed such a loss among loved ones.  In late 1933, a field nurse on the Crow 
Reservation, submitted an enthusiastic report: the pregnant women in her two districts 
were “cooperating very well.”  Smith explained that most of the women consented to a 
seriological examination, and many even displayed “interest in the report on 
Wasserman.”116  
            At the same time, pregnancy raised the stakes surrounding an individual woman’s 
unwillingness to consent to examination and especially treatment.  Despite Smith’s 
optimism, her colleague Mary V. Darmody was only “partially successful” in persuading 
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syphilitic prenatals to begin or continue treatment.117  From the perspective of many of 
Darmody’s peers, pregnant women’s resistance made respect for an Indian woman’s 
bodily autonomy and protection of her unborn child’s welfare irreconcilable. Even as 
many in the Indian Service advocated greater coercion in government health services 
based on Indians’ wardship status, reservation employees argued that pregnancy justified 
government action still further.  In a typical example, one field nurse first acknowledged 
that “Of course it is more desirable to educate the patient to come in of his own accord by 
knowledge of his condition and the desire to improve it.”  Then, abruptly switching from 
male pronouns, she continued, “but we have two women now who are pregnant and one 
is positively luetic [syphilitic], the other has a luetic husband.”  According to the field 
nurse, the former refused to consent to treatment and the latter to a Wassermann test.  “In 
these cases,” she concluded, “there is not time to spend on tactfull [sic] destruction of 
their resistance, they should be treated now.”118  
            Many federal employees also believed that venereal disease could signify 
Indigenous mothers’ deficiencies as social reproducers, signaling an inability to raise 
their children properly.  Both medical and lay observers associated venereal disease with 
sexual promiscuity, as well as with the related and seemingly growing “problem” of 
illegitimacy discussed in Chapter Four. Given such associations, descriptions of 
individual Indian women often took a formulaic form: The woman is promiscuous, 
showing a four-plus Wasserman reaction; she more than likely has one or more 
illegitimate children, and she may be feeble-minded or at least of a “low mental 
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grade.”119 Most government employees took for granted that a “promiscuous” mother—a 
woman who flouted Euro-American sexual norms and thus seemingly bore more 
resemblance to a prostitute than to the innocent wife and mother venereal disease statutes 
had been designed to protect—could not provide the warm, loving, and moral home 
Euro-American observers desired.               
            If a woman’s “promiscuity” resulted in a venereal infection, doctors and other 
government workers argued that the mother presented an even more immediate danger to 
her children and sometimes advocated varying forms of separation.  Concerned about so-
called “innocent infections,” physicians tried to prevent mothers and other family 
members with visible indications of syphilis from contact with children.  Although 
unusual, an individual with exposed syphilitic lesions can theoretically transmit the 
disease through skin-to-skin contact.  In an unfortunate but not uncommon irony, a 
mother’s attempt to maintain contact with her child could be interpreted as lack of 
maternal responsibility.120   
            Even in the absence of visible or potentially infectious symptoms, a venereal 
disease diagnosis (or even rumor) could factor into Indian Service employees’ 
recommendations for a more permanent separation, in which children were removed from 
their homes and placed in foster homes or other institutions.  In recommending removal, 
social workers or other government employees typically cited a laundry list of maternal 
deficiencies, such as promiscuity, poor housekeeping skills, and a sub-normal mental 
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capacity.  Venereal disease was often included on such lists, presented as empirical 
“evidence” of such inherently subjective criteria.  In such cases, Indian women were 
portrayed as carriers of venereal disease, but they were rarely presented as sufferers. 
 
Conclusion 
            In the first decades of the twentieth century, physicians and many laymen 
recognized venereal disease as a threat to national health.  To a large degree, venereal 
disease remained an affliction of the “other,”  but many Americans also recognized that 
the scourge threatened all families and communities.  Euro-Americans dubbed African 
Americans as a “syphilis-soaked race,” and, for those who were paying attention, an 
Indian reservation’s borders seemed to demarcate a “syphilis-soaked” region and 
population.121  But a reservation’s borders could also appear alarmingly porous.  The 
Crow Reservation, for example, witnessed an influx of white settlement in the early 
twentieth century and the growth of nearby white communities, and many neighboring 
whites viewed the “diseased” Crows as a menace and a threat. 
            Indian Service officials and employees viewed venereal and other contagious 
diseases as a barrier to Indian assimilation.  As Crow leaders such as Max Big Man 
recognized, their white neighbors’ exaggerated perception of a syphilis-ridden reservation 
buttressed Euro-Americans’ prejudice and fueled discrimination.  Many Euro-American 
observers also believed that syphilis-ridden reservations served as markers of sexual 
immorality.  For some, this highlighted the social and cultural distance between Indians 
and their white neighbors.  Even for those more critical of white sexual mores, the 
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perception of syphilis-ridden reservations underscored the distance between reservation 
Indians and the assimilationist ideal. 
            Late nineteenth-century Indian Service physician A. B. Holder’s bold and 
expansive assessment of Crow women—“The Crow woman is debauched and 
diseased”—had staying power.  The blanket characterization also had tangible 
implications for non-Native observers’ attitudes toward Crow women’s biological 
reproduction and their capacity for motherhood.  Although the Indian Service’s 
assimilationist zeal waned in the 1930s, Indian Service policy for much of the century’s 
first decades was ostensibly intended to transform Indian women into middle-class 
housewives.  As scholars have demonstrated, this frequently espoused mission coexisted 
uneasily with practices and policies that undermined it, such as the pressure boarding 
schools and reservation employees placed on young Indian women to work for wages, 
typically as domestic servants in white homes.122  Indian Service efforts to control 
venereal disease further demonstrate the contradictory pressures Indian women faced; 
reservation employees’ tendency to associate Indian women with the class of women that 
served as carriers and even sources of, rather than sufferers from, venereal disease 
exposes the perpetual elusiveness of the ideal of civilized womanhood.  The next chapter 
further explores such contradictory pressures by exploring the “problem” of 
“illegitimacy” on Indian reservations 
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CHAPTER 5 
MOTHERHOOD WITHOUT MARRIAGE: SOCIAL WORKERS AND THE 
"MENACE" OF ILLEGITIMACY AND BROKEN HOMES ON THE RESERVATION 
 In 1933, President Franklin Roosevelt appointed John Collier Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs, a decision that portended a shift in the U.S. government’s approach to 
federal-Indian relations.  Collier’s early twentieth-century predecessor, Cato Sells, had 
lamented the impoverished economic conditions and grave health and social problems 
that plagued many Indian reservations.  Two decades later, Collier and other Indian 
Service officials could see few signs of improvement, and many feared that the situation 
worsened.  Like other New Dealers, Collier argued that current policy could not 
adequately address the problems at hand.  A vocal critic of the Indian Service prior to his 
appointment as commissioner, Collier also argued that government policy and the Indian 
Bureau itself bore much of the blame for reservation conditions.1   
Collier and other Indian Service officials challenged some of the fundamental 
premises of federal Indian policy.  Assistant Commissioner Robert Lansdale criticized the 
Bureau’s universal application of policies, explaining that he had “little faith in our 
making any large accomplishments . . . through mass programs.”  “[T]he Indian 
business,” Lansdale argued, “has been subjected to too many schemes for universal 
salvation.”2  From the early 1930s to the late 1940s, a consensus emerged among 
policymakers and Indian Service officials that the solution to the deficiencies of former 
federal policies—the solution to the “Indian problem” as it existed in these decades—
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could be found within the modern profession of social work.  In 1928, Lewis Meriam and 
his staff’s extensive report on the Indian Bureau had emphasized the need for trained 
social workers in the Indian Service.3  Roosevelt’s appointment of Collier represented a 
step in this direction, as Collier had extensive experience working as a social worker in 
New York City.4  Lansdale advocated that the Indian Service shift its focus from “mass 
programs” to individuals and urged that the government’s primary “function . . . [be] 
assisting the individual to adjust to his community and its various relationships.”5  For 
this, the Indian Service required trained social workers and their scientific casework 
methods.6 
 The Indian Service began assigning social workers to Indian reservations 
immediately following social work’s “heyday of professionalization.”7  Social workers, 
like field nurses, represented a more professional, scientific incarnation of field matrons, 
who were being phased out of the Indian Service.8  On reservations, a social worker’s 
responsibilities included coordinating relief, cooperating with the Indian Service medical 
staff regarding reservation health care, working with the teachers at local schools to 
address student-related concerns, and monitoring, assisting, or intervening in any number 
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of problems pertaining to “family” or “child welfare.”  But many social workers—and 
their superiors—viewed unmarried mothers as their “most essential work.”9  In focusing 
on Indian illegitimacy, social workers drew from both federal Indian policy, which had 
long been concerned with Indians’ disregard for legal, monogamous marriage, and 
professional trends, as the professionalization of social work occurred in large part 
through social workers’ proclaimed expertise on the subject of sexual delinquency and 
illegitimacy.10 
 This chapter explores social workers’ efforts to define the “problems” of unwed 
motherhood and broken homes on Indian reservations in the 1930s and 1940s and how 
they approached these problems.11  As commissioner, Collier disavowed much of the 
federal government’s assimilation program and advocated greater respect for Native 
cultures.  For decades, the Indian Service’s civilization program had centered on “moral 
uplift,” which demanded that Indians confine their sexuality and reproduction into 
nuclear family units.  As this chapter demonstrates, these moral imperatives did not 
disappear in the 1930s, but as the Great Depression transformed American politics and 
the U.S. economy, social workers and other government employees cloaked moral 
concerns surrounding illegitimacy and informal marital unions in a discourse of 
economic rationality.  Economic imperatives justified governmental scrutiny of Indian 
women’s sexual and reproductive practices, and the gradual expansion of the national 
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welfare state and Indian communities’ increasing dependence on wage labor created the 
conditions for various forms of federal intervention.  The economic conditions on many 
reservations and the tangled web of federal policies in the 1930s and 1940s combined to 
constrain Indian women’s maternal choices. 
 
The Unmarried Mother Problem 
 The Indian Service began to experiment with social work methods in the early 
1930s, when Congress appropriated funds for the appointment of social workers on the 
Lac du Flambeau Reservation in Wisconsin and the Consolidated Chippewa and Red 
Lake Reservations in Minnesota.12  Appointments on other reservations quickly followed.  
As the Indian Service closed boarding schools and students returned to their 
communities, the Indian Service assigned social workers to reservations to monitor the 
home conditions to which students returned and students’ re-adjustment to their home 
environment.13  Congress did not appropriate nearly enough funding for the Indian 
Service to assign one or more social workers to each reservation, so in some cases the 
Indian Office appointed one social worker to a district, and his or her primary 
responsibility was to act as a liaison between county, state, and federal departments and 
private agencies.14   
Following the Johnson O’Malley Act of 1934, which authorized the Secretary of the 
Interior to contract with states for services to Native Americans, the Indian Service also 
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pursued cooperative agreements with counties and states.  Under such agreements, the 
federal government assumed a portion of a county or state social worker’s salary in 
exchange for their service on Indian reservations.15  Many social workers who fulfilled 
this dual function understood their general public welfare work and their welfare work on 
reservations somewhat differently.  As Kermit Wiltse, a child welfare worker employed 
by the North Dakota Public Welfare Board and assigned to work on the Fort Totten 
Reservation, explained, “[A]s every one in the Indian service knows, every Indian family 
on the reservation is a ‘case.’”  He continued, “Unlike a social agency working among 
white families where a case comes up only by petition of the client himself or referral 
from a definite agency, here the service must be carried into the families whether 
requested or not.”16  Like the field matrons and other field workers who preceded them, 
social workers could provide welcome assistance, but they also brought undesired 
scrutiny and interference. 
 The introduction of professional social workers helped focus the Indian Service’s 
attention on what social workers identified as the “unmarried mother problem.”17  
Throughout the decade, policymakers and reservation employees proclaimed that 
illegitimacy was a growing problem.  In 1934, Laura Dester, one of the earliest trained 
social workers assigned to an Indian reservation, reported that the “problem of 
illegitimacy” was “becomming [sic] a vital one” among the Shoshone living in the Great 
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Basin region.18  At the end of the decade, Mary Kirkland, social worker at the Red Lake 
Reservation in Minnesota, repeatedly declared that illegitimacy had become “the greatest 
social and economic problem on the Reservation.”19  In their attention to the “unmarried 
mother problem,” as in government employees’ approach to “the Indian problem” more 
broadly, social workers often presented the unwed mother and her illegitimate children as 
the dilemma to be solved and failed adequately to address the very real challenges Native 
women faced on a daily basis. 
 Indian Service officials and employees rigorously debated the causes of Indian 
illegitimacy.  For some, illegitimacy was simply evidence of lingering primitivism, of 
Indians' customary disregard for marriage and lack of sexual restraint.  As Supervisor of 
Social Work John Brenton explained, too simplistically but not entirely inaccurately, 
“The Indian never placed a premium upon illegitimacy.” As a result, Brenton suggested, 
illegitimacy represented Indians’ failure to assimilate to “White social standards.”20  
Reservation employees also associated cultural rituals, such as the Sun Dance, with 
sexual delinquency and thus illegitimacy.21   
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Native custom did not provide a complete explanation for the problem, however, 
because it could not account for the apparent increase of illegitimacy on reservations.  
Building on arguments presented in the Meriam Report, some government employees 
argued that federal policy encouraged both illegitimacy and broken homes.  Lewis 
Meriam and his staff contended that the government’s policy of removing children from 
their homes and placing them in distant boarding schools contributed to juvenile 
delinquency, and, as historian Regina Kunzel has demonstrated, many social workers 
understood female delinquency and sexual promiscuity to be virtually interchangeable.22  
The report suggested that by removing children from their homes, the government 
signaled to Indian parents that they could bear children without assuming the 
responsibility for raising them.  The removal of a couple’s children loosened their marital 
bonds.  As Meriam and his staff explained, “Normally husband and wife have a strong 
bond in their common responsibility for children.  To take away this responsibility is to 
encourage a series of unions with all the bad social consequences that accompany 
impermanence of marital relations.”23  As will be demonstrated more fully below, social 
workers and other Indian Service employees feared that various forms of public 
assistance encouraged illegitimacy and broken homes. 
Some explanations sidestepped the question of blame by framing illegitimacy and 
other social and familial dysfunctions as an unfortunate but predictable consequence of 
Indigenous peoples’ rapid transition from one evolutionary phase to the next.  Employing 
the professional vocabulary of the day, social workers on many Indian reservations 
interpreted juvenile delinquency, unwed motherhood, and broken homes as a sign of 
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Indians’ mal-adjustment to white society.  Social workers offered a generational 
explanation; they focused on the youth they believed to be caught between two cultures, 
attracted to the worst aspects of modern American culture and unmoored from their 
communities’ traditional standards.  Unsettled by what she interpreted as the low moral 
standards among Omaha Indians in Nebraska, Mae Bratton attributed the tribe’s “low 
moral ebb” to a “period of cultural transition” in which Omaha youth “seem to have lost 
much of the stamina and integrity of their forefathers.”  Bratton explained, “There is 
always an effort to revive in the memory of this generation the fine, noble folkways and 
mores of their forefathers and to distinguish between authentic customs and those which 
have been assumed merely for convenience of the rationalization of the present 
generation.”24 Similarly, while critical of Indians’ “old practice” of what he called 
“common law marriage,” a male social worker on the White Earth Reservation in 
Minnesota acknowledged that the community’s “elders” respected these unions.  “The 
younger generation,” however, did not hold common law marriage “in as high regard . . . 
and as a result, there are many unstable homes on the reservation.”25  
 Native parents and community leaders shared some of the social workers’ 
concerns.  On the Crow Reservation in Montana, elders like Pretty Shield feared that 
Crow youth were being corrupted by American culture while losing touch with their 
tribal customs.  Like many immigrant and even native-born parents and grandparents, 
Pretty Shield lamented Crow youth’s embrace of American sexual mores and feared that 
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young Crow women on the reservation had less supervision and protection than she had 
had in a world less altered by the presence of whites.26  One of ethnographer Fred 
Voget’s male informants believed that illegitimacy had been rare “in the old days,” but 
that by the late 1930s there were many “illegitment [sic] children” on the reservation.27  
He believed that the blame for this situation rested with the U.S. government, as the 
criminalization of abortion had limited Crow women’s reproductive options, and other 
Crow informants agreed that Crow women had practiced abortion traditionally.   
Prior to sustained contact, “illegitimacy” had not been a meaningful concept in 
Crows’ matrilineal society, but the informant’s  comments suggest that by the 1930s at 
least some Crows had adopted an understanding of illegitimacy that resembled white 
standards.  This resulted at least in part from the rising influence of Christianity on the 
reservation.  Agnes Deernose, raised in a Christian Crow family,  recalled that “to have 
an illegitimate child was one of the worst things a girl could do,” and parents encouraged 
their girls “to marry early . . . [so] they wouldn’t get in trouble this way and bring shame 
on their brothers.”28  When Deernose, a teenager in the 1920s, began to menstruate, both 
parents warned her against pregnancy, and she dropped out of school at age sixteen 
“because my folks forced me to get married.”29  
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 A variety of forces spurred Crow elders’ concerns.  In addition to aligning with 
Christian teachings, stable marital unions also connoted social status, as Crow women 
had traditionally acquired their social position and social prestige through their 
husbands.30  Parents also hoped marital unions could provide their daughters with 
stability and protection amidst great change and uncertainty.  The Depression stretched 
the already limited resources of many Native communities even further.  In addition to 
the social disruptions resulting from decades of federal policy, the Depression and World 
War II increased many Indians’ dependence on wage labor and spurred geographic 
mobility.31  In some cases, such developments prevented extended families and 
communities from caring for children born out of wedlock or following the parents’ 
separation.  More typically, local childcare practices remained in place, but, constrained 
by social and economic circumstances, families and communities requested the assistance 
of the state, which in turn made Native familial patterns increasingly visible to the federal 
government.  
 The vocabulary government employees used to discuss illegitimacy and broken 
homes differed from that typically used within Indigenous communities, even among 
Natives concerned with sexual delinquency and unwed motherhood.  Government social 
workers not only spoke of the “problem” of illegitimacy; they frequently described 
individual Indigenous women—and unmarried mothers as a group—as “problems.”32  In 
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doing so, social workers employed contemporary professional parlance.  From the 1910s 
through the 1940s, social workers attempted to position their field as the authority on 
illegitimacy, displacing the benevolent female reformers who had been the foremost 
authorities on the issue a generation earlier.  In the process, social workers redefined 
unwed motherhood and unmarried mothers; rather than passive victims of male lust and 
predation, social workers portrayed unwed mothers as “problem girls,” imbued with  
agency and often dangerous.33   
This language acquired an additional dimension on Indian reservations, where 
social workers represented one component of the federal government’s evolving effort to 
solve the “Indian problem.”  Originally, the “Indian problem” had signified the 
Indigenous presence on land desired by a nation expanding westward.  Decades into the 
twentieth century, Indians remained on western land, but white Americans had 
successfully reduced and segregated the Indigenous presence.  In these decades, the 
“Indian problem” signified the liminal space Indians occupied in the body politic: non-
Native Americans were pessimistic about Indians’ capacity for complete assimilation, yet 
they viewed a perpetual reservation system unfavorably.34  As long as Indians remained 
in a liminal space—physically or conceptually—policymakers viewed circumstances on 
Indian reservations, and even Indians themselves, as problems demanding government 
solutions.  
 
A Moral and Cultural Problem 
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 Late nineteenth-century policymakers and social reformers who promoted cultural 
assimilation believed that Indians required “moral uplift,” and Indian Service bureaucrats 
underscored the urgency of the government’s mission by characterizing entire tribes as 
sexually immoral.  As explained in Chapter Three, Indian Service employees typically 
measured a given tribe’s sexual morality through its women.  The physician on the Crow 
Reservation reported, for example, “The Crow woman is debauched,” and his colleague 
on the Round Valley Reservation in California echoed, “Our Indian women know not 
what chastity is.”35 Indian Service officials and employees remained concerned with—
and sometimes apparently fascinated by—Indians’ sexual practices following the turn of 
the century.  Progressive assimilationists charged that Indian women’s sexual 
promiscuity exposed the distance between Indians’ current state and the “civilized” 
middle-class ideal and also hindered further progress.36  
    By the 1930s, many Euro-Americans both within and outside the Indian Service 
took the trope of the promiscuous Indian woman for granted, but the appointment of John 
Collier presented a possibility for some change.  Prior to his appointment as 
commissioner, John Collier had defended the Pueblos when Commissioner Charles 
Burke attempted to restrict Indian dances.  Burke and his supporters argued that the 
Pueblos were a sexually immoral tribe and that Pueblo secret dances functioned as 
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celebrations of this immorality.37  Collier rejected both allegations, referring to the 
Pueblos as “‘sexually the purest, sweetest people’ he had ever known,” and declaring that 
he would not hesitate to allow his own sons to participate in the ceremonies if the Pueblos 
permitted non-Pueblo participation.38  As commissioner, Collier espoused a “cross-
cultural vision” and encouraged government employees to show respect for Native 
cultures.39  Collier’s pronouncements produced only limited short-term results because 
they depended on the cooperation of sometimes resistant reservation employees, but they 
represented a significant “transition” nonetheless.40 
 Social workers also played a role in this transition.  As a profession, social 
workers touted science and scientific methods; they generally distanced themselves from 
the moralizing they associated with evangelical women and other predecessors in the 
field of unwed motherhood.41  Social workers required a secular explanation for 
illegitimacy, and by the 1930s, they had begun to understand the unmarried mother as a 
“sex delinquent.”42  Regina Kunzel has observed that by this decade, “some social 
workers were using the terms illegitimacy and delinquency interchangeably.”43 Despite 
the growing emphasis on scientific language and explanations, however, sexual 
delinquency and illegitimacy were very much about morality.  On Indian reservations, the 
discourse of “illegitimacy” sometimes operated in much the same way Victorian 
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discourses of “chastity” and “sexual purity” had decades earlier.  Illegitimacy could serve 
as a short-hand for Indian women’s collective or individual promiscuity, as when social 
workers meticulously noted the illegitimate status of a woman’s children or the number 
of illegitimate children in a household, and when they asserted that out-of-wedlock 
pregnancies had reached near epidemic proportions on a reservation.    
 At the start of the decade, social worker Dorothy Deane spent five weeks on the 
Lac du Flambeau Reservation in Wisconsin. The Indian Service had instructed Deane to 
conduct a survey of the economic and social conditions of the homes of children enrolled 
at the Lac du Flambeau boarding school, which the Indian Service contemplated closing.  
One of the earliest Indian Service social workers, Deane’s assessment of reservation 
conditions did not reflect the social work profession’s emphasis on secular rationality, 
more closely resembling a competing discourse articulated by moral reformers.  She 
concluded that an "appalling moral situation” prevailed on the reservation.  Specifically, 
Deane emphasized the prevalence of broken homes and children born out of wedlock, 
citing both statistics and the testimony of a local minister to demonstrate local Indians’ 
tendency to cohabitate, fornicate, and procreate promiscuously.  Deane also noted that 
some of the parents consumed alcohol excessively, and she vaguely referenced “other 
reasons” for characterizing homes as immoral, but her primary focus remained sexual 
norms and familial structures.44 
 From Deane’s perspective, the moral conditions existing on the Lac du Flambeau 
Reservation posed graver concerns than the economic conditions reservation Indians 
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faced.  Deane argued that the “immoral” conditions present in many homes “would prove 
a greater menace to the child’s future than could a merely pauperized home.”  Deane 
noted that if the government opened a day school immediately and all the boarding 
school children returned home, many of the children would be hungry.  She speculated, 
however, that “They would probably live through this, but they would be in the midst of a 
much more subtle and deadly influence than mere physical discomfort.”45  Even in the 
face of clear economic hardship, Deane chose to emphasize the social and moral concerns 
associated with illegitimacy and broken homes rather than the economic aspects that 
many of her peers would emphasize throughout the decade. 
 Social workers and other government employees agreed that, as a general rule, a 
legal, Christian marriage was the most desirable response to an out-of-wedlock 
pregnancy.  Often, employees had to persuade Indian couples who already considered 
themselves man and wife to obtain a license and visit a pastor. In 1942, a field nurse on 
the Carson Indian Agency in California proudly reported that as a result of her efforts, 
“Two pregnant girls have become respectable wives.”46  When kin was divided over the 
most appropriate action for an unmarried mother and father, government employees 
generally allied with those advocating marriage.  In many cases, they allied with parents 
working to persuade their daughter or her partner to marry.  The superintendent of the 
Klamath Reservation in Oregon supported one Klamath father’s efforts to secure 
marriage for his fifteen-year-old pregnant daughter.  He approvingly described the 
grandfather-to-be as “a very intelligent man [who] would like to uphold the standards of 
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moral [sic] in matrimony and married life.”47  From the perspective of government 
employees and some Indians, marriage had a legitimizing effect on an out-of-wedlock 
pregnancy.   
 But as anthropologist Ruth Landes emphasized in her study of Ojibwa women, 
individual “delinquent girls” who became pregnant out of wedlock responded to their 
situations in a variety of ways, and many eschewed marriage to the father.48  This was in 
large part because, even in Native societies in which anthropologists reported some 
shame associated with illegitimacy in the 1930s, unwed motherhood carried few long-
term social consequences.  The mother’s kin generally welcomed the child, and the 
mother’s sexual history did not bar her from occupying a “respectable” position in her 
community.49  
Unwed mothers who had no intention of marrying could provoke a field worker’s 
ire.  In the early 1940s, Phoebe Sheppard, a field nurse on the Cheyenne River 
Reservation in South Dakota, reported the case of “Eve,” a thirty-three year-old Sioux 
woman who had recently given birth to a premature illegitimate child—“her second 
offense.”  Eve did not wish to marry the man who had impregnated her.  Rather, she 
believed the infant’s father had taken advantage of her, and she wished to see him 
punished.  Sheppard refused Eve’s request for assistance in this matter and instead 
offered an unsolicited lesson in sexual propriety: “I told her she is old enough to know 
what she is doing, to keep her skirts down until she gets married is my advise [sic] to 
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her.”50 From Sheppard’s perspective, Eve’s sexual history, resulting in two out-of-
wedlock pregnancies, demonstrated that she was a sexual actor, not a victim, and her 
sexual choices weakened her entitlement to protection.51  Many social workers attempted 
to distance themselves from the blatant moralizing Sheppard displayed, but as will be 
demonstrated below, they often used similar measures in assessing women’s 
deservedness, and their proposed solutions for the problem of unwed motherhood often 
dovetailed with the broader project of “moral uplift.” 
  
An Economic Problem: Who Will Pay? 
 When she reported the social and economic conditions on the Lac du Flambeau 
Reservation, Dorothy Deane had been certain that immoral homes posed a greater threat 
to the reservation’s future than poverty and even hunger.  Deane’s hierarchy of threats to 
Indian communities was somewhat unusual among government social workers in the 
1930s and 1940s.  As Commissioner Collier touted a less explicitly assimilationist vision, 
and as the Indian Service, Indian communities, and the nation as a whole suffered 
through an unprecedented economic depression, government employees emphasized the 
economic consequences of reservation problems. Policymakers’ and Indian Service 
personnel’s anxieties regarding what they understood to be Indians’ sexual immorality, 
apparently evidenced by illegitimacy and broken homes, did not disappear.  Rather, 
government officials and employees expressed these concerns in economic terms. 
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 Social workers emphasized the “economic phase” of the problem of 
illegitimacy.52 Most unwed Indian mothers, living on impoverished reservations, could 
not support themselves and their children, and many social workers viewed unwed 
mothers as an economic burden—on their families and communities, on federal 
resources, and on white taxpayers.  Broken homes, resulting in female-headed households 
or children raised outside the nuclear family unit, presented a similar burden.  In the mid-
1920s, Indian Service employees on the Crow Reservation in Montana had 
overwhelmingly agreed that broken homes posed few negative consequences for Crow 
children and seldom caused any disruption in their care.  As field physician R. C. Holgate 
explained, “Caring for these children seems to be the least of their troubles.”  Holgate 
continued, “The custom of adopting the children from all classes of homes out to 
relatives or others seems to be universal,” and he emphasized that Crows recognized little 
distinction between biological and non-biological children.53   The rich memoirs of 
twentieth-century Crow women suggest that Holgate characterized Crow childrearing 
practices accurately.  The experiences of Agnes Deernose and Alma Hogan Snell, for 
example, demonstrate that shared childcare responsibilities did not occur only as a 
response to parental death or separation and that flexible childrearing practices continued 
long after Holgate identified them.54   
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Government employees made similar observations on other reservations in the 
following decades.  A male social worker on the Consolidated Chippewa Agency in 
Minnesota noted that most young women who became pregnant out of wedlock 
“remained in their own homes after the birth of the child, and the offspring was accepted 
as another member of the family group.”55  Esther Adamson, his colleague on the 
Mission Indian Reservation in California, expressed some sympathy for the “Indian 
method” of handling out-of-wedlock pregnancies, in which the unwed mother’s family 
assisted in caring for the illegitimate child.  Adamson preferred this method to “the white 
way,” by which she meant that a young unwed pregnant woman entered an institution 
such as the Salvation Army Home, where she gave birth to her baby.56  In the 1930s and 
early 1940s, social workers in maternity homes encouraged most unwed mothers to put 
their illegitimate babies up for adoption.57 Adamson argued that the “Indian way of 
treatment for this situation . . . is much more natural and provides for the child in his own 
environment with the least stigma.”58 
Without question, social workers continued to privilege the nuclear family model.  
Although Adamson spoke favorably of the active role played by a woman’s kin in the 
event of an out-of-wedlock pregnancy, she also lamented, “There has been altogether too 
much passing around of babies among our Indian homes and confusion of children’s 
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names and parentage.”59 Social workers could and did use the non-nuclear nature of a 
family’s domestic arrangements as a factor in their decision to remove a child from his or 
her family and place the child in a foster home.  But throughout the 1930s and into the 
1940s, social workers often tolerated such arrangements in large part because they 
believed them to be the most economical option.  In the mid-1920s, government 
employees working among the Crow demonstrated some awareness of the Crows’ 
childcare practices, but Indian Service health workers and farmers who reported such 
practices did so largely through observation and information relayed by the Crows 
themselves.  In the years to follow, government employees, and particularly social 
workers, assumed a more active role in these processes.  Social workers on many 
reservations found that securing financial support for unwed mothers and their families, 
whether through rations, welfare, or employment, was among their most pressing duties, 
and these financial imperatives shaped their responses to Indian illegitimacy and the 
dissolution of Indian marriages. 
While Indian women sometimes viewed social workers and other government 
employees as adversaries and resented state agents’ intrusions into their private lives, 
they also recognized that government employees could assist them in carrying out their 
own agendas. Unmarried mothers and mothers-to-be who desired marriage requested 
social workers’ assistance in persuading the man in question to agree to a formal union.  
A social worker on the Red Lake Reservation in Minnesota demonstrated to what lengths 
some field workers would go to secure a legitimate marriage.  When a young pregnant 
woman complained that the Indian man who had impregnated her promised to marry her 
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but had since left the reservation, the social worker first made a trip to the reservation at 
which the man was enrolled and next to Minneapolis, where she had heard he was 
employed.  When the man eluded her in both locations, the social worker contacted the 
placement officer for the Civilian Conservation Corps’ Indian Division (CCC-ID), a New 
Deal jobs program, to determine if the man was employed anywhere in the district and to 
request that she be informed if he attempted to secure such employment.60 While this 
social worker likely believed a legal marriage presented the most moral solution to the 
young woman’s out of wedlock pregnancy, she was also motivated by economic factors.  
In the nuclear family model, the husband was expected to act as breadwinner.  The man 
in question had previously worked as a cook in privately-owned restaurants and in a 
CCC-ID camp, experience that the social worker believed enabled him to support the 
young woman and her unborn child financially. 
Women who did not desire marriage requested—and often received—assistance 
in securing financial support from the child’s father.  Most typically, government 
employees made arrangements for unmarried mothers to present their case before the 
local Indian Court.  Clara Madsen, social worker on the Pine Ridge Reservation in South 
Dakota, appreciatively reported that in general the Indian Court cooperated with her 
efforts to secure support for pregnant unmarried young women, but social workers and 
their female clients also frequently found themselves frustrated by the limitations of this 
system.61  Frederick Hoxie has noted that although tribal courts were “viewed as 
instruments of law and order,” their limited jurisdiction ensured that tribal judges’ 
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primary focus was “the regulation of community social life.”  Hoxie likens tribal courts 
to “meetings of elders and erring youngsters” and suggests that Crow tribal judges 
reconciled their need to be perceived as enforcers of law and order and their desire to 
meet their community’s expectations by imposing light sentences for crimes they viewed 
as relatively minor.62  Native feminists have highlighted a gendered aspect of tribal 
judicial systems, charging that male-dominated tribal governments have been reluctant to 
take Native men’s crimes against Native women seriously.63  Social workers often found 
the Indian Court’s response to out-of-wedlock pregnancies inadequate.  They contended 
that the male judges sympathized with alleged fathers rather than the accusing females, 
and they lamented the court’s weak enforcement powers.64 
 Reservation poverty further limited the power of many tribal courts.  As Clara 
Madsen explained, “When the father is able to pay, the Indian Court assesses him a five 
dollar per month payment.”65 When a father was unable to pay, a common occurrence on 
the Pine Ridge Reservation in the 1930s, the unwed mother was left with few options.  
The 1935 Indian Service Law and Order Regulations indicated that any Indian who 
neglected “to furnish food, shelter, or care to those dependent upon him, including any 
dependent children born out of wedlock,” could be deemed guilty of an Indian offense 
and sentenced to three months’ labor “for the benefit of such dependents,” but the social 
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workers’ reports in my sample seldom noted this form of punishment.66  A social worker 
on the Red Lake Reservation in Minnesota lamented that the reservation Indian Court 
allowed an accused father to serve a ninety-day jail sentence in lieu of contributing to an 
illegitimate child’s support.67  In such cases, the man suffered a temporary penalty, but 
the woman and child received no financial assistance.  
Government employees did not always grant unwed mothers the assistance they 
requested.  At times, employees’ moral judgments superseded their economic objectives.  
The field nurse on the Cheyenne River Reservation who advised an Indian woman to 
“keep her skirts down” believed that the woman’s apparent promiscuity and two 
illegitimate pregnancies demonstrated that she did not deserve the nurse’s assistance.68  
Social workers advised women on sexual propriety as well, but their reports rarely 
contained such blatant moralizing.  Nevertheless, social workers almost always refused to 
assist unwed mothers seeking financial support from their children’s fathers when the 
alleged father was a married man.  In such cases, the social workers sympathized with the 
legally married woman and recognized that “to forcefully collect a stated sum of money 
from [the father] imposes a hardship on his family.”69 A social worker on the 
Consolidated Chippewa Agency explained that she started the process of securing 
economic support from an illegitimate child’s father, but because he was a married man 
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she “did not complete the action as more harm would have been done . . . than good.”70  
In such cases, social workers proved willing to overlook adultery, which government 
employees often viewed as evidence of moral failing and an offense worthy of 
prosecution, due in large part to their assessments of the relative deservingness of Native 
women. 
Their female Native clients often resented such distinctions, and they rejected social 
workers’ contentions that another woman’s needs should carry more weight than their 
own.  In the late 1930s, an Indian woman on the Red Lake Reservation—with, according 
to the social worker, three illegitimate children and “a very difficult personality”—
delivered a note to the social worker complaining “that the Agency never made any 
attempt to assist her and that while they collected support for other girls with illegitimate 
children, they refused to help her.”  Exasperated, the social worker reported, “It seems to 
be impossible to make her understand that the fathers of her . . . children are married 
men.”71  More likely, the unwed mother did not accept the superiority of legal marriage 
that the social worker took for granted, nor did she see why the fathers’ marital status was 
more important than the support of her children. 
Married women requested social workers’ economic assistance as well.  Pregnant 
wives or wives with small children looked to government employees to help secure 
financial support from husbands who had deserted them or who otherwise failed to 
provide for their families.  Increased mobility and Indian men’s increased reliance on 
wage labor off the reservation resulted in an “epidemic of desertions” on many 
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reservations, although in many cases such desertions were temporary or seasonal.72 
Because government employees believed broken homes posed both moral and economic 
threats, social workers’ first priority was “to smoothe [sic] out family friction” and 
restore the marriage.73  When this proved impossible, social workers looked to law 
enforcement and the courts to force men to support their families.  Social workers and 
their female clients experienced many of the same frustrations in their attempts to secure 
support from deserting husbands through Indian Courts as they did in their attempts to 
secure support from fathers of children born out of wedlock.  Specifically, social workers 
accused male Indian Court judges of displaying unwarranted sympathy for the male 
defendant.74   
But legal marriage presented other potential means of ensuring that a husband 
supported his wife and children because the Indian Service had expansive power in 
managing individual Indians’ financial affairs.75  Prior to the mid-1940s, no trained social 
workers worked on the Crow Reservation in Montana, so Crow women brought their 
complaints to reservation field workers or straight to the superintendent.  In 1929, a very 
frustrated wife wrote to Superintendent Calvin Asbury, reporting that her husband had 
deserted her and their three children and had contributed nothing for their support during 
his absence.  A couple generations earlier, a Crow woman facing a similar plight might 
have turned to extended kin to exert social pressure on an undependable spouse or to 
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male kin to fulfill the absent husband’s responsibilities; in the late 1920s, the deserted 
wife turned to the state.  The mother requested that Asbury “make him help support his 
children.”  She continued, “He surely has some money coming into the office at various 
times and can you not make arrangements to give it to me so I can at least have enough to 
keep my babies warm.”  Complaining that her previous requests to Asbury as well as to a 
field matron had produced no results, the woman concluded with a strong declaration of 
her rights and Asbury’s responsibilities: “Now I am a ward of the Government and you 
are paid by that government to see that we have justice and to look after our affairs.”76  
In this instance, Superintendent Asbury refused the woman’s request, explaining 
that his office could not “get money out of a person who has none,” but his response 
suggests that the aggrieved wife’s assessment of the situation was not inaccurate.77  When 
a Crow man the government had deemed incompetent leased his land, leasing payments 
went directly to Asbury’s office, and Asbury “very often dr[e]w checks against [a] man’s 
account to help support his wife or child.”78  This was not possible when a deserting 
husband had been classified as competent, leased his own land, and collected his own 
money, but in at least one such case Asbury advocated “withdraw[ing]” a deserting 
husband’s “privilege of renting his own land,” so that his income would have to pass 
through the Indian Office.79 
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 Yet social workers did not simply respond to female clients’ requests.  The Crow 
mother who wrote to Asbury recognized that her status as “a ward of the Government” 
and Asbury’s position as an employee of that government signified a particular 
relationship.  She chose to emphasize Asbury’s obligations within that relationship, but as 
Asbury’s actions to secure financial support for deserted wives and children demonstrate, 
wardship also meant that he and other government employees could intervene in an 
individual Indian’s affairs with relative impunity.  A similarly double-edged relationship 
existed in the field of social work.  When social workers learned of an out of wedlock 
pregnancy, they responded proactively.  They visited unwed pregnant women to assess 
their situations, and whenever possible, they encouraged marriage.80  
 As critically, and increasingly throughout the 1930s, social workers pressured 
unmarried mothers to  “have paternity established,” a process that required an Indian 
Court hearing.81  Some women accepted and even desired this process, recognizing that a 
formal establishment of paternity was necessary if they hoped for legal assistance in 
securing financial support from their children’s fathers.  Others resisted; a social worker 
on the Consolidated Chippewa Reservation reported that one woman refused because the 
man in question was white and “she is afraid she will lose the case,” and another refused 
because she wanted nothing further to do with the man and believed she and her family 
could support her child.82 Like marriage licenses, birth certificates, and social surveys, 
the establishment of a legal relationship between a child and his biological parents helped 
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to make Indian families and communities legible to Indian Service employees, 
bureaucrats, and policymakers.  Government employees also believed that legal paternity 
clarified crucial questions regarding land and inheritance. 
 The Social Security Act of 1935 provided Indian Service employees with a new 
reason to encourage women to establish paternity: the act required the legal establishment 
of paternity if a woman wished to receive public assistance through the Aid to Dependent 
Children (ADC) program.  ADC effectively expanded the mothers’ pension programs 
female social reformers and social workers had successfully achieved at the state level in 
the 1910s and 1920s.  By the early 1930s, forty-six states had adopted mothers’ aid 
programs, but the programs were generally funded by counties and municipalities rather 
than states, and most localities had no programs in operation.83  Indian women rarely 
benefitted from Progressive-Era mothers’ pension programs, but when the Social 
Security Act attached federal funding and regulations to these programs, Commissioner 
Collier consistently lobbied for Indians’ access to these services.84  
 The expansion of the national welfare state in the 1930s and its gradual extension 
to Indian reservations intensified debates among policymakers and citizenry regarding 
financial responsibility for Indian welfare.  Social workers reported that their Indian 
clients faced discrimination when they attempted to benefit from New Deal public 
assistance programs, many of which were operated at the county level. In the midst of an 
economic depression, some financially-stretched county and state governments argued 
that  services to Indians were the responsibility of the federal government.  County 
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officials and local white residents argued that because Indian reservations already 
received federal funding, resources, and services, the county’s share of New Deal relief to 
eligible Indian recipients presented an unwarranted “burden on white taxpayers.”85  Like 
other nonwhite Americans, Indians often received lower relief payments because non-
Native citizens, local administrators, and even some Indian Service officials “assum[ed] 
that standards of relief [were] lower for Indian families than for whites.”86 In such cases, 
poverty served as a rationale for further discrimination.  Indians also found themselves 
cut off from government assistance because they lacked birth certificates or other 
bureaucratic requirements.87 Some social workers believed that county governments 
generally acted fairly in distributing public assistance but that Indians still encountered 
prejudice from individual county and state employees.88 Indians were prohibited from 
receiving Social Security benefits in New Mexico and Arizona through the 1940s.89 
 ADC provided much-needed assistance for individual Indian women and their 
families, but Indian women seeking to benefit from ADC faced significant challenges.  
As Linda Gordon has demonstrated, the Social Security Act created “a stratified system 
of provision.”  Legislators generally excluded Indian women, like white women, from the 
act’s social insurance programs, rendering them eligible only for public assistance 
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programs like ADC.  As Gordon explains, public assistance programs were inferior “both 
in payments and in reputation . . . not just comparatively second-rate but deeply 
stigmatized.”90 
Nevertheless, social workers reported greater difficulty in securing Indian 
women’s eligibility for this second tier of welfare provision than in securing assistance 
for their clients through the act’s other programs, such as Old Age Assistance.91 This 
difficulty stemmed from the intersection of policymakers’ assumptions in designing ADC 
and white Americans’ assumptions about Indian mothers and Indian families.  The social 
reformers and social workers who had first promoted mothers’ pensions had chosen to 
emphasize the plight of the widowed mother—the figure most likely to be viewed as 
deserving of American taxpayers’ assistance.92 Two decades later, policymakers 
remained fearful of creating the conditions in which single mothers, even widows, could 
live comfortably outside of a nuclear family unit for any extended period of time.  They 
designed programs intended to discourage single motherhood “by providing incentives 
for proper and stable families.”93 
 In effect, policymakers designed ADC to assist “deserving” mothers who desired 
and would soon achieve the nuclear family model headed by a breadwinning husband.  
Indian Service employees had attempted to impose this nuclear family structure on Indian 
communities for decades with only limited success.  While individual government 
                                                          
90
 Gordon, Pitied But Not Entitled, ch. 5. 
 
91
 Annual Report, Pine Ridge, 1942, Welfare Branch, Social Workers’ Reports, 1932-42, 1934-48, RG75, 
Box 6, NARA, Washington, D.C. 
 
92
 Gordon, Pitied But Not Entitled, ch. 3. 
 
93
 Ibid., 7. 
 
176 
 
employees within and outside the Indian Service attested to individual Indian women’s 
deservingness of aid, decades of scrutiny of Indian mothers had produced a catalogue of 
perceived deficiencies and a tendency to offer negative evaluations in universal terms.  In 
the 1940s, John Brenton, Indian Service Supervisor of Social Work, demonstrated how 
the federal government’s long-standing effort to transform Indian women into middle-
class housewives had produced a sense of futility among government employees and 
white citizens alike.  Brenton noted that the “failure of the Indian mother to acquire 
wisdom in her buying comes up for frequent public criticism,” and critics used such 
perceived failures as justification for various forms of welfare discrimination.94 
Perceptions of Indian women’s sexual deviancy and excess convinced some non-Native 
observers that Indian women were incapable of maintaining the “proper and stable” 
households ADC’s creators and supporters desired. 
 In most cases, state and county governments required the legal establishment of 
paternity before granting aid.  Such provisions, intended to confirm that the needy mother 
was morally deserving, excluded the children of Indian mothers who were unwilling or 
unable legally to establish the paternity of their children.  Even when legal paternity was 
established, social workers complained that illegitimacy served as a barrier to public 
assistance.  For example, Clara Madsen reported that “the Social Security Department is 
reluctant to accept applications for Aid to Dependent Children from unmarried 
mothers.”95  From the perspective of some state and county administrators, the presence 
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of illegitimate children represented a mother’s failure to achieve the “suitable home” 
provisions ADC required.  In the late 1930s, a social worker in California described the 
“most critical situation” presented by “Violet,” an Indian woman on the St. Ysabel 
Reservation, who “has had five children, each by a different man, and has never been 
married to any of them.”  Despite this evidence of extramarital sex and procreation, 
Violet successfully secured welfare assistance, but state aid also brought intensive 
scrutiny of her personal affairs.  When county officials received reports that Violet was in 
a relationship with a married man who had left his wife, they stopped Violet’s welfare 
payments with no further investigation.96   
According to Mary Kirkland, social worker on the Red Lake Reservation in 
Minnesota, a “suitable home” meant “a home that meets the standard set up by the 
Children’s Bureau.”97 The female bureaucrats within the federal Children’s Bureau were 
physically and socially far removed from Red Lake and other Indian reservations.  As 
Linda Gordon has demonstrated, they promoted a conservative Euro-American familial 
model, even though most did not adhere to this rigid model in their private lives.98  
Kirkland also acknowledged that the phrase “suitable home” was open to interpretation, 
suggesting that the phrase’s vagueness allowed a fair amount of local discretion.  
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Kirkland reported that her conversation with child welfare workers led her to believe that 
few of the children on the reservation would be deemed eligible for ADC.99  
 Some policymakers, state and local welfare officials, and Indian Service 
personnel feared that public assistance to Indian mothers and children addressed an 
economic dilemma but aggravated a moral one.  The bureaucrats and legislators who 
designed the Social Security Act’s social insurance and public assistance programs 
remained wary of social welfare provisions that might produce dependence in the 
citizenry as a whole or, ironically, independence in American women. They deliberately 
designed Social Security programs, including ADC, to avoid these outcomes.100  Federal 
employees with experience in the Indian Service recognized, however, that not only 
could government programs and policies fail to achieve their desired outcomes; they 
could produce unintended consequences and at times the very outcomes the policies 
intended to avoid.    
Even recent Indian Service hires observed this phenomenon, as some social 
workers raised concerns about the social effects of the Social Security Act’s Old Age 
Assistance (OAA) program.  Social workers and other Indian Service employees viewed 
OAA as yet another means of encouraging Indian families to operate as nuclear units.  
Government employees reasoned that if public assistance allowed older Indians to 
achieve financial independence, they could disentangle themselves from the economic 
and social familial networks that led them to reside with their younger relatives.  Some 
social workers expressed optimism that the program would operate as they hoped; one 
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reported in 1937, for example, that “our old people are . . . gradually, one by one . . . 
making arrangements to live more by themselves.”101 But social workers on other 
reservations drew more pessimistic conclusions.  Mary Kirkland complained of the 
difficulty she encountered trying to explain to OAA recipients “that the money was for 
them and not for their families.”  Accustomed to pooling resources, extended families on 
the Red Lake Reservation saw no reason to treat OAA payments differently.  In fact, 
Kirkland suggested that OAA actively discouraged nuclear households; “upon receiving 
Old Age Assistance,” Kirkland reported, “[t]here are numerous cases where the children 
have moved in with the parents.”102  
Similarly, social workers feared that public assistance to Indian mothers 
encouraged the very outcomes Indian Service officials and employees hoped to avoid.  
Echoing social commentators outside the Indian Service, government social workers 
questioned “whether or not this new Aid to Dependent Children program is going to 
encourage broken homes.”103 One year after President Roosevelt signed the Social 
Security Act, Gladys McIlveen, a social worker on a Washington reservation, reported 
that a series of recent ADC applications could all be linked to one young Indian man.  
McIlveen suspected that the man and women involved were deliberately manipulating the 
system; the man married and then divorced or deserted the women, some of whom were 
related to one another, and the women then applied for ADC.  “The question,” McIlveen 
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declared,” is will he go on starting families for the State to care for and if so what should 
be done about it.”104 
Because sources of financial support were so scarce on Indian reservations, Indian 
Service employees and county welfare officials speculated that ADC—public assistance 
available only to single mothers—actually discouraged stable, nuclear homes.  Reporting 
on relief conditions among Montana Indians in the late 1940s, Supervisor of Social Work 
John Brenton noted “the high incidence of broken homes” on Indian reservations and that 
broken homes represented a far greater proportion of the ADC caseload than in 
neighboring white communities.  He suggested, however, that federal, state, and county 
welfare policies made marital separations a rational decision for many Indian families.  If 
a father deserted his wife and children, Brenton explained, he “has reasonable assurance 
that his family will become eligible to ADC.”  While Brenton remained critical of many 
aspects of Indian society, he acknowledged that government policy played a role in 
creating the conditions “[w]hite critics” interpreted as “evidence of White superiority.”105 
Furthermore, although some social workers reported that illegitimacy presented a 
barrier to their efforts to secure ADC payments for Indian children, Indian Service 
employees and state and county welfare administrators increasingly feared that ADC 
contributed to the problem of unwed motherhood on Indian reservations.  A social worker 
on the Mission Indian Reservation in California helped “Diane,” a young unwed mother, 
secure government assistance for herself and her child.  Diane, who had no interest in a 
relationship with her child’s father, lived with her mother and siblings.  Because Diane’s 
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mother was a widow, the family received ADC payments for the support of Diane’s 
siblings.  The household’s pooled resources thus included two ADC grants, and the social 
worker observed that Diane was “much better off financially than if she had married”—
the Indian Service’s first preference—“or than if she could work.”   At least in this case, 
the social worker warned, ADC “amounts to subsidizing illegitimacy,” and she expressed 
concern about the “effect on the reservation situation” as other young women took note 
of Diane’s situation and made similar calculations.106   
A decade later, John Brenton echoed the social worker’s concerns and suggested 
that the situation she had observed was not uncommon.  Brenton reported a “high 
incidence of unmarried parenthood” on Montana reservations, which he attributed to the 
“fact [that] the plains Indians were never condemnatory of the unmarried mother, nor 
applied against her the harsh penalties common to our society.”  He argued that public 
opinion on reservations was “not oversensitive to the demands of White social 
standards,” and most families and community members condoned illicit cohabitation and 
out-of-wedlock pregnancies.  In contrast, “White society” viewed illegitimacy as 
evidence of immorality, and Indian societies’ apparent “laxity . . . serves as a barrier to 
the acceptance of the Indian in non-reservation communities.”  Thus, Brenton concluded, 
illegitimacy “negates the ultimate aim of the Indian Service,” which by the late 1940s 
was the complete immersion of Indians—individually and collectively—into mainstream 
American society.107  
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Brenton argued that because “[t]he Indian never placed a premium upon 
illegitimacy,” white Americans, those “who are more concerned in maintaining the 
conventional home,” bore the ultimate responsibility for Indian promiscuity and 
illegitimacy.  The nation’s current welfare policy, Brenton charged, “penalizes 
conformity to our code and rewards its violation.”  On impoverished reservations with 
high unemployment, government employees’ moralizing could not match the “powerful 
demands of economic interest.”  As Brenton understood the situation, Indian women 
faced a choice: marry, bear “legitimate” children, and experience perpetual financial 
insecurity, or bear “illegitimate” children outside of marriage, establish legal paternity, 
and obtain “year-round security” through public assistance.  Brenton concluded that non-
Native observers should not be surprised that Indian women opted for the option that 
assured “good health and living standards,” nor that their families and communities 
supported such choices.108  Brenton’s analysis, however, vastly overestimates the level of 
financial stability ADC provided.  Not only was such public assistance relatively meager 
by design; Indian women faced discrimination in both access to and amounts of public 
assistance grants.  As importantly, Brenton’s discussion highlights the extent to which 
morality informed social workers’ assessments of the economic issues illegitimacy 
presented. 
 
An Economic Problem: Mothers in the Workforce  
          Indian mothers, whether unmarried, widowed, deserted, or with husbands unable 
to support them, had an additional means of supporting their children: they could work 
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for wages.  In the first decades of the twentieth century, most white middle-class women 
remained at home, outside the workforce.  In the 1930s, depressed economic conditions 
pushed some of these women into the labor force, as their husbands found themselves 
unable to secure regular work and wages.  Ironically, however, policymakers and 
business leaders actively discouraged women, especially married women, from working, 
because they feared working women would divert critical jobs and income from male 
heads of household.  Increasing numbers of middle-class married women joined the labor 
force during and following World War II, but cultural ideals of the middle-class 
housewife were slow to adapt to this new reality. In contrast, poor women and many 
women of color worked for wages.  For these women, work was an economic necessity, 
as their families depended on their labor.109  Middle-class Americans’ cultural ideals 
about female domesticity were applied to these women inconsistently at best, and many 
white middle-class Americans both expected and depended on the labor of immigrant and 
African-American women. 
 Indian women faced contradictory pressures within this race- and class-based 
economic landscape.  Since the late nineteenth century, assimilationists who promised the 
transformation of the Indian into a full-fledged American citizen had taken for granted 
that the assimilated Indian woman’s new role would be that of the civilized middle-class 
housewife. Through the 1930s, field matrons and other female government employees 
attempted to bring about this transformation through intimate exchanges with Indian 
women in their homes, and teachers and matrons at government boarding schools trained 
                                                          
109
 See Alice Kessler-Harris, Out to Work: A History of America’s Wage-Earning Women (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1982). 
 
184 
 
female students in housekeeping and domestic arts.110 Yet scholars have emphasized the 
distance between the domestic training Indian girls received at school and the economic 
and social conditions to which they returned, and some have argued that the primary 
function of this gendered instruction was to prepare young Indian women to perform 
domestic labor in white middle-class homes.111  Indian Service personnel touted “outing” 
programs, in which students lived with white families for a summer or longer, as 
opportunities to expose Indian students to civilized domesticity, but they often operated 
as an apprenticeship in domestic service for Indian women.112 
 In fact, white middle- and upper-class families in urban centers complained of a 
shortage of domestic servants in the 1930s.  As Margaret Jacobs has demonstrated 
through a case study of the San Francisco Bay Area, popular attitudes held that Indian 
women should fill these roles, and Indian Service policies functioned to fulfill these 
expectations.113   On some reservations, the social worker dedicated a significant portion 
of every week to coordinating employment for returned female students in nearby towns 
and cities.  They found that demand often outpaced supply.  In the mid-1930s, a social 
worker in Wisconsin complained that “[t]here are more housework positions than can be 
filled.”114 A colleague in California reported a similar situation.  Due to a regional 
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shortage of “suitable domestic labor,” “a large number of women have called insisting on 
being furnished with girls to work even though none were available.”115 
Tasked with recruiting young Indian women to perform this off-reservation labor, 
social workers and other government employees could easily exploit their positions to 
exert pressure on Indian women, particularly those who had recently returned from 
government boarding schools.  But young Indian women also had reasons to seek 
temporary domestic employment off the reservation and to solicit the social worker’s 
assistance in doing so.  Reservations offered limited employment opportunities for either 
men or women, and young women’s off-reservation employment—poorly paid as it 
was—contributed to their family’s survival.  Urban centers also offered new social 
networks and leisure pursuits and a sense of adventure and independence.116  
The modern leisure culture that appealed to young Indian women was a source of 
concern for Indian Service employees, many of whom remained invested in the moral 
improvement of the nation’s “wards.”  One alarmed social worker advocated against 
sending “our Indian girls . . . to housework jobs in the city where so many temptations are 
given them.”117  More typically, the tension between moral ideals and economic 
imperatives remained unresolved.  The city provided young Indian women, like other 
young American women, increased freedom to explore new romantic and sexual 
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relationships. Social workers and placement officers complained that Indian servants’ 
extracurricular activities compromised their service to their employers: they ran away to 
cohabitate with men; they became ill from venereal disease; and, perhaps worst of all, 
they became pregnant out of wedlock.  Social workers regularly received reports from 
exasperated employers that their domestic servants displayed signs of pregnancy; Jacobs 
estimates that “at least one-quarter” of the nearly 100 Indian domestic servants in her 
sample experienced an out-of-wedlock pregnancy.118   
Indian domestics who became pregnant often found themselves in a challenging 
bind: pregnancy and motherhood hindered their ability to meet employers’ housekeeping 
and childcare expectations, and their employment compromised their ability to provide 
regular care for their biological children.119 An Indian domestic servant’s pregnancy also 
created something of a conundrum for the government employees charged with 
supervising these women.  On the one hand, Indian Service rhetoric championed a 
nuclear middle-class family model in which the mother’s primary responsibility was 
tending to her home and children.  On the other hand, Indian Service policies promoted 
young women’s employment, and many government employees likely recognized that 
the preferred model was not always possible given the economic conditions on many 
reservations.  Jacobs has found that in many cases, the latter imperative outweighed the 
former, and Indian Service employees pressured Indian mothers to place their children in 
boarding schools or give them up for adoption so they did not disrupt their labor.120 Faced 
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with limited options and dependent on their wages, some Indian domestics followed this 
advice.  Others relied on kin networks on the reservation to care for their children, a 
practice with strong precedent in many Native cultures.  Still others chose to terminate 
their employment and return to their communities, where they and their children were 
generally welcomed by extended kin.  
 Indian mothers living on the reservation experienced some version of these 
opposing pressures.  In visits to Indian women’s homes and in group programming, 
social workers, field nurses, and field matrons (who remained on a few reservations 
through most of the 1930s), targeted Indian mothers as the individual responsible for 
maintaining her home and family.  At the start of the 1930s, Collier’s predecessor Charles 
Rhoads assigned extension agents to many reservations, and Collier placed additional 
emphasis on reservation extension work as part of his community development 
programming.  Female extension workers promoted the ideal of the industrious wife and 
mother; they organized Indian women into clubs and provided instruction in childcare 
methods, home and yard improvement projects, household budgeting, and other skills.121  
Skills like gardening and canning could help Indian women stretch limited resources, but 
they frequently were not enough, and many Indian families—extended and nuclear 
alike—required additional income.  ADC filled or partially filled this gap for some 
families, but racial discrimination and cultural assumptions limited Indian mothers’ 
access to this form of public assistance.  Yet Indian mothers seeking employment on 
reservations faced extremely limited options.  As a result, many turned to New Deal jobs 
programs.   
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 New Deal jobs programs for both Native and non-Native populations 
overwhelmingly privileged men.122  As Colleen O’Neill explains, “out of approximately 
156 WPA [Works Progress Administration] projects on Indian Reservations, 11—7 
percent—were designed to employ women.”123 After decades of criticizing Indian 
mothers for their apparent unwillingness to spend their days at home, Indian Service 
officials and employees justified jobs programs that required additional absence in two 
ways.  First, as O’Neill argues, the extension agents, social workers, and other reservation 
employees who implemented women’s relief work “folded those initiatives . . . into 
domestic training programs that were already part of the federal assimilationist 
curriculum.”124  Indian women hired to work on WPA sewing projects, for example, 
sewed garments to be distributed as relief.  In other words, they performed labor that was 
indistinguishable from the gender-appropriate training many had received in boarding 
schools and the voluntary home improvement programs organized by extension workers.  
That the Indian Service sometimes paid women in “materials for clothing and household 
equipment” rather than cash or check underscored the message that these women 
performed “charity” work, not wage work.125   
 In addition, government employees justified relief work for women by 
emphasizing that they only selected the most “suitable” women for such programs.  For 
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example, a social worker in Oklahoma reported that “[t]he only women who have been 
given sewing are those having no men in the home who are able to work.”  She specified 
that this criterion included “widows, deserted women, and women whose husbands are 
physically unable to work.”  In exchange for assistance in securing employment, Indian 
mothers received regular reminders of the Indian Service’s commitment to the ideal of 
the male breadwinner: “The position of the man as the one responsible for the support of 
the family has been stressed whenever possible.”126  
 This social worker apparently did not view unmarried mothers as appropriate 
beneficiaries of government jobs programs, and in this she was not unusual. But many 
social workers determined, however reluctantly, that it was necessary to help secure relief 
work for unwed mothers.  Social workers feared that without wage work, unwed Indian 
mothers would be a financial burden on the federal government and their families, or they 
would promiscuously drift from one man to the next.127 In addition to the WPA, 
unmarried mothers sometimes found work through reservation National Youth 
Administration (NYA) projects.  In the summer of 1937, Mary Kirkland hired seven 
unmarried mothers for a NYA arts and sewing project on the Red Lake Reservation.  
Previously, the women had received regular rations from the federal government; 
Kirkland explained that they would be removed from the ration rolls after they received 
their first paycheck.128 A year later, Kirkland reported that the unmarried mothers on the 
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reservation seemed less inclined to “loo[k] to the agency for assistance in the matter of 
caring for children.”  She speculated that this “changed attitude” was a consequence of 
unmarried mothers’ employment on WPA or NYA projects, but she also hoped the trend 
signaled “a greater feeling of responsibility on the part of the parent.”129  
 Despite Kirkland’s optimism, Indian mothers’ employment often created or 
exacerbated situations that provoked government employees’ criticism.  Like many social 
workers, Kirkland struggled to reconcile her recognition of the economic necessity of 
women’s wage work with her preference for the nuclear model of home and family.  A 
mother’s ability to work for wages often required the support of extended kin networks.  
As had long been common practice in many Native societies, older relatives provided 
day-to-day child care while the younger, able-bodied mother or parents performed 
productive labor, whether paid or unpaid.  As urban centers and defense industries 
offered superior economic opportunities, these arrangements sometimes stretched for 
longer periods of time.  In 1944, Eva Watt, an unmarried White Mountain Apache 
mother, left her four-year-old son with her mother and step-father and pursued “a series 
of wage-paying jobs” off the reservation.  Although Watt returned to her reservation to 
visit her family as she was able, she did not return home permanently for more than two 
decades.130  
 Watt made this “difficult decision” in response to her family’s grave economic 
situation and the reservation’s limited economic opportunities, and she did so to 
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contribute to her family’s support.131  Social workers recognized the poverty plaguing 
many reservations in the 1930s and 1940s.  In practice, many tacitly accepted 
arrangements similar to Watt’s family, but there was no guarantee that government 
employees would understand a mother’s decision in the same way as she and her family 
did.  A social worker in Wisconsin, for example, spoke disparagingly of a mother who 
first bore “eight illegitimate children” and then proceeded to “giv[e]” some of them to an 
older family member.132 Government employees complained that non-nuclear 
childrearing practices caused confusion, although in most cases it seems such confusion 
posed a threat to bureaucratic imperatives rather than to the children or families in 
question.133  
 Even mothers who worked for wages on the reservation—and lived with their 
biological children—raised concerns for social workers.  Mary Kirkland, who observed 
favorable outcomes of relief work for some Indian mothers, also warned that wages could 
provide a level of autonomy that she perceived as threatening.  She observed a “trend” in 
which some of the women employed on WPA had adopted the “attitude . . . that the 
money they earn on WPA projects is theirs to spend as they see fit,” and their financial 
choices did not always align with government priorities.  Even more worrisome, Kirkland 
suggested that a byproduct of these women’s new sense of financial independence was 
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their growing conviction that their “personal lives are no affair of anyone other than 
themselves.”134   
Kirkland feared that wage work could exacerbate Indian women’s worst vices.  
New attitudes and the funds to secure liquor and transportation facilitated casual affairs, 
including those with married men; “these women,” Kirkland charged, “are contributing to 
the breakdown of family life.”  Furthermore, Kirkland argued that as Indian women came 
to view themselves as “career women,” they neglected their maternal responsibilities.  
Tragically, Kirkland reported “a high death rate” among the babies of women employed 
on WPA projects, although it is not clear that the mortality rate for infants of working 
mothers outpaced that for infants of mothers who did not work.  Like many government 
employees, Kirkland attributed this infant mortality to maternal behavior and made no 
mention of broader reservation conditions.  The death rate, she argued, “no doubt can be 
traced to the fact that the mothers are employed,” and they left their small children in the 
hands of “untrained” caregivers.135  The “untrained” caregivers Kirkland derided 
included older siblings, other female kin, and especially grandmothers.  Kirkland’s 
anxieties highlight many government employees’ continued unease with Indian mothers 
in the workforce and underscore the scrutiny working mothers faced. 
 
 
Feeblemindedness: The Moral and Economic Catch-All 
 
  From the turn of the century through the 1930s, growing numbers of American 
social scientists, social workers, and health and welfare professionals embraced the 
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pseudo-science of eugenics, which held that the human species could be improved by 
promoting the reproduction of “desirable” physical and mental traits and discouraging the 
reproduction of traits deemed “undesirable.”  Eugenicists invented a new vocabulary and 
a series of new diagnoses, the most influential of which was “feeblemindedness.”  An 
inherently vague term, feeblemindedness connoted mental (and often physical) unfitness 
and tended to follow a geography of class, most frequently applied to working-class 
whites who their middle-class counterparts feared acted as agents of racial degeneracy.  
Psychologists Henry Goddard and Lewis Terman developed mental tests to increase the 
scientific authority of the diagnosis in the early twentieth century, but testing did little to 
disentangle social factors from ostensibly empirical measures of intelligence.136 
Psychologists and social workers viewed feebleminded men and women as “moral 
degenerates,” and, as Regina Kunzel has demonstrated, they defined feeblemindedness in 
women “almost exclusively in sexual terms.”137  Promiscuity and illegitimacy signaled 
feeblemindedness just as surely as the results of an IQ test. 
 Historians have also noted the racial dimensions of early twentieth-century 
intelligence testing.  Lewis Terman, for example, located the IQs of Indians, as well as 
Mexicans and “negroes” in “the borderline range of 70 to 90.”138  Although the nation’s 
leading eugenicists rarely commented on Indians specifically, Alexandra Stern notes that 
Paul Popenoe, a California eugenicist, believed that natural selection was “appropriately 
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leading to the extinction of decadent races such as the American Indian.”139  Indian 
Service officials and employees may not have agreed with Popenoe’s prediction nor with 
his confidence that the development would be a positive one, but by the 1930s, social 
workers and other government employees regularly employed eugenic language.  In 
particular, reservation social workers found “feeblemindedness,” a term associated with 
female sexual promiscuity and deviation from white middle-class standards, to be a 
useful category. 
Americans concerned with the apparent prevalence of feeblemindedness believed 
sterilization provided an attractive solution.  States began passing sterilization laws in the 
1910s, and by the end of the 1920s, thirty states had passed versions of these eugenics-
inspired statutes.140  Most statutes were theoretically gender-neutral, but in practice 
physicians were more likely to sterilize women than men.141  Social workers, concerned 
with both sexual delinquency and illegitimacy, argued that sterilization would “stem the 
tide of out-of-wedlock pregnancy.”142  Not surprisingly, social workers and other 
government employees on Indian reservations and working among Indians in urban 
centers likewise saw sterilization as an effective response to a range of social problems. 
Government employees sometimes recommended sterilization for Indian women 
who they believed to be unwilling or unable to conform to appropriate moral standards.  
In 1932, Superintendent James Hyde reported one such case to his District Medical 
Director.  Hyde explained that “Edith,” a 23-year-old Crow woman, was promiscuous 
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and had given birth to two illegitimate children, one of whom died in infancy.  Hyde was 
not convinced that Edith was “really feeble minded,” but the repeated offense of 
illegitimacy was enough for him to conclude that she was “subnormal.”  Furthermore, 
Hyde observed that Edith would never live up to the standards of civilized domesticity: 
“She has none of the accomplishments of a housewife and is unable to cook or sew or 
carry on her other household duties.”   Thus, her living child and any subsequent children 
would not be raised in a suitable environment and would be at risk of perpetuating the 
social dysfunctions Hyde identified.  As Hyde’s report demonstrates, government 
employees could employ multiple moral discourses simultaneously.  As an unmarried, 
sexually active woman, Edith posed a moral threat to her community, but Hyde also 
suggested that he advocated sterilization in an attempt to protect the young mother.  “Due 
to her sub-normal mental development,” Hyde explained, “she is the prey of any man that 
comes along.”143    
 As a means of regulating morality, sterilization had clear limitations.  Sterilized 
women—whether “feebleminded,” “subnormal,” or otherwise—could choose to remain 
sexually active, they were still vulnerable to venereal disease, and they could still be 
victims of sexual violence.  Rather, by eliminating the possibility of pregnancy, 
sterilization removed the most visible evidence of sexual immorality.  As importantly, 
sterilization precluded the economic costs such sexual encounters could produce.  In my 
sampling of social workers’ reports in the 1930s and early 1940s, social workers blended 
moral and economic arguments when advocating the sterilization of individual Indian 
women, and they appear to have been most likely to favor sterilization in the cases of 
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unmarried mothers who could not rely on a breadwinning husband for financial support.  
Social workers regularly reported that young Indian women who had been deemed 
sexually delinquent and often feebleminded had been institutionalized “for the purpose of 
sterilization” and released following the operation.144 The Indian Service often could not 
afford an extended period of institutionalization, and sterilization offered a cost-effective 
alternative.  
 Feeblemindedness followed a geography of class in part because middle-class 
observers interpreted impoverished conditions as symptoms of mental deficiency.  An 
Indian woman who bore children out of wedlock without the means to support them 
financially signified not just promiscuity but also subnormal mentality.  In advocating 
sterilization, government employees emphasized the financial burden unwed mothers and 
their illegitimate children posed.  For example, after enumerating Edith’s moral failings, 
Hyde added that Edith’s mother assumed primary responsibility for the care of her 
grandchild, and that Edith was “dependent on the mother for her support.”145   Such 
childcare arrangements were not unusual on the Crow Reservation, and although he did 
not do so, Hyde could have read Edith’s case as an example of Crow families’ 
resourcefulness in handling out-of-wedlock pregnancies.   
Government employees were equally if not more concerned with the financial 
burden illegitimacy posed to the federal government.  Mary Kirkland regularly lamented 
the difficulty of arranging for the sterilization of Red Lake Indians due to constraints 
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presented by state laws.  Describing one case she believed to be urgent, Kirkland reported 
she “feels that the girl is feebleminded, and that as she apparently has no sense of 
discresion [sic] will continue to have illegitimate children and expect and demand the 
Agency provide for their support.”146  In a single sentence, Kirkland combined an appeal 
to scientific authority, a moral assessment, and an explanation of pressing economic 
imperatives to underscore the necessity that this young woman be institutionalized for the 
purpose of sterilization.   
Indian Service employees also recognized that illegitimate pregnancies could 
interrupt young Indian women’s wage labor, and sterilization served as one possible 
means of avoiding this outcome.  In her study of the San Francisco Bay Area, Margaret 
Jacobs found multiple examples of Indian domestic servants who refused to give up their 
illegitimate children and in turn “found themselves subjected to mental tests and 
committed to mental institutions.”147  In a cynical twist, government employees viewed 
these women’s commitment to mothering their biological children as suspect and worthy 
of punishment.  Private employers, outing matrons, and Indian Service bureaucrats 
succeeded in placing at least two of the women in Jacobs’s sample in the Sonoma Home 
for the Feebleminded.  As Wendy Kline has demonstrated, this California institution led 
the nation in involuntary sterilization of inmates in the first decades of the twentieth 
century.148 
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Yet, as Johanna Schoen reminds us, eugenic sterilization “did not function only as 
an assault on women’s reproductive autonomy.”149  Sterilization, like other reproductive 
technologies, was not inherently “repressive or liberating”; rather, women have viewed 
the operation according to “the context in which the technology was embedded.”150   Like 
other women faced with unplanned pregnancies, some Indian women in the 1930s and 
1940s may have been open to sterilization as one of the few birth control options 
available to them.  Of course, the inaccessibility of temporary means of preventing 
unwanted pregnancies stacked the odds in favor of more permanent measures.  In the late 
1930s, Crow Indians attributed what appeared to them a rise in illegitimate children in 
recent decades  to the “simple reason” that Crow women had been warned of the legal 
ramifications of abortion.  Federal law had cut off reproductive options that had 
previously been available to them.151  
Superintendent Hyde emphasized that in recommending sterilization for Edith and 
in similar cases, he intended to “remain in strict conformity with State law on the 
subject,” and he and other Indian Service employees consistently documented their 
efforts to obtain the women’s “consent.”  The Crow Reservation did not have a social 
worker in the early 1930s, so Hyde sent a field nurse to “talk with the mother and the girl 
[Edith] with a view to getting them to consent to an operation that would result in 
sterilization.”152  In such situations, Indian women with varying knowledge of English 
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and of Western medicine depended on government workers accurately to describe the 
procedure they advocated.  Furthermore, the social workers who increasingly assumed 
the task of visiting Indian women and, when they deemed advisable, encouraging 
sterilization were the same government agents who made decisions about relief eligibility 
and other matters that carried significant weight for Indian families.  Mary Kirkland 
illustrates a social worker’s ability to define the choices presented to Indian families.  She 
observed that given the choice between the extended and sometimes indefinite 
institutionalization of their daughters and the prospect of their daughters’ return 
following a “sterilization operation,” parents typically desired the latter.153  The economic 
conditions described in this chapter further constrained Indian women’s choices; many 
had kin who depended on their labor, and they recognized that financial options for the 
support of their children were limited and often came with a price.  
 Finally, it is critical to acknowledge that the accounts of many twentieth-century 
Indian women challenge Indian Service employees’ claims of their adherence to even this 
constrained version of consent.  Decades later, the Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare (HEW) accelerated programs that subsidized the sterilization of Medicaid 
recipients.  Spurred by this financial incentive, the Indian Health Service (IHS), by this 
time a branch of the Public Health Service (PHS) within HEW, sterilized thousands of 
Indian women.154  As Indian activists and scholars have documented, IHS and contract 
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physicians performed some of these operations without the women’s informed consent or 
in some cases even knowledge.155   
As this chapter has demonstrated, Indian Service employees had moral and 
economic motivations to encourage sterilization in the 1930s and 1940s as well, and 
Indian women accused government health workers of violating Indian women’s 
reproductive autonomy in the same ways they would in the postwar period, even if, as the 
granddaughter of one early activist explains, they “had no one to report to” and struggled 
to make their voices heard.156  About a year before Superintendent Hyde and the field 
nurse on the Crow Reservation initiated arrangements for Edith’s sterilization, Susie 
Walking Bear Yellowtail, one of the first Indian women to become a registered nurse, left 
her position at the Crow Indian Hospital due to the “unethical medical practices” she 
witnessed by some of the physicians.  Specifically, as discussed in Chapter Two, 
Yellowtail alleged that government physicians sterilized Crow women “without their 
being aware of it.”157  Following World War II, Yellowtail gained a national reputation 
for her health and welfare work, and she eventually reported her earlier observations on 
the Crow Reservation directly to the president, but there is little evidence that her 
accusations spurred tangible change in the intervening decades.158   
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Conclusion 
 Indian women’s memoirs demonstrate notable continuity with regard to Native 
attitudes towards family, including flexible childrearing practices, multigenerational 
domestic arrangements, and a sense of shared responsibility among extended kin.159  This 
continuity is quite remarkable against a backdrop of concerted government attempts to 
disrupt these patterns.160  In the 1930s, Commissioner Collier disavowed many 
assimilationist federal policies that functioned to destabilize Indian families, such as the 
removal of Indian children to off-reservation boarding schools, but the changes Collier 
promised proceeded slowly and unevenly at the local level.  Furthermore, Collier and 
other policymakers remained committed to patriarchal political structures, and Indian 
Service social workers remained committed to helping individuals and families “adjust” 
to the nuclear unit they perceived as the societal norm. 
 Social workers defined illegitimacy and broken homes as an urgent problem, and 
social disruptions and limited economic resources strained Indian families’ ability to care 
for extended kin and children born in or out of wedlock.  Social workers and other 
government employees increasingly emphasized the economic aspects of the problem of 
illegitimacy and broken homes, a decision that was encouraged by Collier’s rejection of 
assimilationist rhetoric as well as social workers’ desire to distance themselves from their 
un-professionalized predecessors in work with unwed mothers. The nation’s economic 
                                                          
159
 See Watt, Don’t Let the Sun Step Over You; Voget, They Called Me Agnes; and Beverly Hungry Wolf, 
The Ways of My Grandmothers (New York: Morrow, 1980). 
 
160
 See, for example, Rose Stremlau, Sustaining the Cherokee Family: Kinship and the Allotment of an 
Indigenous Nation (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011); and Cathleen Cahill, Federal 
Fathers and Mothers: A Social History of the United States Indian Service, 1869-1933 (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2011). 
202 
 
climate in the midst of the Great Depression further foregrounded financial 
considerations, as did nearby white citizens’ complaints about the financial burden Indian 
reservations posed for counties and states with limited resources. 
 In practice, social workers’ attempted solutions for illegitimacy and broken homes 
dovetailed with many long-standing federal objectives with regard to Indian family life.  
Government employees almost always encouraged marriage and pressured fathers to 
provide for their children and families, and they rewarded mothers who met white 
middle-class standards of a “suitable home” through the distribution of ADC grants and 
other public assistance.  At the same time, however, unstable economic conditions and 
Indian Service policy and practice in the 1930s and early 1940s exasperated the 
contradictory pressures facing Indian mothers.  Even those who chose marriage or who 
undertook steps to secure financial support from their children’s fathers were often 
unable financially to support their families.  Familial economic need often pushed 
married and unmarried women into the labor force, but economic opportunities for 
women were extremely limited on many reservations, and government employees played 
a role in encouraging women to seek wage work off the reservation.  To work for wages 
either on or off the reservation, Indian mothers often relied on extended kin for daily or 
long-term childrearing, a practice government employees had long discouraged and 
remained skeptical.  Ironically, engaging in wage work to support their families could 
buttress tropes of the negligent Indian mother. 
 It was in this context that social workers and other government employees 
employed the eugenic language of “feeblemindedness” to explain Indian women’s 
sexual, maternal, or even financial choices that deviated from white middle-class 
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standards—or, more accurately, white middle-class ideals.  Some employees presented 
sterilization as a partial solution to Indian women’s deficient morals and as a solution for 
the economic burdens their children posed, and the evidence suggests that in at least 
some cases Indian women had no say in their permanent sterilization.  This form of 
negative eugenics drastically declined in the United States following World War II, but 
the government’s assessment of the moral and economic threats Indian women, families, 
and communities posed only intensified as policymakers spearheaded yet another shift in 
federal Indian policy in these years.  In the decade and a half following World War II, the 
federal government endeavored to get out of the Indian business altogether.  
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CHAPTER 6 
FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY AND AMERICAN INDIAN WOMEN IN THE 
TERMINATION ERA 
 In April 1959, in Phoenix, Arizona, “Susan,” a sixteen-year-old unmarried 
Tohono O’odham mother, gave birth in a hospital with which the federal government had 
contracted for Indian health services.  Susan attended the local Indian boarding school, 
but the school staff reported that they had no knowledge of her pregnancy until the 
morning she went into labor.  After being rushed in an ambulance to the nearest contract 
hospital, Susan gave birth to a healthy baby boy.  The school superintendent alerted a 
Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) social worker to the unexpected delivery that very day.  
In the days immediately following her son’s birth, two unidentified school employees and 
a female BIA social worker visited Susan in the hospital, the latter announcing to hospital 
staff that the purpose of her visit was “to discuss the relinquishment of the child.”  The 
social worker “interviewed the patient” and “had her sign papers” in which Susan 
ostensibly consented to the adoption of her child.  As it turned out, the social worker 
“obtained the wrong relinquishment forms from the girl,” but it does not appear that this 
error delayed the adoption process.  The social worker removed the infant from the 
hospital and placed him in a foster home shortly after Susan was transferred to another 
hospital for convalescent care.1 
 Susan’s experiences in the days following her delivery resulted from the BIA’s 
recent decision to promote the adoption of Indian children.  In 1958, the BIA collaborated 
with the Child Welfare League of America to establish the Indian Adoption Project 
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(IAP).  Government and private hospitals provided a critical location in the BIA’s effort 
to promote Indian adoption to white homes, and the IAP placed more Indigenous children 
for adoption in Susan’s home state of Arizona than any other state.2  In Arizona and 
elsewhere, government employees justified foster care and adoption policies and 
practices by pointing to the poverty plaguing many Indian reservations against a 
backdrop of national postwar posterity.  The BIA’s promotion of foster care and adoption 
was premised on a faith in the superiority of the nuclear family and reflects the 
conviction of many policymakers, social scientists, and non-Native citizens that Indian 
children would be better served in white rather than Native homes, raised by white rather 
than Native mothers and other relatives.  
 It is also notable that Susan was an unwed mother.  As Rickie Solinger has 
demonstrated, social scientists and policymakers in postwar decades viewed unwed 
mothers as “deviants threatening to the social order,” and they devised race-specific 
solutions to the problem of unwed motherhood.3  White unwed mothers were perceived 
as psychologically unwell but redeemable; thus, caseworkers argued, if a mother gave up 
her child for adoption, under coercion if necessary, both she and her infant could still 
achieve ideal gendered and domestic norms.  Black unwed motherhood, on the other 
hand, was understood to be pathological, and black unwed mothers faced punitive 
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measures to control their behavior, including discrimination in welfare services and 
coercive sterilization.4 
 This chapter demonstrates that Indian women—wed as well as unwed—were 
targets of both strategies, although the pressure Indian mothers faced to give up their 
children was not accompanied by promises of moral redemption as in the case of unwed 
white mothers.  The widespread fostering and adoption of Indigenous children and the 
BIA’s ongoing restrictive reproductive policies and practices, most notably the coercive 
sterilization of Native women, both reflected and furthered the terminationist ethos that 
dominated postwar federal Indian policy.  As policymakers committed themselves yet 
again to eliminating “the Indian problem” once and for all, Indigenous mothers found 
themselves simultaneously deprived of critical services and the target of federal policies 
and practices that compromised their maternal rights. 
 
American Indian Women in Postwar Social Science Discourse 
 As previous chapters have demonstrated, John Collier ushered in notable changes 
in at least some aspects of federal Indian policy in the 1930s, even as his administration 
continued many policies and practices targeting Indigenous women.  In addition to his 
faith in social work methods and trained social workers, Collier was committed to 
utilizing the field of anthropology in the administration of Indian affairs.5  In the midst of 
an economic depression, anthropologists found employment in various government 
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agencies, including the Bureau of Indian Affairs Applied Anthropology Unit.  Scholars 
agree that this alliance between anthropologists and Indian Service bureaucrats was 
limited in part by disagreements regarding the objectives of anthropological studies on 
Indian reservations.  Throughout the decade, many anthropologists remained committed 
to “salvage ethnology,” which directed their attention to the Indigenous past and thus was 
of minimal interest to many government officials and reservation employees.6  
But the decade also witnessed the emergence of anthropological studies of 
Indigenous “acculturation,” and anthropologists such as Ralph Linton emphasized the 
relevance of acculturation studies for policy formation, as the nation faced the reality that 
Indigenous groups were neither dying out nor becoming absorbed into mainstream 
culture.7  Margaret Mead’s The Changing Culture of an Indian Tribe, published in 1932, 
can be seen as one of the earliest examples of an acculturation study, although Mead and 
her employer Clark Wissler of the Museum of North American History in New York City 
emphasized that the study was not intended to inform policy.8  Mead spent just three 
months on the Omaha Reservation in Nebraska, and she was thoroughly disappointed by 
the “broken culture” she believed she encountered there.  At a loss to explain the poor 
social and economic conditions she observed, Mead concluded that there was plenty of 
blame to go around.  She criticized government policies and cultural attitudes that 
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perpetuated Indians’ physical and conceptual segregation from mainstream American 
culture and institutions and cultivated Indian dependency and entitlement.9  
 Mead’s study is also an example of another contemporary trend in American 
anthropology—namely, the scholarly interest in American Indian women.  A holistic 
understanding of an Indigenous society and culture required fieldwork among its women.  
Since the earliest days of the discipline, some male anthropologists had welcomed female 
researchers with the expectation that female field workers might “gain access to 
‘women’s spheres,’” but unprecedented numbers of female anthropologists conducted 
field work on Indian reservations in the 1930s through BIA programs.10 Ethnological 
interest in Indian women was not restricted to female researchers, however.  On the Crow 
Reservation, for example, Frank B. Linderman and Fred Voget deliberately sought out 
female informants and interrogated them on topics they believed to be the province of 
women.11  
 Mead envisioned her study as an examination of the experiences of Omaha 
women.  Maureen Molloy notes, for example, that Mead titled her book The Reservation 
Woman, and that it was the publisher who made the change to the current title.12  The 
Omaha woman was also the “central figure” on which the book focused, and the 
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archetypal Omaha woman Mead presented was a delinquent.13  Much like the social 
workers described in Chapter 4, Mead dedicated particular attention to promiscuity and 
illegitimacy on the reservation, which she interpreted as both a symptom and a cause of 
Omaha mal-adjustment and degeneracy.   
Mead’s depiction of Omaha women was not entirely unsympathetic.  She 
observed, for example, the strong intergenerational bonds among Omaha women and 
argued that, in contrast to Omaha men, “women are still Indian in positive terms, in a 
multitude of details which bind mother to daughter and both to grandmother.”14  In 
Mead’s framing, however, this solidarity and stability among Omaha women was double-
edged at best.  Mead contended that promiscuous women effectively passed on  their 
sexual delinquency to their daughters, yet she simultaneously highlighted the frequency 
of delinquency among girls who were raised by their grandmothers.15  Furthermore, 
Mead viewed Omaha women’s “cultural conservatism” as an obstacle to solutions to the 
current social and economic problems on the reservation and particularly to Mead’s 
apparently preferred solution, namely, “the gradual amalgamation of the Antler into the 
white population through scattered residence and absorption into various industrial 
pursuits.”16   
 If Mead’s 1932 publication can be seen as an early example of a study of 
Indigenous acculturation, Mead herself is most frequently associated with the loosely-
organized school of culture and personality studies, which was influential in American 
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anthropology from the late 1920s through the early 1950s.  John Gilkeson characterizes 
the culture and personality school as “an interdisciplinary collaboration between 
anthropologists (and other social scientists as well) and psychologists.  It represented the 
application of psychological (and psychiatric) methods and viewpoints to anthropological 
material.”17  Rejecting earlier evolutionary paradigms and contemporary notions of 
biological determinism associated with eugenics, culture and personality scholars 
“defined culture as a form of ‘social inheritance’” and studied the reproduction of culture 
across generations with particular emphasis on culturally-specific child-rearing 
practices.18 Like Mead’s study of the Omaha, culture and personality studies often 
dedicated significant attention to women due to their role as biological and especially 
social reproducers.   
 In the early 1940s, these anthropological trends converged with federal Indian 
policy when the Office of Indian Affairs, in conjunction with the Committee on Human 
Development at the University of Chicago, sponsored The Indian Personality Project.  
Initiated by John Collier and coordinated by his wife, anthropologist Laura Thompson, 
the project consisted of anthropological studies of families and communities on five 
Native American reservations.19  The project’s focus on family and childrearing both 
reflected scholarly trends and represented long-standing concerns in the Indian Service.  
Researchers investigated Native cultures by studying the “personalities and life histories” 
of children, on whom they performed “a battery of psychological tests of both the 
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projective and the performance types.”20  “The objective of this project,” as Gordon 
Macgregor, the lead anthropologist for the study of the Pine Ridge Reservation in South 
Dakota, explained, was to provide an integrated analysis of personality formation among 
each group “for implications in regard to Indian Service administration.”21 
 Macgregor’s analysis of personality formation on the Pine Ridge Reservation 
centered on Dakota families.  Traditionally, he explained, nuclear families “merged with 
the extended family group with which it lived, hunted, and shared its food and social 
life.”  The extended family, rather than what Macgregor called the “individual family,” 
was the most important familial unit in Dakota society.  This would have come as no 
surprise to Indian Service administrators, who had long viewed Indigenous family 
structure as an obstacle to their assimilation.  Macgregor reported, however, that due to 
economic imperatives and government policies, the nuclear family had “risen in 
importance” and displayed “greater independence” from extended kin networks.22  
Macgregor’s own evidence, as well as Dakota sources over the following decades, 
suggest that the transformation Macgregor believed he witnessed may have been 
somewhat superficial, reflecting changes in living arrangements, for example, rather than 
changes in the nature of social and familial relationships.23  
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 For Macgregor, however, the increased independence and isolation of the nuclear 
household was significant for the way that it appeared to augment the biological mother’s 
role within the family.  Macgregor reported that Dakota children spent more time with 
their mothers than previously, and mothers shouldered more responsibility for their 
children’s upbringing.24  Yet Macgregor feared that the biological mother’s increased 
prominence not only came at the expense of extended female kin, but also reflected her 
husband’s declining status.  Macgregor reported that traditionally, “Dakota culture was 
definitely oriented toward the life and pursuits of the men, and the women’s life was 
almost completely supplementary to the men’s activities.”25  His conclusion echoes 
Mead’s conclusion following her brief stay among the Omaha, another Plains tribe, a 
decade earlier.  Macgregor’s assessment misinterprets “Dakota culture” in a way that Ella 
Cara Deloria, a Dakota woman and a trained anthropologist, suggested was typical 
among non-Natives who spent little time getting to know Indians as human beings.  As 
Deloria explained, “Outsiders seeing women keep to themselves have frequently 
expressed a snap judgment that they were regarded as inferior to the noble male.  The 
simple fact is that woman had her own place and man his; they were not the same and 
neither inferior nor superior.”26  Deloria depicted these complementary sex roles in her 
ethnographic novel Waterlily, which portrays ideal Dakota lifeways prior to sustained 
Euro-American contact.27   
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For nearly a century, policymakers had worked to shore up the authority that they 
believed the men in most Native cultures lacked in their families and communities 
through the imposition of patriarchal land and inheritance policies and political 
structures.28 As feminist scholars have demonstrated, Indigenous women’s political 
power decreased rather than increased as a result of colonization.29  Macgregor warned, 
however, that economic circumstances threatened the Indian Service’s effort.  He and 
other white middle-class observers expected Indian men as “head of the family” to 
support their dependents financially, but most men on the reservation had been unable to 
achieve self-sufficiency as farmers or to obtain regular, year-round wage labor.  As a 
result, many Pine Ridge families depended on government assistance—and on women’s 
wage work.30 
 In emphasizing the necessity “for the mothers to earn wages to keep the family 
fed and clothed,” Macgregor overlooked the fact that many Dakota and other Indigenous 
women had fulfilled these functions long before they became wage earners.31  Macgregor 
characterized the relationships between Dakota men and women as plagued by mutual 
hostility, and he attributed these “hostile attitudes” to the reversal in “roles and status” 
within the home and family.  Macgregor claimed that Dakota men were dissatisfied with 
their position in their families, and, accordingly, they “resent[ed]” and “antagoni[zed]” 
their wives.  In turn, Dakota women allegedly had little respect for their husbands and 
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openly criticized and ridiculed them.  Macgregor further argued that Dakota women’s 
increased importance within the household contributed to many broken homes.32  In 
making this claim, Macgregor joined a long line of Euro-American observers who 
desired an explanation for some Indians’ apparent disregard for the Western ideal of 
legal, lifelong, monogamous marriage. He also foreshadowed arguments Daniel 
Moynihan would make in a famous report two decades later, in which he attributed the 
very real social and economic problems facing African Americans to deviant familial 
models and characterized African American women as “matriarchs.” 
 As Joanne Meyerowitz has argued, in their emphasis on “culture-specific child 
rearing practices,” culture and personality scholars “placed a heavy burden on parenting, 
especially on mothers,” and Macgregor’s study reflects this trend.33   At first glance, 
Macgregor seems to depict a more harmonious relationship between mothers and their 
children.  He notes, for example, that “the observed mother-child relationships appear in 
general to be very pleasant and close to the idea of affection and respect.”34  In fact, in a 
few cases, Macgregor implied that the strength of the mother-child relationship was in 
itself a problem, as children appeared unable to adjust to adulthood and form their own 
independent families.35  Psychologists and other social scientists directed similar 
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criticism against white mothers in this period as well.36  Macgregor devoted more 
attention, however, to those mothers whose relationships with their children he perceived 
as unsatisfactory.  Although he recounted one instance of physical abuse, his primary 
examples of inadequate mothers were those he believed displayed “indifferen[ce] toward 
their children”; here, as earlier chapters have demonstrated, Macgregor drew on a well-
established trope of apathetic Indian mothers.37 
Macgregor perceived maternal indifference when he or his staff observed children 
living with grandparents or other relatives, a circumstance that was out of step with the 
report’s conclusions about the rising importance and independence of the nuclear family.  
Macgregor acknowledged that it was not uncommon for Dakota children to live with 
extended kin “in the old days,” but he argued that the “frequency with which children are 
now voluntarily living away from their parents’ home without disapproval by the adults 
may be looked upon as symptomatic of cultural breakdown.”38  On this point, Macgregor 
created rather than discerned a problem, as his own framing of the issue suggests that this 
was not a concern for Dakota adults.  He also neglected to mention that with the 
increased isolation of nuclear families on allotments, it was less likely that Dakota 
children could live simultaneously with extended kin and their biological parents.  
Instead, they often traveled back and forth freely. 
Like Mead, Macgregor was critical of Indians’ continued dependence on the 
government, which he believed deprived them of self-confidence and self-sufficiency.  
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The study betrays the author’s discomfort with Native Americans’ wardship status.  He 
argues that past government “methods for ‘civilizing’ the Indian” had produced a 
seemingly inescapable quagmire in which Indians both resented and clung to wardship.  
Yet Macgregor, who conducted fieldwork in 1942 and 1943 and whose study was 
published in 1946, understood “forced assimilation” as a relic of the past, a policy 
objective that had ended with Collier’s appointment as commissioner in 1933.39  Even as 
he wrote, however, some of Macgregor’s contemporaries clamored to turn back the clock 
and espoused a more drastic assimilation agenda than their early twentieth-century 
predecessors.  Congressional proponents of forced assimilation did not look to the results 
of the Indian Personality Project studies before forging ahead with their new agenda, and 
their primary motivations were economic.  Nevertheless, they often framed their cause in 
a manner that dovetailed with many of Mead’s and Macgregor’s concerns; they presented 
themselves as working to liberate American Indians from the stranglehold of federal 
wardship and allow Native people to stand on their own feet.40  
 
Social Scientists and Midcentury Federal Indian Policy 
 Over the next decade and a half, policymakers enacted a number of policies 
intended to solve “the Indian problem” once and for all by eliminating Indianness.  
Scholars have emphasized that midcentury termination policies were in keeping with 
long-standing federal objectives.  Charles Wilkinson observes, for example, that 
“[t]ermination offered full and final relief from the centuries-old weariness with the 
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refusal of Indians to abandon their political and cultural identity.”41  More immediately, 
however, policymakers conceptualized termination policies in response to the new 
directions Collier had forged in federal Indian policy during the 1930s and early 1940s.  
The backlash against Collier and his Indian New Deal began as early as 1943, when the 
Senate Committee on Indian Affairs released a report condemning current policies that 
lawmakers believed served to “keep the Indian an Indian” rather than “to make the Indian 
a citizen.”  The report argued that Collier’s attempt to help the Indian “recapture his 
ancient, worn-out cultures” was not only futile; it was harmful, as it functioned to 
“segregate[e] the Indian from the general citizenry” and “condem[n] the Indian to 
perpetual wardship.”  A year later, the House Select Committee on Indian Affairs echoed 
their colleagues’ conclusions and affirmed that the ultimate objective of federal Indian 
policy was assisting Indians as they joined “the white man’s community on the white 
man’s level and with the white man’s opportunity and status.”42  
 Assimilationist arguments gained strength throughout and immediately following 
World War II.  Thousands of Native American men left their reservations to join the war 
effort, and thousands of Indian men and women embraced employment opportunities in 
booming defense industries, even when doing so meant traveling thousands of miles from 
their reservations.43 Policymakers used the experiences of Indian veterans and wartime 
wage workers to argue that Indians were prepared to integrate into mainstream society 
and that time was ripe for change.  In 1947, a year after the publication of Macgregor’s 
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study, Acting Commissioner William Zimmerman, facing pressure from policymakers, 
produced a report that identified tribes he believed were prepared to sever their trust 
status and recommended that responsibility for services and assistance for other identified 
tribes be transferred to the states.44  The same year, President Harry Truman appointed a 
commission to recommend administrative changes to the executive branch of the federal 
government.  When the commission issued its report two years later, it advocated 
“progressive measures to integrate the Indians into the rest of the population.”45  In 1950, 
Truman appointed Dillon S. Myer as commissioner of Indian affairs.  Myer had served as 
Director of the War Relocation Authority from 1942 until the WRA’s dissolution in 
1946.  In this capacity, Myer had supervised the internment and resettlement of Japanese 
immigrants and Japanese Americans.  It was this wartime experience that likely 
convinced Truman that Myer would be uniquely suited to oversee the postwar 
assimilation of American Indians.46 
 Midcentury federal Indian policy centered on three legislative and bureaucratic 
strategies for forcibly assimilating Native Americans into mainstream American society.  
First, House Concurrent Resolution 108 (HCR 108), passed by the House and Senate in 
August 1953, codified emerging termination policy.  HCR 108 stated that the objective of 
federal Indian policy was “to make Indians . . . subject to the same laws and entitled to 
the same privileges and responsibilities as are applicable to other Americans”—and to do 
so “as rapidly as possible.”47  Between 1954 and 1962, Congress passed twelve acts that 
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terminated the legal status of tribes ranging from the Catawba tribe of South Carolina to 
the Klamath tribe of Oregon.48 Although motivated in large part by financial imperatives, 
policymakers and administrators presented termination as a rejection of past paternalism, 
exemplified by terms such as “wardship,” “subjugation,” and “pacify,” and the promotion 
of independence and colorblind citizenship.49 
 Postwar termination policy reflected ideological shifts and spurred institutional 
changes that affected all Indians, not only those who were enrolled members of 
terminated tribes.  Not only did all tribes live in fear of termination; individuals in non-
terminated tribes were targets of the BIA’s second assimilationist strategy: the relocation 
program.  Like termination, which aimed to sever a tribe’s legal status, policymakers 
intended for relocation to sever individual Indians’ ties to their tribes, reservations, and 
communities through complete immersion into mainstream society in urban centers.  The 
government provided limited, short-term financial assistance and support services for 
individual Indians and sometimes families to relocate to a city, obtain housing, and 
secure employment. According to Myla Vicenti Carpio, “between 1945 and 1957, more 
than 100,000 Indians left their reservations.”50  Relocation was technically a voluntary 
program, but as with so much of federal Indian policy, BIA employees established 
narrow parameters of choice.  Through promotional literature and interpersonal 
interactions, government employees attempted to “sell” Indians on resettlement in urban 
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centers.  They touted the opportunities and comfort awaiting Indians in cities, and they 
contended that Native Americans could have no real future on the reservation.51  Vine 
Deloria, Jr. characterizes BIA employees’ attempts at persuasion as nothing short of 
“harass[ment].”52  Wilma Mankiller, former chief of the Cherokees, has drawn parallels 
between postwar relocation and the forced removal the Cherokee endured in the 
nineteenth century, labeling her own family’s migration “our Trail of Tears.”53 
 Commissioner Myer instructed government employees to target young Indian 
men for relocation, the demographic he believed would be most likely to succeed as wage 
earners.  Male relocatees often made the initial journey to the city alone with the 
expectation that their wives and children would follow once they had secured a home and 
stable employment.54   Ironically, the relocation program increased the likelihood, at least 
in the short term, of the female-headed households that government employees derided, 
particularly because economic security eluded the many Indian men who found 
themselves relegated to irregular, often seasonal labor.  BIA employees targeted Indian 
men because they expected husbands and fathers to be breadwinners, but the 
superintendent of the Colorado River Agency in Arizona noted that relocating large 
families was difficult because the average male relocatee could not support a family on 
his wages.55   
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The BIA provided some vocational training and economic assistance to Indian 
women as well, but the logistical and financial challenge of securing child care meant 
that mothers—whether married or unmarried—could rarely take advantage of this 
assistance unless they chose to leave their children with relatives on the reservation, a 
decision about which BIA administrators would have been at best ambivalent.  The 
Colorado River superintendent contended that in addition to the obstacle of childcare, the 
stigma of illegitimacy made it “difficult, if not impossible” to secure employment for 
unwed mothers.56  Regardless of their family situation, most relocatees found that city 
life failed to live up to the BIA’s promises.  Between thirty and seventy-five percent of 
relocatees eventually returned to their reservations, although thousands remained.57 
 Policymakers’ final terminationist strategy involved shifting federal obligations 
onto the states.  In fact, the ultimate objective of the postwar termination agenda was for 
Indians to receive no “special privileges” from the federal government and to be subject 
to state control and eligible for state services to the same degree as non-Native citizens.  
The same month Congress passed HCR-108, it also passed Public Law 83-280 (PL-280).  
PL-280 granted six states partial criminal and civil jurisdiction over the Indian 
reservations within state borders.  The law also transferred responsibility for the health 
and welfare of needy Indians to these states.  PL-280 would later be expanded to include 
ten additional states.  Following the passage of PL-280, Indians living in these states 
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received less federal support and endured the bureaucratic wrangling and neglect that 
arose from unclear and hotly contested jurisdictional issues.58   
 Reflecting on these “detrimental” forced assimilation policies in the late 1960s, 
Vine Deloria, Jr. complained that anthropologists like Mead and Macgregor did not 
“c[o]me forward to support the tribes” and instead remained largely silent.59  In fact, 
anthropologists and other social scientists did not remain entirely outside the political 
fray in the late 1940s and 1950s.  In 1946, Congress passed the Indian Claims Act, which 
established a commission to arbitrate grievances Indigenous tribes filed against the U.S. 
government.  Passed as termination was gaining strength in Congress, the act allowed for 
monetary compensation when the commission ruled in a tribe’s favor with the 
expectation that such matters would be settled once and for all.  With a few notable 
exceptions, anthropologists who worked with the Indian Claims Commission did so on 
behalf of Indians rather than the Department of Justice.60  In addition, Sol Tax first 
articulated his concept of “action anthropology” in 1951, and throughout the decade he 
worked with organizations trying to slow or stop termination and relocation.61  On the 
whole, however, early terminationists had minimal interest in anthropologists’ critical 
perspectives, and at any rate, the field of American anthropology shifted its focus to the 
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international arena during and following World War II, diverting attention away from 
reservations and the nation’s Indigenous population.62  
 Nevertheless, culture and personality scholars did have some influence on the 
implementation of federal Indian policy.  Philleo Nash, who served as Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs for five years in the 1960s, noted that although he could not point to any 
specific policy changes that resulted from Macgregor’s study or the four other studies 
associated with the Indian Personality Project, he and other BIA officials and reservation 
employees certainly read them.63  Nash also displayed his familiarity with Mead’s 1932 
study of Omaha society.  Anthropologists influenced BIA bureaucrats just as they 
influenced American public opinion more broadly.  By the early 1950s, for example, “the 
culture concept” dominated the social sciences and had also become “part of the 
vocabulary of educated Americans.”64  Many culture and personality scholars wrote not 
only for other academics but for an educated American audience, and perhaps no one 
worked to popularize culture and personality scholarship more than Margaret Mead.  
Mead’s study of Omaha society and Omaha women is unusual among her monographs 
because although relatively well-received within the field, it did not gain popularity 
outside the academy until the book was reprinted in 1966.65   
In her foreword to this second edition, Mead espoused a strain of liberal 
colorblindness that had become a dominant racial ideology in the postwar decades.  She 
demonstrates how easily such colorblindness dovetailed with the terminationist ethos that 
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lingered throughout the 1960s.66  Eliding the fact that federal Indian policy involved a 
relationship between the federal government and Indigenous nations, Mead condemned 
“[r]acially based restitution” and the “massive, inappropriate technical assistance” the 
federal government provided to Native Americans as “an undifferentiated group.”67  In 
1966 as in 1932, Mead argued that the “Indian problem” was primarily one of 
government dependence.   
As Mead’s second edition suggests, many postwar scientists, like white 
Americans more broadly, did not embrace the tenets of cultural relativism—the belief 
that cultures should be understood on their own terms—wholesale.  Rather, they brought 
a number of biases and expectations to bear in their analyses of other cultures.  Alice 
O’Conner has observed that social scientists in the postwar period were influenced by 
“the resurgence of middle-class domesticity in Cold War ideology and culture, which 
reinforced the patriarchal family as a psychological and cultural norm, and treated 
deviations from it as a source of lifelong afflictions in the young.”68  Steeped in the 
pronatalist sentiment that followed World War II, they continued to view non-nuclear 
family models as deviant, but they believed such dysfunctions to be products of culture, 
and they understood culture to be more or less entrenched.  As the welfare state expanded 
from the 1940s through the 1960s, and growing numbers of nonwhite Americans, 
including Indians, were added to state welfare rolls, white Americans became 
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increasingly alarmed that, as one North Dakota paper warned its readers, dysfunctional 
Indian families were costing them money.69  
 In 1946, Macgregor’s study of the Pine Ridge Reservation scrutinized families 
and specifically mothers and argued that as wives and mothers, Dakota women 
contributed to the maladjustment of their husbands and children and in turn hindered the 
cultural progress of the tribe.  He explicitly eschewed economic solutions to reservation 
ills, arguing that the primary problems were psychological, social, and cultural.70  In the 
following decades, other social scientists would make similar arguments with regard to 
nonwhite women and families, with anthropologist Oscar Lewis as perhaps the best 
known.  In two highly-publicized studies of Mexican women and Puerto Rican women, 
Lewis articulated a “culture of poverty” thesis that would quickly be stripped of its 
national origins and applied to impoverished populations in the United States.71  Lewis 
focused on women as reproducers because he argued that the dysfunctional traits 
associated with the culture of poverty were transmitted through social and biological 
reproduction.  Although influenced by Marxism, Lewis echoed Macgregor in his 
skepticism that the cultural problems he identified could be solved economically.72  In the 
BIA, social workers and other government employees “readily applied such social 
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science studies to Indians.”73  These studies and slogans invited scrutiny of Indigenous 
mothers and interventions into Indigenous social and biological reproduction. 
 
Indian Health Service and Contract Hospitals 
Postwar policymakers lamented that the continuing health crisis on many 
reservations hindered the assimilation process.  They viewed the Indian Transfer Act of 
1954 as a necessary step toward the rapid assimilation they desired.  The act transferred 
the responsibility for Indian health care and Indian health facilities from the BIA to the 
Public Health Service (PHS).  The PHS established a Division of Indian Health, soon 
renamed the Indian Health Service, to accommodate its expanded obligations.74  As 
David Dejong has argued, the transfer was entirely in line with federal policy goals in this 
decade; it represented “but one step toward the Congressional objective of divesting the 
Indian Service of all responsibility for American Indians and Alaska Natives.”75 Glenn 
Emmons, Myer’s successor as commissioner of Indian affairs, observed that the 
legislation initiated “the biggest reduction of program responsibilities in the history of the 
Bureau.”76   
 The transfer of health services and facilities from the BIA to the PHS brought 
some advantages to Indian health care, particularly in the long term, but from World War 
II through the Indian Health Service’s first years, the prevailing terminationist ethos 
compounded the already poor health situation facing many Native Americans.  While 
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conducting his field work on the Pine Ridge Reservation in the early 1940s, Gordon 
Macgregor observed that the Dakota were in a “chronic state of apprehension” regarding 
health and welfare in their communities.77  Although Collier had secured increased 
funding for reservation health services in the 1930s, the onset of war reversed many of 
these gains.  For example, by the end of the war, the Navajo Reservation “had lost five 
government hospitals and dozens of physicians and nurses to wartime demands.”78   
Following the war, policymakers’ desire to minimize expenses for services that 
exclusively served Indians produced additional hospital closures.  In early 1947, a 
District Medical Director informed Gordon Macgregor, who Collier had appointed as 
superintendent of the Tongue River Reservation in Montana two years earlier, that the 
hospital on his reservation would be closed immediately.  The medical director presented 
the closure as an economic necessity: due to the “extreme shortage of funds,” it was 
“wholly uneconomical to operate the Tongue River Hospital.”79  Reservation employees 
instructed the Northern Cheyennes that the Indian hospital on the nearby Crow 
Reservation would serve them as well.  Many Northern Cheyenne men and women 
resented the BIA’s unilateral decision.  They objected to the additional distance patients 
had to travel, and they alleged that Cheyenne patients did not receive adequate treatment 
at the Crow Indian Hospital.80  Commissioner Myer accelerated hospital closures in the 
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early 1950s.  Myer contended that the BIA should operate hospitals or other health 
facilities only when it was not possible for Indians to receive care at state or local 
facilities.  By mid-decade, Commissioners Myer and Emmons had closed eight more 
Indian hospitals.81   
The PHS prioritized the integration of Indian and non-Indian health services 
whenever possible, but IHS continued to operate approximately fifty Indian hospitals.82 
When government facilities were not available for Indian use, PHS contracted with 
private or community hospitals and state and local health departments for the provision of 
Indian health services.  As became clear when the IHS faced intensive scrutiny in the 
1970s, PHS provided contract hospitals with minimal guidance and less oversight.  
Following the Indian Health Facilities Act of 1957, PHS authorized the use of Indian 
health funds for the construction of joint-use community hospitals.  The hospitals pledged 
to provide care to Indians, but following construction, they operated outside the federal 
government’s purview.83 
Native Americans complained that they faced discrimination throughout the 
health care system.   Echoing Crow complaints about Indian Service hospital staff in the 
early twentieth century, a Crow woman reported that the PHS administrators at the Crow 
Indian Hospital “come in with a superior attitude,” showing no concern for “the wishes of 
the people.”84 Nevertheless, as a rule, Indians preferred Indian hospitals because they 
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believed physicians and nurses at contract and public hospitals had little interest in 
treating Indian patients.85  In the spring of 1961, representatives from at least twenty-
eight tribes testified at a congressional subcommittee hearing on the possible closing of 
the Shawnee Indian Hospital in Oklahoma.  The Indian witnesses—almost all male—
“resent[ed] being told to utilize non-Indian hospitals and State welfare services.”  They 
argued, “the Indian hospitals are our hospitals, so why should we be told to go 
somewhere else?”  They also interpreted the threatened closure as political.  A HEW 
bureaucrat surmised that the Indians were ultimately motivated by “the well-grounded 
fear . . . that the closing of Shawnee will mark the loss of another outpost of Indian rights, 
that the boundaries of their unique status will shrink once more under the relentless 
eroding action of the Federal bureaucracy.”86  
The most extreme form of discrimination postwar Indians faced was the denial of 
services, a practice exacerbated by the terminationist ethos that prevailed in the late 
1940s and 1950s.  Relocation and termination policies further complicated already 
complex jurisdictional questions regarding Indian health and welfare,  and the transfer to 
PHS invited renewed debate regarding governmental obligation and Indian eligibility.  
HEW officials and PHS administrators increasingly contended that Indians were no 
longer entitled to health care on the basis of any existing treaties.87   Therefore, PHS 
officials aimed to define eligibility narrowly.  Members of terminated tribes lost all 
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federal health services upon termination, leaving many Indians without health care.88 
Because the PHS included residence on a reservation among the criteria for IHS health 
care, urban Indians, including the thousands who had moved to cities with government 
encouragement and assistance, found themselves either without access to health facilities 
or without the money to pay for health services.89  Federal officials believed health 
services for non-reservation Indians fell to state and local governments, while state and 
local governments continued to believe that Indians were the federal government’s 
responsibility.  Urban Indians found themselves turned away from county hospitals and 
with no recourse to federal assistance unless they returned to their reservations, a difficult 
feat for Indians already facing economic hardship.90   
Thus, in the decade and a half following World War II, Native women faced 
economic and institutional obstacles in their efforts to secure health services for 
themselves and their families.  After decades of government pressure to accept Western 
medicine and government health services, Indians on many reservations and in urban 
centers found such services even less accessible than they had previously.  Similarly, 
over the course of the first half of the century, the hospital had replaced the home as the 
most common location for childbirth.  Hospital closures and eligibility restrictions posed 
potential health dangers for women who had come to depend on government physicians 
and hospitals for childbirth.  Belle Highwalking, a Northern Cheyenne woman, lamented 
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that after the hospital on her reservation closed, the mothers who would have given birth 
there previously had to travel much further.  As a result, “many babies,” including one of 
her own grandchildren, were “born on the way over to Crow Agency.”91 
 The growing numbers of Indigenous women who overcame these logistical 
obstacles and gave birth in IHS and contract hospitals throughout the termination era at 
times found their maternal rights ignored in these medical settings, much as Indigenous 
women who gave birth in Indian Service hospitals in the decades preceding World War II 
complained that reservation physicians and nurses often showed little respect for their 
rights as mothers.  In part, this was due to racism and paternalism on the part of hospital 
employees, many of whom had little experience with or direct knowledge of Indians.  But  
their experiences were also tied to policy and thus to the broader federal objectives of the 
period. 
 
American Indian Mothers and Federal Termination Policies 
 After the shift to PHS, IHS hospitals provided a critical location in the BIA’s 
effort to promote the adoption of Indian children in the termination era.  As Margaret 
Jacobs has argued, the placement of Indian children in white foster and adoptive homes 
“served both the assimilationist and bureaucratic imperatives” of the postwar period.92  
The Indian Adoption Project, a collaboration between the BIA and the Child Welfare 
League of America, remained a relatively small-scale endeavor, but Jacobs argues that 
the project was influential, both in its coercive methods and as a result of the propaganda 
its leaders disseminated regarding Indian mothers and families.  By the late 1960s, the 
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alarming and disproportionate numbers of Indian children who had been removed from 
their families and communities represented “nothing less than an Indian child welfare 
crisis.”93  
 First, the IAP had to persuade Indian mothers to give their children up for 
adoption.94  In January 1959, HEW officials informed PHS area medical officers that the 
Division of Indian Health was committed to cooperating with the BIA to achieve this 
objective.  HEW officials instructed PHS personnel to monitor pregnant Indian women 
closely, and if they suspected based on a patient’s “actions or words” that she might 
consider giving her child up for adoption, they should arrange a meeting between the 
woman and a BIA social worker.  If the BIA social worker determined that the infant 
should be adopted, the PHS was responsible for providing the medical examination and 
securing the “social data” that was necessary for placement, and the BIA requested that 
these tasks be carried out quickly, within twenty-four hours after birth, in order to 
“expedite” hospital discharge and the adoption process.  On the other hand, if the BIA 
social worker determined that the discharge date set by the medical officer outpaced “the 
course of the adoption process,” he or she could request that the hospital delay the 
infant’s discharge, and HEW officials encouraged medical officers to comply with such 
requests whenever possible.95 HEW officials also specified which tasks, though often 
occurring in PHS hospitals, were to be carried out by BIA rather than PHS personnel.  
Most notably, the BIA social worker bore the responsibility for determining a new 
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mother’s marital status when necessary and for securing the mother’s consent for 
relinquishing her child.  HEW officials instructed PHS medical officers not to interfere in 
this process; if they detected a change in a woman’s attitude, they should report their 
observations to the BIA social worker.96 
 The BIA social workers charged with making these decisions specifically targeted 
the children of unwed mothers for adoption.  Jacobs suggests that BIA and state service 
agency officials’ concern regarding “the Indian unmarried mother” was relatively new in 
the late 1950s.  She notes that by 1960 authorities reported, “with no statistical evidence, 
that Indian unwed motherhood had increased and had become a problem.”97  As I argue 
in Chapter Four, however, social workers assigned to Indian reservations in the 1930s 
had contended with similar urgency that Indian illegitimacy rates were rising and that 
unwed motherhood posed “the biggest social and economic problem” facing Indian 
communities.98  The IAP’s targeting of unwed mothers in the late 1950s and 1960s 
reflected these earlier Indian Service social workers’ belief that unwed motherhood 
hindered Indians’ moral and economic progress—and posed a financial burden for white 
taxpayers.  In the postwar period, however, bureaucrats and social workers successfully 
created and disseminated “stock figures” of Native families, including “the unmarried 
Indian mother,” that served as stand-ins for nearly all Native Americans.99  Non-Natives’ 
perception that all Indian mothers were unwed and all Indian children were illegitimate 
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contributed to the disproportionate number of Indian children in foster care and adoptive 
homes. 
Jacobs demonstrates that BIA employees encouraged unwed pregnant women to 
give birth in distant maternity homes in the hope that the social workers’ persuasive 
efforts would be more effective when a mother was removed from her social networks.100  
BIA officials expected IHS hospitals to serve similar functions.  In some hospitals, PHS 
personnel likely met BIA expectations without comment, particularly considering that 
they had been explicitly instructed that formal adoption arrangements should be handled 
by the BIA social worker.  One IHS medical officer’s expression of moderate dissent, 
however, illuminates the potentially exploitative nature of practices that otherwise 
received little official comment.101 
In the spring of 1959 Dr. William S. Baum, a Division of Indian Health medical 
officer in the Phoenix area, raised a number of legal questions regarding the interactions 
between BIA social workers and young unwed Indian mothers in PHS hospitals.  Baum 
expressed concern about virtually every step of the process spelled out by the BIA and 
Child Welfare League for PHS hospitals.  He questioned, for example, BIA social 
workers’ practice of contacting mothers in the days immediately following delivery, as he 
and other medical officers did “not feel that the mother is always mentally capable of 
making such an important decision” at that time.  Baum protested the pressure placed on 
PHS physicians to certify an infant’s physical condition “without the benefit of a period 
of observation.”  Baum also implied that BIA social workers showed little concern for the 
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legality or ethics of a minor consenting to relinquish custody of her child, and he 
suggested that this question was a pressing one for “Indian tribes where the extended 
family is so important.”102  In short, Baum suggested that the BIA’s promotion of the 
adoption of Indian children overshadowed legitimate medical, legal, and ethical 
considerations. 
 Baum supplemented his pointed questions with extensive descriptions of two 
unwed mothers who had recently given birth in area hospitals.  On April 8, “Violet,” a 
sixteen-year-old Pima woman, entered the IHS hospital in Sacaton, Arizona, in the throes 
of labor, and her infant was born the following day.  According to Baum, Violet reported 
that she had been in contact with Sylvia Kerr, a BIA social worker, prior to her 
confinement, and she had agreed to release her child for adoption.  Mother and baby 
remained in the hospital five days later, at which point Violet “signed relinquishment 
papers.”  Baum displayed discomfort with this part of the process.  He noted, for 
example, that no witnesses were present when the mother relinquished custody, even 
though it was standard practice for a witness to sign the mother’s statement authorizing 
the release of her child.  Furthermore, the BIA did not provide the IHS with a copy of the 
relinquishment papers, but Kerr expected the hospital to discharge the baby into her care 
with no questions asked.  (It appears that the hospital staff complied.)   
 Developments following the separate discharges of Violet and the infant 
intensified Baum’s suspicions.  On April 21, the medical social worker at the Phoenix 
Indian Hospital, where Baum worked, received a call from a foster parent who explained 
that Kerr had instructed him to make an appointment so that the infant he was caring for 
could receive necessary medical care before being transported to the East Coast for 
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adoption.  Medical officers at the Phoenix Indian Hospital could not reach Kerr for any 
information on the child.  They contacted another female BIA employee, who “stressed 
the importance of knowing that the child had no abnormalities that would hinder his 
immediate placement for adoption,” but emphasized that the hospital staff’s involvement 
should be strictly medical and the hospital should have no involvement in planning for 
adoption.  Yet when the foster mother brought the child in for examination, she made 
clear that she had been under the “impression that [the IHS was] definitely involved in 
the plan for adoption.”  The attending physician identified a minor medical concern, 
prescribed treatment, and indicated that he would like to see the child again to clear him 
for travel.  The foster mother did not keep the appointment the physician had requested; 
presumably, the child had already been transported East.103  
 The same month, Susan, introduced at the start of this chapter, gave birth to her 
son.  Coming on the heels of Violet’s discharge, the circumstances surrounding the 
relinquishment of Susan’s child eventually provoked a stand-off between IHS officials 
and the BIA.  The superintendent at the local boarding school Susan attended 
immediately alerted a social worker of her unexpected delivery, and Baum later learned 
that the school had previously “agreed to report all of its unmarried mothers to the BIA 
Welfare Worker as a matter of cooperation with their adoption plan.”  After multiple 
visits, the BIA social worker succeeded in persuading Susan to sign relinquishment 
papers, but according to Baum, the contract hospital staff “refused to be involved in 
anyway [sic] in the relinquishment of the child for adoption,” so the social worker left the 
hospital to “secure her own Notary Public.”104 
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 As in Violet’s case, the Phoenix Indian Hospital became involved in the 
developments surrounding Susan and her newborn son in the days following his birth.  
Less than a week after giving birth, Susan was transferred to the Phoenix Indian Hospital 
for convalescent care.  Upon learning of the transfer, the BIA social worker informed the 
hospital staff that she had “obtained the wrong relinquishment forms from the girl” and 
therefore would need to interview her again at the Phoenix Indian Hospital.  IHS medical 
officers refused; they impugned the social worker’s method of obtaining the young 
mother’s consent in the first place, and they indicated that they would not cooperate until 
they had received legal counsel from HEW attorneys.  Writing to request such counsel on 
May 1, Baum explained that as the situation currently stood, the BIA social worker, 
although apparently lacking the proper paperwork, had placed the infant in a foster home.  
Baum expected that the social worker would make contact with Susan as soon as she 
returned to school to obtain her documented consent for what had already taken place.105 
 The dominant theme in Baum’s correspondence parallels a charge made by 
Indigenous women in the 1950s and later decades: BIA and state social workers had 
tremendous, often troubling, discretion and authority in their interactions with Indian 
mothers. Baum’s concerns regarding the BIA’s methods in carrying out aspects of the 
adoption process in PHS hospitals centered on questions of legal liability as well as the 
relative power between the two agencies.  Baum complained that the BIA expected PHS 
to cooperate with their various policies and programs without question, but, as he argued 
became abundantly clear in Susan’s case, BIA employees refused “to recognize her as a 
Public Health Service’s [sic] patient and consequently, our responsibility.”  The 
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imperatives of the BIA’s adoption project, Baum suggested, were at times in opposition 
to medical ethics and sound medical care.106  Baum believed BIA social workers elided 
medical officers’ authority in IHS hospitals.  The standoff was not without irony, as 
Native activists publicized similar charges regarding the alarming discretionary authority 
of government physicians a decade later.  For Indian women, perhaps including Violet 
and Susan, BIA social workers’ coercive methods in IHS and contract hospitals 
undermined their rights as mothers.   
 The BIA’s promotion of adoption occurred in tandem with restrictive policies and 
practices targeting Indigenous biological reproduction, most notably the coercive 
sterilization of Indigenous women in IHS and contract hospitals.  Throughout the 1950s 
and 1960s, IHS hospitals were generally expected to abide by state sterilization laws.  As 
in other aspects of postwar Indian policy, the tangled jurisdictional web produced 
confusion, as IHS area offices often covered four or more states. When activists and the 
federal government investigated sterilization at IHS and contract hospitals in the 1970s, 
they concluded that the lack of centralized authority and standard guidelines contributed 
to the alarming prevalence of sterilization abuse at these institutions.107  Many states still 
had versions of the eugenic statutes passed in the early twentieth century on the books.  
In 1959, for example, the Area Medical Director in Aberdeen, South Dakota, requested 
the status of sterilization statutes in each state under his jurisdiction.  HEW officials 
complied, providing him with the language of sterilization statutes, such as Michigan’s 
1929 law, introduced in Chapter Two, that remained in effect.  In addition to almost 
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standard references to feeblemindedness, moral degeneracy, and sexual perversion, this 
statute authorized the sterilization of individuals “likely to become a menace to society or 
wards of the state.”108   
Nevertheless, it is extremely difficult to provide reliable quantitative data for the 
coerced or involuntary sterilization of Indigenous women in this period.  Federal agencies 
and hospitals did not keep adequate sterilization records, and because of patient privacy 
concerns and rights, more recent medical records are less accessible for scholars than 
early twentieth-century records.  Rebecca Kluchin suggests that national sterilization 
rates likely declined in the 1950s, as hospitals tightened their sterilization policies “to 
support contemporary pronatalist sentiment.”109  Yet as Johanna Schoen has 
demonstrated, at the very moment that policymakers and hospital boards sought to 
restrict white women’s access to contraceptive sterilization, women of color found 
themselves targets of coercive sterilization programs and policies.110  In the 1950s, 
southern African American women experienced what became known as “Mississippi 
appendectomies”; these women entered hospitals for other operations, and physicians 
performed hysterectomies without their knowledge.   Kluchin interprets the motivations 
of the physicians, social workers, and members of state eugenics boards who promoted 
the forced sterilization of black women as both political and economic.  These operations 
were especially common in localities with a visible civil rights movement, and 
proponents explicitly argued that sterilization would “reduc[e] the number of blacks 
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eligible to receive public assistance,” a practice many black activists argued constituted 
attempted genocide. 111 
Kluchin argues that coercive sterilization practices “changed and spread in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s,” incorporating other nonwhite groups, namely American 
Indian and Latina women, as targets.112  There is some truth to this chronology with 
regard to Indigenous women.  Federal family planning programs implemented in the mid-
1960s and especially the early 1970s increased the number of Native women sterilized by 
physicians.  Nevertheless, in previous chapters I have demonstrated that since at least the 
early 1930s, government employees had used both subtle pressure and blatant coercion to 
secure the sterilization of Indian women.  Furthermore, both ideological and budgetary 
imperatives put Indigenous women at risk for sterilization in government hospitals in the 
1950s and early 1960s as well as in the later period.   
In fact, Jane Lawrence suggests that forced sterilization was a “common 
occurrence” for Indian women during the 1960s.113  Similarly, Myla Vicenti Carpio heard 
reports of government and contract physicians sterilizing Indian without their informed 
consent or full knowledge more than a decade before the Government Accountability 
Office began investigating the practice in the mid-1970s.114  Native women have reported 
that either they or their family members were sterilized without their knowledge or 
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consent during this period.  Mary Brave Bird, for example, reported that physicians 
sterilized her mother “without her permission” but noted that this type of reproductive 
violence was so “common at the time . . . that it is hardly worth mentioning.”115  In the 
late 1960s, a Crow woman explained to Kay Voget, wife of ethnologist Fred Voget, that 
hysterectomies were relatively commonplace at the Crow Indian Hospital.  “There are the 
usual number of hysterectomies,” she reported, but she implied that this number had been 
higher previously, when the hospital had been run by an IHS physician who “[t]he older 
women” referred to as “the butcher.”116  Involuntary sterilizations of Indian women 
proceeded steadily throughout the 1960s, although without the public attention and 
outrage that would develop in the next decade. 
 
Conclusion 
 Beginning with Margaret Mead’s The Changing Culture of an Indian Tribe in 
1932 and continuing through the postwar period, a number of well-respected 
anthropologists concluded that Indigenous women were holding back the progress of 
their families and tribes.  Social scientists repeated tropes dating from the turn of the 
twentieth century of Native women as apathetic, negligent mothers and Progressive-era 
tropes of Native women as sexually delinquent.  To these, they added concerns associated 
with anthropology’s new interest in psychology, such as Indigenous mother’s role in 
contributing to the maladjustment of her children.  Mid-century social science placed a 
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heavy burden on biological mothers and continued to disparage non-nuclear familial 
models. 
 In the years following World War II, educated Americans largely embraced the 
“culture concept” advocated by social scientists associated with the school of culture and 
personality.  “Culture” rather than “race” became the accepted framework for 
understanding human difference.  Because Americans understood culture as an inherited 
trait, academics and non-academics alike often presented culture as rigid and inflexible.  
Any number of dysfunctions and pathologies, and even poverty itself, could be viewed as 
a cultural trait, inspiring a sense of pessimism regarding government solutions to 
reservation problems.  In these same years, policymakers, also influenced by financial 
imperatives and stripped of the optimism of their predecessors, worked to absolve the 
federal government of its financial and moral obligations for Indian affairs.  Proponents 
of termination often argued they were liberating Indians from dependence on the federal 
government and inspiring self-sufficiency, and they could present their cause as entirely 
in keeping with a postwar colorblind ethos which held that all Americans should be 
treated the same, regardless of race.  Like postwar social scientists, many policymakers 
and government employees, including BIA social workers and IHS physicians, concluded 
that Indian women hindered progress and that their reproduction was a threat to white 
taxpayers, including themselves. 
The widespread fostering and adoption of Indian children and the coercive 
sterilization of Native women reflected government bureaucrats’ and medical officers’ 
extreme pessimism regarding Indian women’s capacity as mothers.  Joanne Meyerowitz 
has noted that the “boldest” culture and personality scholars suggested that social 
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scientists “could redesign the character of a culture by modifying the child rearing of its 
future generations.”  “This prescription for change,” she argues, “lifted child rearing from 
the domain of parents and families . . . and into the realm of group identity, national 
politics, and international relations” and invited extensive interventions to “monitor 
mothers.”117  For too many Indian women, these developments manifested in the transfer 
or elimination of their mothering capacity.   
The coercive elimination of procreative and childrearing labor also stemmed from 
policymakers’ financial and budgetary imperatives in the postwar period.  In the postwar 
period, policymakers, social scientists, and other non-Indians presented reservation 
poverty as a moral and cultural failing and as justification for the removal of Indigenous 
children and the coercive limitation of the size of Indian families.  In the midst of the 
terminationist fervor following World War II, the transfer of Indigenous children to white 
homes was in keeping with policymakers’ desire to solve “the Indian problem” by 
eliminating Indianness.  The sterilization of Indigenous women went a step further by 
eliminating Indians themselves.  As will be discussed in the epilogue that follows, both 
practices mirror actions included in the United Nations’ five-part definition of 
“genocide.”
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CHAPTER 7 
EPILOGUE: RESTRICTIVE REPRODUCTIVE POLICIES AND THE FIGHT FOR 
REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE IN THE 1960S, 1970S, AND BEYOND 
 In the spring of 1990, more than thirty Native women from at least eleven 
Northern Plains tribes descended on Pierre, South Dakota, for a three-day “collective 
decision-making process” in which they established a “Reproductive Justice Coalition” 
and established an agenda for future action.  Among the women’s nineteen demands were 
the “right to all reproductive alternatives and the right to choose the size of our families”; 
the “right to stop coerced sterilization”; the “right to give birth and be attended to in the 
setting” they deemed “most appropriate”; and the “right to active involvement in the 
development and implementation of policies concerning reproductive issues.”1 
 In formulating this expansive reproductive rights agenda, these and other female 
Indigenous activists responded to a long history of reproductive violence perpetrated by 
government agents against American Indian women, much of which has been 
documented in this study.  Their demands also reflected a more immediate response to 
the Indian Health Service’s policies and practices surrounding the reproductive 
technologies of birth control, abortion, and sterilization since the late 1960s.  The 
restrictive yet contradictory web of policies Indian women encountered in this period 
appear consistent only in their objective of depriving Native communities—and Native 
women specifically—of their ability to exercise reproductive autonomy.  As a new 
generation of Indian activists emerged in the latter half of the twentieth century, many 
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Indian women therefore viewed biological reproduction as central to Native peoples’ 
struggle for sovereignty and self-determination.  
 
Federal Family Planning Policies in the 1960s and 1970s 
 The Indian Health Service began offering family planning services in 1965 as part 
of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare’s (HEW) expanded commitment to 
family planning.   Advancements in artificial contraceptive technologies facilitated 
federal family planning programs, as physicians considered the newly-available birth 
control pill to be a relatively convenient, safe, and effective method of contraception.2  
Two postwar political movements—one in promotion of women’s right to safe, legal 
birth control and one in promotion of population control—further encouraged HEW 
family planning programs.  Population control advocates were concerned with both 
global overpopulation and an expanding domestic welfare state.  By the mid-1960s, 
President Lyndon B. Johnson and his administration incorporated family planning into 
Great Society programs as an anti-poverty measure.3 
 The concept of artificial contraception was not new to many Indigenous women in 
the mid-1960s, however.  Women in many Native societies had used various herbal or 
plant-based contraceptives for centuries, and in some cases use of herbal contraceptives 
may have increased in the twentieth century, as some Native women were reluctant or to 
expand or start families amid the social and economic disruptions on their reservations.4 
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In the 1950s, white researchers recorded a wide variety of oral contraceptives in 
Indigenous societies, including the Mexican wild yam, which contains one of the primary 
active ingredients in commercial birth control pills.  Native women in the Southwest 
continued to use herbal teas as contraceptives in the late 1970s.5  
 Whether they had access to Indigenous contraceptive methods or not,  Native 
women were introduced to new contraceptive methods in government hospitals.  
Beginning in 1965, HEW officials instructed IHS physicians to inform Indigenous 
women of available contraceptive options—at this time, typically an intrauterine device 
(IUD), diaphragm, spermicides, or the pill—and to help them select the most appropriate 
method.  While IHS family planning services were ostensibly voluntary and non-
coercive, it is clear that some physicians strongly encouraged Indigenous women to 
utilize birth control by emphasizing their difficult financial circumstances.6 Physicians 
could also influence the contraceptive method a woman selected by, for example, 
privileging long-term over short-term methods.  Native women’s attitudes toward the 
artificial contraceptive methods they encountered in government hospitals varied.  On 
some reservations, a generational divide emerged, as younger women embraced the pill 
and other contraceptive methods, but older women disapproved.7  
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 One reproductive health service that was largely unavailable to Indian women in 
IHS hospitals was abortion.  Prior to 1973, abortion was illegal in many states, as it had 
been since anti-abortion physicians and activists succeeded in achieving its 
criminalization in the latter half of the nineteenth century.8  Along with oral 
contraceptives, women in many Native tribes had long practiced abortion to limit family 
size, particularly in times of scarcity.9  Euro-American observers often pointed to the 
practice to stigmatize Indigenous women—and as a justification for state intervention—
but Native feminists have noted that abortions likely increased with colonization.  Sarah 
Deer notes, for example, that “[p]riests and missionaries recorded that Native women 
chose to induce abortions . . . in communities where sexual violence had become 
commonplace.”10  The state’s capacity to police illegal abortions increased in the 
Progressive Era, and the practice may have declined more quickly or been pushed further 
underground than the use of oral contraceptives.11  As Indian women converted to 
Christianity, some also came to view abortion as immoral.12 
 Reflecting the widespread pronatalist sentiment in the U.S. after World War II, 
the state exhibited renewed aggressiveness in suppressing abortion, but as Leslie Reagan 
has demonstrated, the postwar repression of abortion did not affect all women equally.  
Ironically, white, middle-class women, the women most likely to be represented in Cold 
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War depictions of the happy American housewife, were also most likely to have the 
resources, insurance, and social networks that enabled them to obtain safe and legal 
abortions in hospitals.  In contrast, poor women and women of color, including Native 
women, were less likely to obtain hospital abortions and more likely to suffer the worst 
effects of criminal abortion.13  The first federal forays into family planning in the 1960s 
did not include abortion, which the government still deemed too controversial.   
This two-tiered system did not end following Roe v. Wade in 1973.  Just three 
years later, Congress passed the Hyde Amendment, which eliminated public funding for 
abortion.  The amendment hindered the ability of all women receiving government 
assistance for health care to obtain an abortion and disproportionately affected women of 
color.  Indian women have charged that the amendment discriminates against them 
specifically, because an Indian woman’s racial identification and tribal affiliation entitles 
her to health care through a federal agency.  As Charon Asetoyer explains, “we’re the 
only race of people in this country that are restricted purely—from abortion access and 
under the constrictions and restrictions of the Hyde Amendment—based on race.”14    
The relative inaccessibility of abortion can be interpreted in part as a strategy to 
encourage Indian women to accept more permanent birth control options.  By the 1970s, 
the obstacles Indigenous women faced in accessing the reproductive technologies of 
artificial contraception and abortion were at least temporarily overshadowed by the 
coercive sterilization, typically via a hysterectomy or tubal ligation, of Native women in 
government and contract hospitals.  In 1970, the IHS began receiving increased federal 
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funding for sterilizations, which exacerbated the abuse that had long occurred in 
government hospitals.15  As this study has demonstrated, twentieth-century physicians put 
forth both social and economic rationales in recommending and justifying the 
sterilization of Native women.  The federal government’s near subsidization of 
sterilization in the 1970s provided official sanction and financial support for long-
standing attitudes and practices.   
In the 1970s, as in earlier decades, evidence suggests that physicians sterilized 
Native women coercively.  In some cases, Native women entered the hospital for 
childbirth or an unrelated surgery and did not learn they had been sterilized until months 
or even years later.  In one widely reported case in Montana, two young Native women 
entered a government hospital for appendectomies and received tubal ligations without 
their knowledge.  The young women—and many other Native women who were 
sterilized in the twentieth century—were minors, in this case not yet sixteen years old.16   
Perhaps more typically, Native women reported that health workers inadequately 
explained the procedure and its consequences and used the authority of the state to force 
consent.  Marie Sanchez, Chief Tribal Judge on the Northern Cheyenne Reservation in 
Montana, found that physicians regularly “push[ed] hysterectomies on otherwise healthy 
patients,” and HEW circulated pamphlets promoting sterilization in Native 
communities.17 Many women reported that they had been under the false impression that 
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the surgery was reversible. Convinced that many Native women were not intelligent or 
capable enough to use the pill effectively, some physicians deliberately steered their 
patients away from short-term birth control methods and toward more permanent 
measures, or they made their willingness to perform an abortion contingent on the 
women’s consent to a tubal ligation in the process.  Both inside and outside hospitals, 
social workers played a role in the government sterilization campaign, by threatening the 
deprivation of welfare benefits or the removal of current or future children to “a faraway 
foster home.”18   
 In 1976, the Government Accountability Office launched an investigation into 
allegations of sterilization abuse in government hospitals.  The GAO Report stopped 
short of declaring that the IHS coercively sterilized Native women, but it did highlight a 
number of problems with the informed consent process.  The report found that HEW 
failed to provide IHS hospitals with sterilization guidelines and that the IHS lacked 
standardized consent forms, resulting in some physicians’ ignorance of proper protocol 
and tremendous variation from hospital to hospital.  Many hospitals used inadequate 
consent forms, which did not adequately explain risks and alternative birth control 
methods and did not clarify that a woman’s birth control decisions had no bearing on her 
qualification for government programs.  IHS area offices also failed to follow HEW 
regulations regarding a moratorium on women under the age of twenty-one and a waiting 
period of seventy-two hours between consent and an operation.19  If only implicitly, the 
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GAO Report revealed a reality that would not have surprised many Indigenous women: 
physicians and other medical staff enjoyed tremendous, often troubling, discretion and 
authority in government and contract hospitals.  At the same time, investigators relied on 
government records rather than interviews with Native women, and the report’s emphasis 
on bureaucratic missteps obscured the power dynamics that shaped Indigenous women’s 
reproductive experiences. 
 As in the decades preceding World War II, quantifying the coercive sterilization 
of Native women quickly becomes a complicated endeavor.  The GAO investigation 
covered four of the twelve geographic areas serviced by IHS and concluded that 3,406 
Indigenous women of childbearing age had been sterilized between 1973 and 1976.20  
Indigenous activists conducted their own investigations, revealing much higher numbers.  
Connie Pinkerton-Uri, a Native American physician who worked to publicize the issue, 
determined that at least twenty-five percent of Indian women between the ages of fifteen 
and forty-four had been sterilized by IHS physicians.  In some locations, the percentage 
climbed even higher.  On the Northern Cheyenne Reservation, Marie Sanchez announced 
that physicians had sterilized twenty-six of fifty women.21  Lee Brightman, a male Lakota 
activist, estimated that forty percent of Indigenous women had been sterilized.22   
The startling numbers and percentages Indigenous activists discovered led many 
of them to conclude that the coercive sterilization of Native women constituted nothing 
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less than genocide.23  Indeed, the United Nations recognizes the imposition of “measures 
intended to prevent births” within a targeted racial group as a form of genocide, and the 
coercive sterilization of Indigenous women in government hospitals in the 1970s 
certainly appears to fit this definition.  It further bears noting that the UN characterizes 
“[f]orcibly transferring children” of a targeted racial group “to another group” as a form 
of genocide.  As Chapter Five demonstrated, state and federal agencies transferred 
Indigenous children from their homes to white foster and adoptive homes at what 
Margaret Jacobs has characterized as crisis levels in this period.24   
 
Toward Reproductive Justice 
 Scholars have suggested that the drastic increase in coercive sterilizations of 
Indigenous women in the late 1960s and 1970s was in part a response to the increasingly 
visible Native American activism in the postwar period.25  Rebecca Kluchin has argued 
that alongside the civil rights movement, the Black Power movement, and the Chicano/a 
rights movement, the pan-Indian activism of the 1950s and especially the 1960s 
represented a threat to “white power and privilege.”26  But sterilization abuse also fueled 
this Native activism.  The struggle for bodily autonomy and a broad-based reproductive 
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rights agenda was at the core of Indigenous women’s political activism in the self-
determination era. 
 As this study suggests, Indigenous women had organized around their social and 
biological reproductive labor throughout the twentieth century.  Traditionally, Native 
women’s authority stemmed from the gendered division of labor in their societies, with 
biological reproduction serving as one critical realm of female control.27  The Indian 
Service worked to destabilize these gendered power structures by shoring up men’s 
authority within the home and political power within the community.  Government 
employees’ promotion of hospital childbirth, which included a sustained campaign 
against Indigenous midwives, challenged the gendered division of labor surrounding 
reproduction and pushed reproductive issues into the male-centric political sphere.  
Native men’s power was magnified in the tribal governments and councils Commissioner 
John Collier championed, but women did occasionally appeal to the councils, often 
invoking their status as mothers to do so.28  As the experiences of Susie Yellowtail, the 
Crow woman who began practicing midwifery after witnessing unethical sterilization 
practices while a nurse at the Crow Indian Hospital, suggest, and the frequent tensions 
between government employees and Indigenous midwives affirm, the continued practice 
of and demand for midwifery through the 1930s, 1940s, and in some locations beyond, 
can be viewed in part as a political act. 
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 During and following World War II, Native women became more active in formal 
tribal politics.  By the mid-1950s, for example, Crow women regularly spoke at Tribal 
Council meetings, despite some grumbling from their male counterparts.  Crow women 
also served on council committees, especially those related to education and health.29  
When Lyndon B. Johnson included Native Americans in his War on Poverty initiatives, 
such as Head Start, Native women played a critical role in implementing these programs 
in their communities.  Daniel Cobb points to the Salt River Pima and Maricopa 
Reservation in Arizona as an example of a location where Native women used federal 
programs to “reasser[t] their presence in the political, economic, and social lives of their 
community.”30  This trend occurred throughout Indian Country, including on the Crow 
Reservation.  As Cobb explains, many women leveraged their positions in Head Start and 
reservation health programs to acquire a voice in tribal politics.31  
 In these same decades, Native Americans organized on a national level to protest 
termination and the constant threat of termination and to assert their demand for self-
determination.32  In this context, Native women’s local actions gained a national 
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platform.  Once again, Susie Yellowtail serves as an illustrative example.  Yellowtail 
ceased her midwifery practice in 1960, and the following year President John F. Kennedy 
appointed her to the Department of Health, Education and Welfare’s Council on Indian 
Health, where she remained through the Johnson and Nixon administrations.  In the early 
1960s, she founded the Native American Nurses Association (later renamed the 
American Indian Nurses Association).33  A reverse trajectory occurred as well, as women 
who gained experience and knowledge in national organizations and protests carved out 
new roles for themselves on their reservations.34  
 Native women’s increased political activism in their communities and at the 
national level translated into broader awareness of and resistance to state reproductive 
violence, including the coercive sterilization of Indigenous women.  Following her 
appointment to HEW’s Council on Indian Health, Susie Yellowtail was finally able to 
report—directly to the president—the unethical sterilization practices she had observed 
on her reservation decades earlier.35  As Yellowtail traveled throughout Indian Country, 
she discovered that these practices were not unique to the Crow Indian Hospital.  The 
Native American Nurses Association she helped found was an organization of Native 
nurses whose professional experiences had alerted them to the sterilization abuse that 
occurred in government hospitals and the poor treatment Native patients received from 
IHS and contract health workers.36 
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 By the 1970s, two trends had converged to make sterilization abuse in IHS 
hospitals a highly-politicized and widely-publicized national issue: the increase in 
sterilizations resulting from the federal subsidization of the operation and the emergence 
of a more militant strand of Indian activism with established networks for disseminating 
information.  When Connie Pinkerton-Uri, an IHS physician of Choctaw and Cherokee 
descent, began encountering sterilized female patients, many of whom did not fully 
understand the implications of the procedure, she lobbied lawmakers to investigate the 
issue but did not wait for them to act.  Pinkerton-Uri conducted her own investigation of 
records of an IHS hospital in Oklahoma and found that of 132 Native women sterilized at 
the hospital, only thirty-two of these sterilizations had been labeled “therapeutic.”37  
Pinkerton-Uri also earned her law degree and founded Indian Women United for Justice 
to pursue legal restitution for Native women who had been coercively sterilized.38  
 Other Indian women, by this time firmly entrenched in local and national 
leadership and activism, committed themselves to exposing and eliminating sterilization 
abuse.  As noted above, Northern Cheyenne tribal judge Marie Sanchez conducted an 
investigation on her own reservation and was vocal in her conclusion that government 
sterilization estimates were far too low.39  In the late 1970s, Indigenous women who had 
been active in the American Indian Movement (AIM), a militant activist organization, 
established Women of All Red Nations (WARN), which continued to coordinate closely 
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with AIM leaders but also prioritized issues of particular importance to Indian women, 
including coercive sterilization.40  
 The first political priority for most female Indigenous activists was tribal 
sovereignty and self-determination.  Indian men and women alike understood Native 
women’s reproductive autonomy as a critical component of sovereignty.  In 1977, male 
chiefs, clan mothers, and young people from the Six Nations (also known as 
Haudenosaunee) came together in Loon Lake, New York, “to define sovereignty for 
Native peoples.”  The group identified “control of reproduction” as one of sovereignty’s 
five “essential elements.”41 The group’s document, which was widely distributed in 
activist circles, noted that the recent publicity surrounding the sterilization of Native 
women had “driven home” the urgency of reproductive autonomy.42  The document 
concluded, “In terms of the children, in terms of guaranteeing the continuity of Our 
Peoples—the women must lead.  The women must re-strengthen themselves.”43  
Reflecting this sentiment, Indian women often organized on the basis of their status as 
mothers—either biological or metaphorical—and couched their activism in maternal 
language, reflecting a division of activist labor many Native men and women viewed as 
appropriate.44  
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 Those at the Loon Lake conference favorably noted one “good, strong way” 
Native women were taking the lead in reclaiming control of their reproduction: the return 
to “natural childbirth” and Indigenous midwifery.45  When Katsi Cook, a Mohawk 
activist, gave birth in 1975, she arranged for a home birth, although she had difficulty 
finding Native women who were willing and able to assist her because midwifery 
knowledge had not been passed down to the younger generations.  Cook participated in 
the Loon Lake conference in 1977, and she recognized that “there needed to be a place 
for the woman’s voice in this construct of sovereignty.”46 For Cook, reproduction 
provided this space, and she took up midwifery soon after the conference.  She worked as 
an apprentice in spiritual midwifery, received clinical training at the University of New 
Mexico’s Women’s Health Training Program, and traveled throughout Indian Country to 
speak to older Native women about traditional childbirth practices. WARN’s founders 
asked Cook to speak at the organization’s first annual conferences, where she 
passionately called for a return to home births, Indigenous midwifery, and Native 
women’s recognition of their power as life-givers.47  Cook emphasized the urgent need to 
train “new generations of Native American midwives,” a task she dedicated herself to in 
the following decades.48 
 Cook and many other Indigenous women’s response upon learning of the 
sterilization abuse that occurred in IHS hospitals in the 1970s mirrors Susie Yellowtail’s 
decision to give birth at home and serve as a midwife for other women  after witnessing 
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unethical sterilization practices at the Crow Indian Hospital forty years earlier.  It also in 
some ways parallels contemporary trends in the women’s health movement.  In 1971, for 
example, the Boston Women’s Health Collective published the first edition of Our 
Bodies, Ourselves, which encouraged women to learn about their bodies and reproductive 
processes in an effort to reclaim control from male medical “experts.”49  Cook, who was 
familiar with the Boston Collective, similarly lamented that Native women had become 
“ignorant in our everyday fertility issues.”50  For Cook, Indigenous midwifery allowed 
Native women to seize control from government physicians and also from Native men 
who she believed sometimes appropriated reproductive issues for their own agendas.51  
Charon Asetoyer, who was also active in WARN’s early years, emphasized that 
regardless of whether a woman chose to give birth in a hospital or at home, it was critical 
that reproductive decisions be “the business of women” rather than men.52  Asetoyer and 
Cook’s insistence on women’s autonomy in this realm reflects the increased conviction of 
Native women, many of whom identify as Native feminists, that gender and colonial 
oppression must be fought simultaneously and that the struggles are in fact 
interconnected.53 
 Above all, however, Indian women emphasized the relationship between their 
reproductive autonomy and their peoples’ struggle against U.S. colonialism.  WARN, for 
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example, asked Indian women to consider, “[H]ow is [sterilization] genocidal to Native 
people and how does it threaten the survival and sovereignty of our People?”54  Both 
male and female activists viewed state reproductive violence as directly linked to U.S. 
settler society’s seemingly insatiable desire for Native land.  President of United Native 
Americans Lee Brightman claimed that “the sterilization campaign is nothing but an 
insidious scheme to get Indians’ lands once and for all.”55  Lorelei Decora Means and two 
other WARN co-founders attributed the coercive sterilization of Native women at least in 
part to “the government’s drive for energy resources” such as gas and oil on reservations.  
In fact, WARN women understood this as the same struggle; as one activist explained, 
“WARN sees the fight as having two parts: to stop the government’s drive for energy 
resources on the reservations, and to stop IHS hospitals from sterilizing Native women.  
The two are one fight: stop the genocide of Native American people.”56  While many 
dismissed such charges as exaggerated or conspiratorial, Meg Devlin O’Sullivan has 
demonstrated that there did appear to be a connection between resource-rich tribes and 
particularly high sterilization rates.57  
 Female Indian activists’ belief that reproduction was intimately connected to other 
pressing political struggles of the late twentieth century resulted in a reproductive rights 
platform that incorporated a broad social justice agenda.  WARN leaders and other Indian 
women protested water pollution, uranium mining, and other forms of environmental 
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degradation on reservations, all in the name of protecting their reproductive health.58  The 
contamination of a tribe’s water source, these women argued, was a reproductive rights 
issue.  WARN women also organized to provide nutritional education and substance 
abuse treatment to pregnant Native women.  Access to this education and these services, 
women like Charon Asetoyer argued, was a reproductive rights issue.59   Like other 
women of color, Indian women argued that “choice,” a buzzword in the mainstream 
women’s right movement, was an inadequate framework for a reproductive rights 
agenda.  Poverty, reliance on public assistance, and dependence on government health 
care constrained the parameters of choice for many Native women.60   
 Indigenous women coordinated with mainstream women’s organizations on issues 
where they shared common ground.  Both Asetoyer and Cook, for example, sat on the 
board of the National Women’s Health Network.  Meg Devlin O’Sullivan has argued that 
Indian women, along with other feminists of color, were instrumental in expanding the 
reproductive rights plank adopted at the International Women’s Year conference in 
Houston, Texas, in 1977.  O’Sullivan explains that they “successfully extended the terms 
of reproductive rights beyond abortion and birth control to include freedom from coerced 
sterilization.”61  While many Native women did not approve of abortion for themselves, 
the women in their tribe, or even Native women more broadly, most reproductive health 
activists, like the women who made up the Reproductive Justice Coalition introduced at 
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the start of this chapter, believed that access to safe and legal abortions was a necessary 
part of a broad reproductive justice agenda.62  Asetoyer, with other Native activists, 
pushed mainstream organizations to incorporate the fight against coercive sterilization 
into their reproductive rights platforms, but she remained frustrated by many white 
women’s insistence on a narrow agenda, as well as by Indigenous women’s “lack of 
visibility” in the movement.63  For her part, Cook decided to resign from the board of the 
National Women’s Health Network when she realized that her work with national 
organizations detracted from her work in her own community.64 
 Native women also formed coalitions with women of color engaged in 
comparable political struggles.  Like Native women, black and Latina feminists 
advocated an expansive reproductive justice agenda that privileged the struggle to end 
sterilization abuse and approached economic security and access to health care as critical 
reproductive rights issues.65 In particular, Native women developed relationships with 
Latina activists.  Native publications like Akwesasne Notes emphasized Latina women’s 
similar history of state reproductive violence, and Asetoyer further argued that Chicanas, 
more than other women of color, understood Native issues due in part to a shared sense 
                                                          
62
 Joanne McClosky reports that many Navajo women remained skeptical of abortion or reported that they 
would not choose to have an abortion themselves.  See McClosky, Living Through the Generations.  
Scholars have also reported that Indian women tend to express relatively conservative views on abortion in 
surveys.  See Margot Liberty et al., “Rural and Urban Omaha Indian Fertility,” Human Biology 48, No. 1 
(1976): 59-71; Liberty et al., “Rural and Urban Seminole Indian Fertility,” Human Biology 48, No. 4 
(1976): 741-55.  
63
 Ibid., 39-47. 
 
64
 Cook, Interview by Follett, 67. 
 
65
 See Jennifer Nelson, Women of Color and the Reproductive Rights Movement (New York: New York 
University Press, 2003); and Jael Silliman et al., Undivided Rights: Women of Color Organize for 
Reproductive Justice (Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 2004). 
 
263 
 
of indigeneity.66  But Indigenous women also remained committed to separate 
organizations and projects to address issues and problems they believed to be products of 
Native Americans’ unique history as targets of U.S. settler colonialism.  Many Native 
activists viewed their struggle in defense of their reproductive health and maternal rights 
first and foremost as a project of decolonization. 
 
The Struggle Continues 
 Following the release of the GAO Report in 1976 and sustained scrutiny from 
Native activists and communities, coercive sterilizations drastically decreased in IHS 
hospitals. Also in 1976, Congress passed the Indian Health Care Improvement Act, which 
was designed to give tribes more control over IHS facilities and services, a development 
many communities welcomed.67  But the reproductive violence many Native women 
encountered in the 1970s—as well as the longer history of reproductive violence 
recounted in this study—left painful legacies. 
 Most immediately, victims of coercive sterilization often experienced 
psychological trauma, particularly given the value many Indigenous societies placed on 
women’s social and reproductive labor.  As Pat Bellanger, an Ojibwe activist in 
Minneapolis, explained, “Being sterilized is a really tender and emotional issue.”  In 
fact, Bellanger noted, victims’ reluctance to speak about such a painful event was one 
obstacle she faced in her efforts to discern the scope of the sterilization crisis; it was also 
an obstacle in securing the assistance many victims needed.  Through her work with 
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WARN, Bellanger arranged counseling services for known sterilization victims, many of 
whom were “really ripped apart because they’re no longer women in the way that they 
know.”68  Jane Lawrence notes that sterilized women “had to deal with higher rates of 
marital problems, alcoholism, [and] drug abuse,” as well as feelings of “shame” and 
“guilt.”69  
 Government sterilization policies also affected entire communities, both by 
threatening a tribe’s survival and by compounding a long-standing distrust of government 
services.  Many Native women who had been forcibly sterilized refused to enter IHS 
hospitals for health care, and some women who had not been sterilized avoided 
government hospitals for fear that they, too, would be targeted.70  As Mary Brave Bird 
recalled her childbirth experience in the 1970s,  “I was determined not to go to the 
hospital . . . I wanted no white doctor to touch me.  Always in my mind was how they had 
sterilized my sister and how they had let her baby die.”71  In fact, according to Charon 
Asetoyer, some of the women on her reservation suspected that government agents had 
pushed hospital childbirth in the 1940s and 1950s because “they wanted to sterilize 
them.”72  Native women’s distrust of hospital services fueled the resurgence in 
Indigenous midwifery in the 1970s and 1980s, but it also likely resulted in decreased 
reproductive health services for many women. 
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Furthermore, Jennifer Denetdale has argued that the sterilization abuse in IHS 
hospitals and the pressure IHS staff exerted on so many Navajo and other Native women 
to limit their family size likely influenced Native women’s attitudes toward birth control 
and abortion.73  Some Native women came to view all birth control methods as 
instruments in a genocidal plot against American Indians.74  At the same time, however, 
following the public outcry against sterilization abuse in the 1970s, Native women 
wanting to terminate an unwanted pregnancy encountered increased difficulty in doing 
so.  Two decades later, IHS physicians explained that the controversy surrounding the 
institution’s past reproductive policies resulted in a cautious approach to restrictive 
reproductive procedures.75  A study by the Native American Women’s Health Education 
Research Center in 2002 found that only five percent of surveyed IHS service units 
performed abortions even in the limited circumstances allowed by the Hyde 
Amendment.76 
Finally, although the permanent sterilization of Indigenous women in the form of 
hysterectomies or tubal ligations waned in the 1980s, the government’s effort to control 
Native women’s reproduction continued.  As Andrea Smith has demonstrated, physicians 
promoted “unsafe, long-acting hormonal contraceptives” in IHS hospitals, particularly for 
Native women with disabilities or who were struggling with alcoholism or drug abuse.77  
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For example, IHS physicians regularly used Depo-Provera, a long-acting injectable 
contraceptive, prior to the drug’s FDA approval in 1992.  Norplant, a contraceptive 
implant that prevents pregnancy for up to five years, has also been used in IHS hospitals.  
Native activists argue that both contraceptive methods can be dangerous and are known 
to produce extreme side effects, particularly when they are used, as Asetoyer argues has 
frequently been the case, on women who are “poor candidate[s]” for the drug, due to 
health conditions such as high blood pressure or depression.78  Native women reported 
that, as with permanent sterilizations in the 1970s and earlier, physicians did not follow 
proper protocol for obtaining informed consent for these contraceptive methods.79  
Asetoyer and other Native women argue that long-acting contraceptives like Depo-
Provera and Norplant, when used coercively, should not be seen as birth control but as 
sterilization.80   
American Indian women’s struggle to end coercive sterilization in all forms, as 
well as their struggle for access to reproductive health services and for control over their 
reproductive lives, continues into the twenty-first century.  As I began writing this 
epilogue, female Native activists, including women I have discussed above, were joining 
with non-Native activists at an annual conference on reproductive justice held in Norman, 
Oklahoma.  Native women spoke out against the injustice they continued to face in the 
health care and criminal justice systems, and they celebrated Indigenous perspectives on 
life and the power of life-givers.81  The gravity of challenges Native women face in the 
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twenty-first century does not diminish what Native activists have accomplished in recent 
decades, which in many cases is nothing short of extraordinary.  When Susie Yellowtail 
protested the coercive sterilization of Crow women in the Crow Indian Hospital in the 
1930s, she struggled to be heard by anyone with power.  When Indigenous women, 
including Yellowtail, organized to fight the same practice decades later, they, along with 
Native men, forged a movement that built on domestic protests in the 1960s and 1970s 
and global anti-colonial struggles.  As Native women respond to new and old challenges 
in the twenty-first century, they draw on kin, community, and pan-Indian networks, and 
their activism spans from local to national to international. 
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